Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|
03THEHAGUE3043 | 2003-12-11 05:15:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy The Hague |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 003043 |
1. (SBU) Summary: Trial Chamber III of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) heard from three key witnesses in November offering unique perspectives on the role Milosevic played. During the week of November 10, historian Robert Donia resumed his testimony concerning the policies of Bosnian Serb leaders and their relationships with external actors, including Milosevic, other Belgrade leadership, JNA, paramilitaries, international negotiators and international figures. The week of November 17, Borisav Jovic, former Yugoslav President who described himself as Milosevic's one-time closest political ally, depicted Milosevic as an autocrat with "absolute authority." At the same time, Milosevic effectively elicited on cross-examination Jovic's dismissal of the notion that Milosevic was pursuing a plan for a greater Serbia. In late November, ICTY indictee Miroslav Deronjic, who has pled guilty to persecution, testified through a lengthy written statement. His oral testimony focused on events leading up to the Serb offensive in Srebrenica. Deronjic characterized the massacres of Srebrenica as the "logical finale" of the spiraling sequence of events. Milosevic's cross-examination attempted to highlight contradictions in the witness's statement utilizing confidential documents dealing with Bosnian Serb secret military orders and Karadzic,s daily calendar. End summary. -------------------------- Robert Donia's Testimony -------------------------- 2. (SBU) On November 11, the trial chamber heard from Robert Donia. Donia previously appeared before the trial chamber on September 12, where he provided a report that dealt with the policies of the Bosnian Serb leadership and the relationships they had with external actors. The report analyzed the transcripts of 35-40 sessions of the Assembly sessions of the Republika Srpska to glean evidence of the policies of the Bosnian Serb leadership. Milosevic resumed his cross-examination by attempting to discredit the report as biased against the "Serb side" and misleading. Milosevic tried, from various angles, to show that the excerpts and quotes that Donia used were taken out of context to bias the report. However, Donia deflected the Accused,s criticisms by explaining the context of the quotes to the chambers in a way that only strengthened his original contention. 3. (SBU) Milosevic attempted to characterize the origin of the conflict as rooted in armed secession, and he asked Donia, as an historian, if he agreed. Donia rejected this proposition and offered his view that "this conflict was caused by a determination on the part of (Milosevic) and others in the Belgrade leadership to prevent (a) peaceful secession." Milosevic responded, as he as done previously, that the war was imposed upon Serbia by the premature recognition of individual parts of Yugoslavia. Donia again rejected this view and said that the principal cause of the conflict was the determination of Milosevic and others in the Belgrade leadership to "instigate uprisings" amongst the Serbs in Croation and Bosnia-Herzogovina against the peaceful process. 4. (SBU) Milosevic addressed a particular reference to Karadzic speaking in the Assembly of Republika Srpska where he acknowledged that if Bosnian Serbs entered Srebrenica in 1993 that there would have been "blood to the knees" given the history of ethnic conflict in the area. Milosevic attempted to parlay this expression of awareness into evidence that the leadership of the Republika Srpska (RS) would attempt to avoid such an explosive situation. However, Donia responded that the primary concern that Karadzic was expressing was the potential impact on the Bosnian Serb "state" rather than the loss of Muslim life. He also noted that the situation was very different in 1995, since the principle threat to RS was military rather than lack of diplomatic recognition. Therefore, he rejected Milosevic,s contention that the leaders of the Republika Srpska were as concerned in 1995 about entering Srebrenica as they were in 1993. Donia said that the context had changed, so the parallel could not be drawn. 5. (SBU) Milosevic raised issue with Donia,s use of "Greater Serbia" in his report. Milosevic noted that "not a single representative of the Government of Republika Srpska ever used the term 'Great Serbia.'" Donia responded that while "Velinka Srbija" does not appear in the citation, the "sense of that terminology" indicates that a "Greater Serbia" was an objective of the leadership of the RS and that use of the term was suitable. -------------------------- Borisav Jovic's Testimony -------------------------- 6. (SBU) On November 20, the trial chamber heard from Borisav Jovic, the Serbian member of Yugoslavia's collective presidency in 1989 and 1990 and later president of the Serbian Socialist Party. Jovic described himself as one of Milosevic's closest political associates, but he described Milosevic as a autocrat with "absolute authority." He claimed that Milosevic had him replaced in a "non-democratic manner" like many others. However, during the cross-examination, Jovic helped Milosevic paint a picture of the Serb leadership trying to keep Yugoslavia together and protect the Serbs from a multitude of forces including armed succession by Croatia, an over-zealous Germany forcing the European Community into recognizing the republics, and a United States bent on fighting Communism even if it meant tearing apart a country. 7. (SBU) Jovic submitted his evidence-in-chief as a written statement, which included large chunks of his diary that chronicles, among other things, Milosevic's manipulation of the political system for his own gain. Jovic testified that Milosevic had "absolute authority" and no one would disagree with him publicly. He said that he had a rare relationship with Milosevic, one in which he could privately disagree with Milosevic. However, Jovic noted that Milosevic usually put in place people he could "trust to accept the decisions he had made." When pressed on this issue during Milosevic,s cross-examination, Jovic replied that these were his personal conclusions as he expressed them in his book and are ones he stands by today. Milosevic asked Jovic, "But did I not respect other,s opinions?" Jovic replied, "Yes, as long as they did not clash with your own." Jovic explained that at first things were different, but later prestige and confidence in his own ability changed Milosevic. He further observed that through this transformation political bodies were marginalized as they automatically adopted Milosevic's policies. In short, he concluded, Milosevic's word was decisive, both necessary and sufficient. 8. (SBU) Jovic testified to Milosevic's willingness and ability to manipulate the media to his own ends. He also explained the cult of personality that was formed around Milosevic. When Jovic protested the practice of the public of carrying around photographs of socialist leaders, Milosevic agreed and put an end to it with the exception of his own photo. Milosevic responded to Jovic's accusations with a series of questions. Milosevic asked whether any papers or radio stations were censored or prohibited, whether there were local private television stations, and whether there were any political prisoners? To each of these questions, Jovic answered no. However, Jovic commented that Milosevic had complete control over the State run papers, radios and television stations. Moreover, Jovic identified the State-run national television station as the single most influential medium. 9. (C) Milosevic employed his usual tactic with potentially helpful witnesses whereby he cultivates their support during the early part of his examination by holding back issues of disagreement until the end. As such, Milosevic began his cross-examination with his favorite coined phrase: "Greater Serbia." He asked Jovic whether this "Greater Serbia" was a fabrication and whether they ever had this on their mind. Jovic responded that they never thought about a "Greater Serbia." He noted that historians are looking into the origin of this concept, but that it did not concern their discussion. Instead, he explained that they had 3 principles: preserve Yugoslavia, provide self-determination through referenda, and ensure equality for Serbs everywhere. Milosevic chimed in, "Serbian people should be equal no matter, nothing more, nothing less." 10. (SBU) Milosevic then turned to the source of the conflict. He characterized the source of the conflict as an internal affair of Croatia that turned into a violent act of secession leading to the oppression of Serb rights. Jovic said that no one cared about the secession of Slovenia, since it had a single ethnic identity, and agreed with Milosevic that the violent succession of Croatia was the origin of the conflict. Moreover, they both attributed blame to Germany for forcing the hand of other European states to approve the early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Milosevic quoted Jovic's diary as claiming that the United States wanted to destroy communism, even at the expense of breaking up Yugoslavia. Jovic responded that it was clear that the United States wanted to topple Communism in Eastern Europe and was prepared to take Yugoslavia apart to introduce multi-party elections in the individual republics. 11. (SBU) Jovic also provided useful testimony for the Accused concerning his control over the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). Milosevic asked whether he could give commands to the JNA. Jovic responded that only members of the Presidency could make binding decisions, thus the JNA could not receive orders from Milosevic under the Constitution. However, Jovic left the door open by adding that whether the JNA followed suggestions made by others was certainly something that the generals could be asked. Milosevic then asked whether in 1991 the JNA was still the Army of Yugoslavia and not a Serbian Army. Jovic concurred that the JNA was not a Serbian Army and noted that the Chief of Staff was Bosnian, the General Staff was Croatian and the entire army was ethnically mixed. Later, Jovic reiterated that Milosevic could not give orders to the JNA. -------------------------- Miroslav Deronjic's Testimony -------------------------- 12. (SBU) On November 26, the prosecution called Miroslav Deronjic, who had already pleaded guilty before the ICTY for ordering the ethnic cleansing of a Muslim village, Glogova. Deronjic testified to the involvement of the JNA, paramilitary groups and the Red Beret commandos in military operations around Glogova. Milosevic accused the witness of lying to the court as part of his plea agreement with the Prosecution. The witness rejected this proposition. Deronjic also provided a lasting impression as he described a domino effect of conflict and ethnic tensions of which "Srebrenica was the logical finale." 13. (SBU) Deronjic described how Serbian paramilitary groups including Arkan's men and Seselj's men would arrive into an area and escalate the ethnic tensions with violent conflicts and looting, which brought on panic and fear. He described their efforts as part of a secret plan that not everyone in the SDS new about. He also testified to the presence of the JNA. He said the JNA took part in the offensives in some areas. Deronjic also said that the Red Berets commandos were present. Milosevic, as president of Serbia, would have had control over this group through his interior ministry. Deronjic also accused Milosevic of sending volunteer forces from Serbia to help cleanse Muslims from villages in the area. 14. (SBU) Milosevic charged Deronjic with agreeing to provide false testimony as part of a plea agreement with the Prosecution. Deronjic replied that he had not provided false testimony and had expressed his desire to appear as a witness for the prosecution before he ever made a plea agreement. He said that he was not testifying because of the plea agreement, but that it was his "absolute wish to testify before this court." 15. (C) Milosevic referred to two separate documents while trying to refute the specifics of Deronjic's testimony. Deronjic claimed that he became away of potential military preparations concerning Srebrenica and became concerned that local Serb forces would incur major losses if not supported by more professional soldiers. Deronjic claimed that he traveled to Pale to talk with Karadzic about these preparations. Milosevic attempted to discredit the witness by referring to a secret military order issued out of Pale, which Milosevic claims Deronjic would have seen. Also, Milosevic provided the court with a copy of Karadzic's calendar for the day in question taken from the diary of his secretary. While his efforts to discredit the witness were SIPDIS not all that effective, it is noteworthy that Milosevic continues to have access to such documents. 16. (SBU) In his testimony, Deronjic described how already existing ethnic tensions were deliberately aggravated by the arrival of Serbian paramilitary and volunteer units. He described a domino effect where tensions, conflict and violence lead to an atmosphere of fear and panic. He said that the massacre in "Srebrenica was the logical finale." 17. (C) Comment: November was an important month for Milosevic and the prosecution, with each side making gains through key testimony. With the most dedicated focus yet on the crimes which occurred in Bosnia, the month opened with the "big picture" testimony of Lord David Owen, continued with a host of insiders and "crime-base" witnesses, and concluded with one of the Bosnian Serb officers on the ground during the Srebrenica massacres of July 1995. Some of the witnesses, including Owen and Jovic, gave some credence to Milosevic's argument that he did not control the actions of Bosnian Serb political and military leaders. Others, such as Deronjic and Donia, saw things differently, with Milosevic clearly at the center of the war in Bosnia, if not an actual perpetrator of each crime a clear inspiration of them. In sum, neither side made the trial chamber's job any easier. End comment. SOBEL |