CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) - WRAP-UP FOR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 THE HAGUE 003038

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR CHUPA
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) - WRAP-UP FOR
THE 35TH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

REF: A. A) STATE 328754

B. B) STATE 335665 (NOTAL)

This is CWC-135-03.

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) Having resolved most critical policy issues at the
October Conference of the States Parties, the 35th Executive
Council managed only to remove a bit of the administrative
underbrush. Russian hostage-taking of the U.S. plans
regarding the Aberdeen destruction facility continued,
although a larger discussion of the issue of end point of
destruction was initiated within the Western Group and more
widely among States Parties. Russia continued to be
uncooperative regarding its combined plans and notifications
of changes at former CW production facilities. While India
blocked agreement on a document addressing "captive use,"
there was greater attention to the entire range of industry
issues, which will likely continue in 2004. Finally, there
was extensive and heated discussion on the pending
introduction of results based budgeting, indicating that the
Technical Secretariat will need to undertake a major
educational effort next year to pave the way for the
introduction of RBB. End Summary.

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AGENDA ITEM THREE: STATEMENT BY THE DG
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2. (U) The Director-General's statement focused on the
accomplishments of 2003 and significant decisions taken this
year. The statement (faxed to AC-CB) touched on the Review
Conference, the tenure decision, chemical weapons
destruction, national implementation, universality, and the
financial health of the OPCW (e.g., 2004 program and budget,
stabilization fund, results based budgeting). The DG also
announced that Alexander Khodakov (former Russian Ambassador
to the Netherlands) would be the new Director of Special
Projects and that the Mexican Ambassador (Santiago Onate
Laborde) will be the Legal Advisor.

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AGENDA ITEM FOUR - GENERAL DEBATE
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3. (U) General debate opened with Ambassador Javits'
delivery of the U.S. statement. Japan, the UK, Russia and
China followed, citing as key accomplishments of 2003 the
success of the Review Conference, the decision on limiting
staff tenure, agreement on a budget allowing expansion of key
program activities, and completion of action plans on
Universality and National Implementation. Japan and Russia
also pointed to the agreements on demilitarization deadline
extensions among the year's top accomplishments. Most
statements pointed to the implementation of the action plans
and introduction of results based budgeting (RBB) as leading
challenges for 2004.


4. (U) India, Iran, and South Africa's national statements
highlighted serious reservations about introducing RBB.
While insisting that it did not object to RBB per se, India
said prior CSP endorsement of RBB was a statutory
requirement, and called on the TS to prepare a draft decision
to that effect. South Africa echoed those points and said it
remained to be seen whether RBB was policy-neutral as claimed
by the TS and its consultant. Iran said it supported RBB in
principle but that its introduction required a positive
decision by policy-making organs. These NAM statements
foreshadowed extended debate on RBB under the Financial
Issues agenda item. India also trumpeted its
ahead-of-schedule CW destruction program, and received
congratulations from the Council Chairman and many other
delegations.


5. (U) China announced that the 2 July 2003 legislative
council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR)
had passed CWC implementing legislation, the legislation was
published on 11 July 2003, and the SAR will designate the
data of Hong Kong's EIF shortly. China announced that its
National Authority will submit Hong Kong's declaration to the
OPCW.

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AGENDA ITEM FIVE: DETAILED PLANS
FOR DESTRUCTION OF CW
--------------


6. (U) Aberdeen: Once again the Russian Federation blocked
the U.S. document due to our declaration of the commercial
facility as part of the Aberdeen CWDF. In making its
argument, the Russian delegation confused the issue by
arguing that the commercial facility does not meet the
Verification Annex, part IV(A),section C, paragraph 13,
requirement that CW only be destroyed at "specifically
designated and appropriately designed and equipped
facilities," and therefore cannot be declared as part of a
CWDF. While this reference is clearly specious, it had its
intended effect. Moreover, the Russian delegation asserted
that there were numerous "technical questions" remaining with
regard to Aberdeen, which Russia proposed to discuss further
with the U.S. in bilateral consultations.


7. (U) Russia did not acknowledge or respond to the U.S.
proposal to insert language stating that approval of the U.S.
plans do not set a precedent. Ambassador Javits rebutted the
RF position from the floor of the Council. At delegation's
request, the Technical Secretariat delivered a brief,
non-polemical statement about destruction and verification at
the Aberdeen CWDF. On hearing of the U.S. request, the
Russian delegation insisted the TS do likewise for Gorniy.
The TS statement was positive but so technical as to do
little to clarify that end point of destruction was not an
open question at Aberdeen. That the "end products" were CO2
and waste-water was stated, but lost in a jumble of technical
references. Consequently, and when combined with Russia's
assertions that it still has unanswered questions, some
delegations remain under the mistaken impression that there
are still "technical" questions related to Aberdeen.


8. (U) Del began the process of educating WEOG and others
about the importance of this issue and Russia's political
linkage of Aberdeen to the end-point of destruction question,
particularly Russia's interest in "getting credit" for
destruction of its nerve agent after stage one of the
process. Del believes that the education process must
continue and, critically, must emphasize that while end point
of destruction is an outstanding issue for the Council to
address, it is not an issue at Aberdeen, except to the extent
Russia has created this linkage. Russia's "technical
questions" to the U.S. about whether hydrolysate is still
considered CW, the transportation implications if it is
considered CW, why we need or want to destroy hydrolysate at
a CWDF if it is not CW, etc., etc., are merely outgrowths of
the same "problem": our declaration of the commercial site as
part of the CWDF. At the end of the session, the Russian
delegation presented the U.S. del with a draft, amended set
of Aberdeen documents in which the only apparent change is to
remove the declaration of the commercial facility as part of
the CWDF.


9. (SBU) Therefore, the primary effort the Del intends to
make with other delegations in the coming weeks is to clarify
the confusion Russia has created, by emphasizing that there
are not multiple, technical questions or issues before them
with regard to Aberdeen, as Russia suggests. Rather, there
is but a single, simple question before them: does the U.S.,
or indeed any possessor state, have the right to declare a
commercial facility to be part of a CWDF? 156 States Parties
appear to believe the answer is "yes," while only one asserts
the answer is "no". Del believes it would be ill-advised to
engage in a point-by-point debate with Russia over its
"technical questions" or to re-enter bilateral consultations,
which would serve only to create the illusion that there is
something "technical" left to talk about. Russia's position
and its motives are crystal clear at this stage, and our
efforts ought to focus on letting everyone know what they are.


10. (U) Belgium, France, Germany, UK and Canada all made
statements of general support for the U.S. position and cited
the need for the Council to take on the issue of end point of
destruction. However, only Canada and UK specifically called
for approval of the Aberdeen documents. While attempting to
support us, Germany unhelpfully suggested linking end point
of destruction with the Aberdeen documents during informal
consultations, which it proposed to engage in during the
upcoming intersessional period. As noted above, Del worked
to de-link the issues of the Aberdeen documents and the end
point issue, but as evidenced by Germany's attempt at
"helping" us, the issue remains nebulous for even the
comparatively well informed. While no decision was taken,
there is a notion in the minds of some Council members that
informal consultations on end point of destruction will
likely be required, and sooner would be better than later.
WEOG members did not object to a proposal by the coordinator
(Ruth Flint, Switzerland) that the end point issue be
discussed on a regular basis in WEOG.

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AGENDA ITEM SIX: COMBINED PLANS FOR
DESTRUCTION OR CONVERSION
--------------


11. (U) The Executive Council deferred until the next EC
session the Russian combined plans for the destruction or
conversion and verification of CWPFs (production of a VX-type
substance and filling into munitions),EC-32/DG.8 dated 19
February 2003 and the draft decision approving this plan
(EC-32/DEC/CRP.8, dated 11 March 2003). U.S. CW experts yet
again met with a Russian expert to reemphasize that the
proposed changes are mainly to make this plan consistent with
other Russian CWPF combined plans for conversion such as the
aminomercaptan and chloroether. No progress could be made,
as Russia did not come prepared with the relevant experts to
discuss and resolve this issue.


12. (SBU) The U.S. combined plan for destruction and
verification of the QL production and fill facility at Pine
Bluff, (EC-35/DG.3, dated 14 October 2003),and the draft
decision approving this plan (EC-35/DEC/CRP.2, dated 14
October 2003) were deferred until the next EC session. Per
guidance, Del stated during destruction informals and on the
floor of the Council that because of the rapid pace of
destruction of the PB QL production facility, this session
would probably be the last opportunity for the Council to
take meaningful action on the document. Nonetheless, China
stated that its experts had not yet reviewed it. Informally,
Chinese delegate Kang lamented the glacial pace of the
bureaucrats in Beijing and indicated that he had no reason to
believe there were any problems with the verification plan.

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AGENDA ITEM SEVEN: NOTIFICATIONS OF
CHANGES AT FORMER CHEMICAL WEAPONS
PRODUCTION FACILITIES
--------------


13. (U) The EC deferred the DF facility Volgograd,
Notification of Changes to Chemical Process Equipment
(EC-34/DG.1 dated 4 June 2003) and the facility for filing of
non-chemical parts of chemical munitions, Volgograd,
EC-34/DG.3, dated 10 June 2003) until the next session. The
U.S. was again unable to join consensus to these notification
changes until the TS prepared and circulated to the EC the
combined plans for conversion and verification as is required
in accordance with Part V, paragraphs 79-80 of the
Verification Annex. During bilateral consultations with
Russian CW experts, the U.S. again expressed it concerns
about the delay in the submission to the EC of the respective
combined plans for conversion and verification for these two
facilities.


14. (U) The EC noted the notification of changes at the
former aminomercaptan production facility at Novecheboksarsk
(EC-35/DG.5, dated 5 November 2003). The U.S. joined
consensus on this agenda item but provided to Russian experts
two clarification questions related to equipment, which they
agreed to take back to capital.


15. (U) Russia provided a brief update on the status of
conversion activities still in progress at its former CWPFs.
In its update, Russia stated that 15 of 16 CWPFs have been
converted and the only remaining effort is at the VX facility
at Novocheboksarsk that is estimated to be completed in 2007.
However, the TS has issued only 6 certifications of
completion. During bilateral consultations, U.S. experts
inquired about the status of conversion activities of four
CWPFs at Volgograd that are of concern to the U.S. Russian
expert Leonoid Liangastov, informed us that the destruction
of a bunker at the preparations for filling of non-chemical
parts facility has been delayed due to lack of funding. He
stated that all conversion activities has been completed at
the sarin, soman and sarin/soman filling facilities. U.S.
experts also reminded Russia that revised schedules of
incomplete conversion activities are to be provided to the TS
and the EC on its CWPFs.

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AGENDA ITEM EIGHT: FACILITY AGREEMENTS
--------------


16. (U) The EC deferred the draft decisions on the U.S.
facility agreement for the Aderdeen Chemical Agent Disposal
Facility at Aberdeen Proving Ground (EC-332/DEC/CRP.6, dated
10 March 2003). See paras 6-10 above.


17. (U) The EC deferred the Russian Federation facility
agreement for the Gorniy chemical weapons destruction
facility (EC-33/DEC/CRP.1, dated 23 September 2003). The
U.S. informed Russia and the Council that answers to
questions provided by Russia were still under review in
Washington. China indicated that the appropriate officials
in Beijing had not had an opportunity to adequately review
the document.


18. (SBU) The EC adopted the Republic of Korea's facility
agreement for a schedule 1 facility for protective purposes
(EC-33/DEC/CRP.1, dated 14 May 2003) after the TS issued a
corrigendum (EC-33/HP/DEC/CRP.1/Corr.1). After this item was
adopted, the U.S. made a statement from the floor, per Ref A
instructions, that this agreement does not, in the view of
the U.S., constitute a binding precedent for future
agreements.


19. (U) The Council noted the agreed modifications and
updates to 11 chemical weapons storage facility agreements
between the OPCW and the U.S. (EC-32/S/1, dated 24 November
2003).

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AGENDA ITEM NINE: INDUSTRY ISSUES
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-------------- Clarification of Declarations --------------


20. (U) The Council deferred consideration of the
Clarification of Declarations (EC-34/DEC/CRP.8, dated 24 Sep
03) until its next session, since proposed text on this issue
has not yet reached consensus.

-- Discrepancies in Scheduled Chemical Imports and Exports --


21. (U) The Council decided to continue work on this issue
during the intersessional period. Regarding the
discrepancies identified in the paper on imports and exports
of scheduled chemicals (EC-34/S/1, dated 3 Sep 03 and Corr.1,
dated 12 Sep 03),the Technical Secretariat issued an
addendum (Add.1, dated 3 Dec 03) indicating that
discrepancies resulted from administrative errors on behalf
of both the Technical Secretariat and States Parties, which
have all been clarified. To facilitate the efficient and
effective conduct of clarification requests regarding imports
and exports in the future, the U.S. circulated proposed
report language to establish a facilitation to discuss
process improvements. Although States Parties did not
support specific establishment of a facilitation in EC report
language, States Parties committed to continue work on this
issue. Specifically, Japan, Canada, Italy, Iran, ROK, and
India all indicated they would support discussions to improve
the process.

-------------- Captive Use --------------

22. (U) The Council deferred decision on "Captive Use"
(EC-34/DEC/CRP.5/Rev.1, dated 22 Oct 03) due to a refusal to
join consensus by the Indian Delegation. The position of the
U.S. and other Council members is that all production of
monitored chemicals must be declared if applicable
concentration and quantity thresholds are exceeded, whether
the chemical is isolated or not. The Indian position is that
if a chemical is produced, above relevant thresholds, but can
only be isolated if "significant modifications" were made to
the plant (e.g., the addition of costly or complex equipment
or extraction units),then chemical production should not be
declared. The Indian position is inconsistent with the
requirements of the Convention and poses a serious
verification and chemical weapons proliferation loophole in
which production above applicable thresholds could be carried
out without a declaration requirement. Del requested U.S.
demarche New Dehli on the issue, which was issued on 7 Dec 03
(Ref B).

-------------- Article VI Project to Assist State Parties in
Identifying New Declarable Facilities --------------


23. (U) The Council noted the update on the project to
assist States Parties in identifying new declarable
facilities under Article VI of the Convention (EC-35/S/3,
dated 26 Nov 03). Brazil made a protracted statement
regarding the use of open-source information and questioned
the responsibility of the TS in this area, but received no
support from other Council members.

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AGENDA ITEM TEN: CHANGES TO THE LIST
OF APPROVED EQUIPMENT AND TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATIONS FOR APPROVED EQUIPMENT
--------------


24. (U) The Council decided to return to the issue of the
Director-General's note on the item recommended for inclusion
on the list of approved inspection equipment (EC-35/DG.1,
dated 10 Oct 03). The Council also considered the revisions
for the two items of approved inspection equipment
(EC-35/DG.2, dated 10 Oct 03.). However, Germany and India
noted concerns that the Technical Secretariat did not meet
the approved procedures and timeline for State Party
consideration of such proposals. Therefore, the TS left open
the time period for State Party comments until 14 Dec 03, and
left the agenda item open for consideration at the next
Council session.

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AGENDA ITEM ELEVEN: LIST OF NEW
VALIDATED DATA FOR INCLUSION IN
THE OPCW CENTRAL ANALYTICAL DATABASE
--------------


25. (U) The Council adopted the list of new validated data
for inclusion in the OPCW Central Analytical Database
(EC-35/DG.4, dated 31 Oct 03) without debate. The Council
also deferred consideration of the Chemical Abstracts Service
registry numbers report (EC-35/DG.8, dated 25 Nov 03) due to
the late submission of the report for consideration during
this Council Session.

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AGENDA ITEM TWELVE: AGREEMENTS ON
THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE OPCW
--------------


26. (U) All four agreements before the Council were approved
(Burundi, Cyprus, Bosnia, Slovakia).

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AGENDA ITEM THIRTEEN: FINANCIAL ISSUES
--------------

27. (U) The Council "received with appreciation" the
Director-General's Note on Results Based Budgeting
(EC-35/DG.9),but deferred consideration of a TS paper on
non-service incurred death and disability insurance
(EC-35/S/4). DG Pfirter introduced RBB by stating that it
was being presented to States Parties early, before the
beginning of 2004, for use in preparing the 2005 budget.
This would allow the States Parties ample time to familiarize
themselves with the new tool, which for the first year would
be used in parallel with the traditional budget process. He
stressed that RBB was policy-neutral and would not affect
budget allocations for 2005, which would be subject to the
usual intercessional consultations and final approval by the
Conference of States Parties. The States Parties would
decide at CSP-9 whether to adopt the RBB-format or
traditional format for the 2005 budget. NAM delegations led
by India, South Africa, and Iran took issue with the
contention that they were being consulted "early" about RBB
or that it was policy-neutral. They subjected the
Secretariat and RBB consultant Robert Smith to lengthy

SIPDIS
questioning about the concept and the implementation of RBB.
By contrast, Western delegations and the TS strongly endorsed
RBB. Many stated that they anticipated consultations on RBB
in tandem with the 2004 budget consultations.


28. (U) The TS report on options for non-service incurred
death and disability insurance (EC-35/S/4) was widely praised
for allowing for a 12% reduction in premium payments, but it
was also criticized by a number of Western delegations.
Italy complained that it did not respond to the specific
tasking of EC-34 to "include options for a legally sound,
phased transition to a new system of insurance coverage."
Canada, citing PrepCom negotiation of staff regulations,
argued that they were never intended to harmonize with the UN
system. Still, there was widespread agreement that OPCW
staff had acquired rights to coverage for non-service
incurred damages. Several delegates also argued that staff
morale should be considered, particularly in light of the
impact of the implementation of the tenure decision. The UK
alone unequivocally defended the report. In deferring the
issue to EC-36, the Council repeated its call for the TS to
provide more options regarding insurance.


29. (U) The Council also noted three reports on income and
expenditure by the Director-General (EC-35/DG.6, 7, 11) and a
status report on the SmartStream Project (EC-35/S/2). The EC
also considered the DG's Note on using the Working Capital
Fund as a budget stabilization mechanism (EC-35/DG.12),with
U.S. Del making clear that the proposal was under active
review but had not been approved by the USG.

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AGENDA ITEM FOURTEEN: IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT
--------------


30. (U) The Council noted the DG's note. India took
exception to the statement in the note that there are no
problems with the Host Country, but did not elaborate.

--------------
AGENDA ITEM 15: ANY OTHER BUSINESS
--------------


31. (U) Date for EC-37: The Council agreed that EC-37 will
be held from June 29 - July 2, 2004 and that intersessional
consultations will continue throughout July 2004.


32. (U) The request to reclassify two posts was referred to
ABAF.


33. (U) Ambassador provided a letter to the
Director-General expressing concern over late documents as
noted in Ref A instructions. The DG provided a response
which was faxed to AC/CB. Del will continue to press the TS
on the issue of timely documents as part of the discussion on
improving the efficiency of Executive Council sessions.

--------------
Destruction Informals
--------------


34. (U) Albania made its initial presentation on the status
of its CW demilitarization program during the informal
session on CW destruction. The presence of senior MOD
officials from Tirana was appreciated by the TS and member
states alike and the presentation was well received. GOA
officials held bilateral consultations with the U.S.
delegation, Switzerland, Holland, and senior TS officials.

--------------
DISCUSSIONS ON THE MARGINS
--------------


35. (SBU) Albania: U.S. Del met on the margins of the EC
with Switzerland, Canada, UK, and Italy. (Note: We had heard
that their governments may be interested in making financial
contributions in the effort to destroy the GOA stocks. End
Note.) While no pledges were made, the Spiez laboratory in
Switzerland and Italy are clearly interested in providing
assistance. The UK and Canada stated that the issue would be
referred to capitals. U.S. deloff Weekman provided a general
overview of U.S. efforts to date to secure the stockpile and
conduct a technology assessment in anticipation of
accelerating preparation work in 2004 and completing the
destruction in 2005. Deloff left open the possibility of a
foreign firm taking the lead on the actual destruction
project but, in any event, stated that the U.S. would seek
approval for funding to assist in the destruction effort as
soon as we have a better understanding of the projects total
cost. Deloff also reinforced our desire to keep detailed
consultations on Albania restricted to only a small number of
countries that are seriously interested in making a financial
contribution. (Note: Switzerland and Italy remain irritated
that Albania has not responded to their respective offers of
assistance and continue to read this as a sign of
non-interest -- i.e., an American project. Deloff explained
that GOA is likely not responding because Tirana does not yet
have a firm understanding of the total project cost and
likely do not know what is required at this point. Italian
and Swiss reps both stated that an interim reply of some kind
would be helpful. Washington should consider asking GOA to
provide an interim reply. End note.)


36. (U) Ito sends.
SOBEL