CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): REQUEST FOR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 003010

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR AC/CB, NP, CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S, SA/INS
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR CHUPA
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL IN CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): REQUEST FOR
DEMARCHE IN NEW DELHI ON "CAPTIVE USE"


(U) This is CWC-132-03.

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Summary and Action Request
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1. (U) India is blocking agreement on a document supported
by the U.S. and all other delegations to the OPCW concerning
the technical issue of "captive use." Failure to reach
consensus on this important document before the end of the
current Executive Council session on Friday, December 5 will
effectively kill the current proposal and the years of work
that have been devoted to finding consensus on a document.
U.S. Delegation recommends that Washington consider a
demarche in New Delhi at the senior political level to
convince the Indians to join consensus. End Summary and
Action Request.

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Background
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2. (U) At the current Executive Council meeting (December
2-5) of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW),the Indian delegation is completely isolated
on the technical issue of "captive use." Captive use
addresses a situation where a monitored chemical is produced
(i.e., formed through chemical reaction) above applicable
quantity and concentration thresholds and subsequently
consumed (i.e., converted into another chemical via a
chemical reaction) or processed (i.e., physically blended,
extracted or mixed to form another chemical but where no
reaction takes place) below applicable quantity and
concentration thresholds during subsequent, or "downstream"
manufacturing steps. Since declarations for activities under
the Convention are based on chemistry and not chemical
engineering, captive use merely clarifies that a State Party
must declare all production of monitored chemicals, whether
they are isolated from the process stream or not.


3. (U) The position of the U.S. and all other attending
Council members (minus India) is, clearly, that all
production of monitored chemicals must be declared if
applicable concentration and quantity thresholds are
exceeded, whether the chemical is isolated or not. The
Indian position is that if a chemical is produced, above
relevant thresholds, but could only be isolated from the
manufacturing stream if "significant modifications" were made
to the plant (e.g., the addition of costly or complex
equipment or extraction processes),then chemical production
should not be declared.


4. (U) Numerous informal consultations and bilateral
consultations with GOI representatives (including Ambassador
Cowsik and the Head of the Indian National Authority) have
been unable to resolve the issue. U.S. del understands that
Canada and the UK are preparing to demarche New Delhi as
well. The period for technical discussions and proposals for
"adjusting the text" is over. U.S. del believes that
continued consultations or proposals for modifying the text
(even from Western nations) is counter-productive in that it
could lead to:

-- text that is acceptable to others but not the U.S., which
could lead to the U.S. becoming isolated at the end of the
week; and
-- alleviating the pressure on the GOI because the Indian
"problem" essentially becomes a multilateral problem for all
others to resolve.


5. (U) In addition, this would entail an effective end to
negotiations, as delegations have instructions to accept the
current version of the text. Any alterations would likely
require review in capitals that would make a consensus based
decision this week virtually impossible, which would open the
possibility for re-opening of the entire text during
subsequent consultations.
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CWC Delegation Recommendation
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6. (U) It is important for the U.S. that the "captive use"
proposal as it now stands is adopted in this Executive
Council session. The document as it now stands would be a
valuable tool in our effort to control production of
monitored chemicals. It would close a serious verification
and chemical weapons proliferation loophole in which
production above applicable thresholds could be carried out
without a declaration requirement. For that reason, the U.S.
delegation strongly recommends that Washington consider a
demarche at the senior political level in New Delhi on this
issue.


7. (SBU) GOI CWC National Authority reps are currently in
The Hague and, according to the Indian Ambassador, are
subject to influence from the chemical industry producers.
Therefore, for this demarche to have a chance of changing the
instructions of the Indian delegation, U.S. del strongly
recommends that this demarche will need to be made at a
senior political level (i.e., above the CWC National
Authority level).


8. (U) Suggested points for the demarche

--The Captive Use decision creates no new obligations. It
only clarifies those already established by the Convention in
Article II, paragraph 12(a).
-- The U.S. believes that it is important to reach consensus
on the document regarding "captive use" currently under
consideration at the Executive Council of the OPCW.
-- All other OPCW delegations are in agreement on the
document as it now stands.
--Declarations are based on activities conducted.
-- The focus of Indian objections appear related to
theoretical capability to production or technical capability
to isolate chemicals, once produced, and are irrelevant for
declaration purposes.
--There are no chemical engineering or "downstream" process
activities (e.g., storage, in-line destruction, drumming)
which negate or mitigate a State Party's obligation to
declare production if relevant concentration and quantity
thresholds are exceeded.
--Past and current Indian proposals have found no support
among delegations. This is due to the fact that in each
instance, proposed text has created a loophole by which a
chemical, which is stable and capable of isolation, would not
be declared simply because the capability to isolate is not
currently integrated into the plant. Because such a
integration may be possible, this creates a verification
loophole.


9. (U) Javits sends.
SOBEL