Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03THEHAGUE2581
2003-10-08 13:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): SCENESETTER FOR

Tags:  PARM PREL CWC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 002581 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR CHUPA
WINPAC FOR FOLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2013
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): SCENESETTER FOR
THE EIGHTH CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES

REF: THE HAGUE 2453

Classified By: Ambassador to the OPCW Eric M. Javits for Reasons 1.5 (B
, D)

This is CWC-104-03.

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 002581

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR CHUPA
WINPAC FOR FOLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2013
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): SCENESETTER FOR
THE EIGHTH CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES

REF: THE HAGUE 2453

Classified By: Ambassador to the OPCW Eric M. Javits for Reasons 1.5 (B
, D)

This is CWC-104-03.

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The Oct. 20-24 Conference of States Parties will be
dominated by discussion of the budget and other financial
issues. We have supported the Director-General's request for
a 7.36% increase, and share the DG's view that an increase of
this magnitude is needed to ensure core functions are
adequately financed. However most delegations are not
convinced, and as a result, the final budget number will, in
all likelihood, be decided at the eleventh hour of the CSP.
With regard to the U.S. request for an extension of our 45%
destruction deadline, whether the issue takes center stage
will depend on what we have convinced the Russians to accept
in the run-up to the CSP. While there is still skepticism
among many delegations about the U.S. position regarding our
100% destruction deadline, we suspect most delegations will
not be more vocal than the Russians. On other action items,
there is a reasonable chance that an Article VII action plan
for national implementation will be ready for adoption by the
Conference, and an outside chance that that may also be the
case regarding an action plan on universality. Under
industry issues, a decision on Captive Use might also be
ready for consideration. Finally, the ILO decision regarding
former Director-General Bustani is not on the formal agenda,
and there is no indication yet that it will be specifically
added. While it could come up as part of "any other
business," there is no clear consensus at this point on what
action (pay/not pay; appeal/not appeal) member states want to
take, and everyone is waiting for the U.S. position on how
the organization should respond. In the absence of a clear
U.S. policy driving the CSP to a particular outcome, it is
likely that the Conference may simply punt on this issue for
another year. End Summary.

--------------
OPCW 2004 BUDGET - PAYING FOR CORE FUNCTIONS

--------------


2. (C) DG Pfirter has proposed a budget increase of 7.36%
for 2004, making a strong case that the full amount is needed
to ensure that the organization can perform its core
functions. While delegations have been willing to consider
an increase, 7.36% is far above the increase most delegations
currently are willing to accept. The Japanese entered the
budget debate pressing for zero nominal growth, and the
Western Group is bunched around an increase of some 6%. Amb.
Javits has fully supported Pfirter and made the case for the
DG's proposal in larger budget discussions as well as in
individual meetings with delegations. While there was
consideration of holding a special Executive Council meeting
to try to hammer out agreement on a budget, the consensus is
that there would be little reason to hold such a meeting, and
it would be more efficient to have the CSP gather as a
special EC at the start of the conference. Even with that
step, it is likely that the budget discussions will continue
on to the last min
ute and be decided by attrition.


3. (SBU) The DG has also made a strong case to have more
flexibility to pursue efficiencies. While there are concerns
about some aspects of the DG's management decisions, such as
on travel and use of consultants, there appears to be general
agreement on the need to avoid micromanagement by the
governing bodies. We support the general approach promoted
by the DG to give him added authority to pursue streamlining
and reform, while ensuring that he does not have carte
blanche. With regard to other key financial issues, the DG,
pursuant to suggestions from the U.S., is making a request
for retention of the 2001 cash surplus of 3.4 million Euros.
In addition, he has made a separate request to establish a
special fund for late receipt of Article IV/V funds in 2004
to be retained for use by the OPCW, rather than have the
monies returned to the States Parties.
--------------
U.S. EXTENSION REQUEST
--------------


4. (C) At EC-34, Russia blocked consideration of the U.S.
request for extension of the 45% destruction deadline, and
was content to merely provide a list of questions which broke
no new ground. While the Russians touched on the issue of
what the U.S. intends to do about the 100% destruction
deadline in April 2007, they did not conduct a frontal
assault on the issue. That was left to other delegations
during informal consultations during the September EC. There
was eventual agreement on language that would assuage the
concerns of Germany, the U.K. and a number of other
countries, although this did not eliminate a healthy
skepticism about the U.S. approach to addressing the 100%
deadline. Whether that skepticism will become manifest at
the CSP will likely depend once again on how the Russians
wish to play this issue at the Conference. While there is
substantial veiled (and sometimes open) off-line criticism
about the U.S. reluctance to address the issue of the 100%
deadline, members of the Western Group will not be more
critical than the Russians on the conference floor.


5. (C) As for Russian attempts to draw parallels between
their extension request for the 20% destruction deadline, and
the U.S. request, the Western group is solidly opposed to the
Russian ploy. And while NAM delegations may well chide the
U.S. and Russia on not having met deadlines (while India
pointedly noted that it is meeting its obligations on time),
this will be more of an irritant than a problem.

--------------
BUSTANI DECISION
--------------


6. (C) While a number of legal and political arguments have
been raised regarding the ILO decision on former DG Bustani,
there is no clear consensus among delegations about what
action should be taken by the OPCW. All delegations are
waiting for the U.S. position on how it wishes the
organization to respond, and that will likely serve as the
driving force for any decision by the Conference. In the
absence of a clear U.S. position, the chances for concrete
action at CSP-8 are minimal. The July 29 provisional agenda
for the Conference has no specific item regarding Bustani.
The detailed agenda will not be provided until next week, and
there is as yet no indication of a specific reference to the
ILO decision. As a result, the one place where the issue
could arise is in the "any other business" category. Whether
any delegation wishes to raise it is problematic, as there is
no indication that the member states are agreed upon an
appropriate response by the OPCW.


7. (C) The general consensus is that the ILO decision is
simply wrong, but there is also a strong desire to have the
OPCW put this issue behind it and move on. Beyond those
general sentiments, positions are divided on the specific
issues of 1) payment of the ILO judgment, and 2) appealing
the decision. A small number of states have advocated paying
the judgment in order to put the issue to rest. Another
group wants to pay before taking the steps needed to appeal
the ILO decision. What probably comes closest to an
amorphous general view is that the organization needs to
follow the rule of law, which would entail an appeal directly
back to the ILO on the issue of material damage, or to the
International Court of Justice via the UNGA on the overall
issue of the ILO's jurisdiction in handing down the decision.



8. (C) Under such circumstances, without a U.S. policy
driving the discussion, it is unlikely that the CSP would
reach agreement on a particular course of action, and will
likely defer action on the issue until the next Conference.
The OPCW's Rule 69 states that on a matter of substance, a
decision should be taken by consensus. If consensus is not
attainable when the matter comes up for decision, there is a
mandatory 24-hour deferment during which the presiding
officer must seek to achieve a consensus. If there is still
no consensus, the decision requires a two-thirds majority of
members present and voting. Rule 71 clarifies that "present
and voting" means casting a valid affirmative or negative
vote. Members who abstain from voting shall be regarded as
not voting.


9. (C) With the Bustani issue so contentious, it is very
likely that many delegations will simply abstain. As a
result, the number of countries required to block such a
decision (one-third plus one),is potentially very small.
Moreover, in the event that a two-thirds majority could be
found to pay the judgment, the Technical Secretariat has
informed us there is no amount set aside in the budget for
such a payment. As a result, there may be recourse to a
voluntary fund to pay the judgment. However, supporters of
Bustani may balk at pursuing such a course, as there is the
risk of an embarrassing response to any request for funds to
pay the former DG. As a result, in the absence of a clear
decision supported by the U.S., the likely result may well be
statements from the floor on the ILO decision, but a deferral
of action until the next CSP.

--------------
ACTION PLAN ON NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
--------------


10. (SBU) The Article VII facilitator (Mark Matthews/U.K.)
has done yeoman's work in pushing for an action plan on
national implementation, and it will not be clear until the
end of the week whether he has managed to achieve consensus.
The final remaining issue involves acceptable language
regarding measures to ensure compliance from countries that
do not meet the agreed-upon timetable. DG Pfirter will be
chairing a small meeting of key countries (U.S., U.K., Iran
and India) to see if agreement can be reached on acceptable
wording on that point. In every other respect, the draft
text meets the goals set out by the U.S., in particular,
containing language that marks CSP-10 as the timetable for
meeting obligations.

--------------
ACTION PLAN ON UNIVERSALITY
--------------


11. (U) Here again, the facilitator (Consuelo
Femenia/Spain) has made substantial progress, and there is an
outside chance that consensus will be reached on an action
plan by CSP-8. There is general support for the TS to drive
the process and use voluntary regional and sub-regional
points of contact to push the initiative. Delegations are
split on the issue of whether to state that some non-States
Parties are of more concern than others. In addition, there
remains substantial opposition among NAM and other
delegations for numerical targets. Despite these divisions,
the facilitator is pushing ahead with consultations to find
acceptable wording, and with the onset of the CSP as a firm
deadline, there are reasonable prospects for consensus.

--------------
ARTICLE XI
--------------


12. (SBU) Iran and others have sought to use work on
fostering international cooperation for peaceful purposes as
the vehicle to launch an attack on the Australia Group and
establish a cooperation committee for consultations for
promoting Article XI implementation among States Parties.
While the Facilitator (Norma Suarez/Mexico) has sought to
find a paper that will be an acceptable point of departure
for the Western Group, she has not yet been successful. The
issue should not be ripe for discussion at the CSP, although
there may be some shots fired by the Iranians and others.

--------------
CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS
--------------


13. (C) The issue of challenge inspections may come up in
side-bar discussions. During EC-34, the EU statement, read
by the Italian representative, made reference to the issue of
challenge inspections and to the European desire to see
progress made on this front. While there is no specific item
on the CSP agenda that would allow for a decision of any type
regarding challenge inspections, the Europeans may elect to
return to the topic during informal talks.
--------------
INDUSTRY ISSUES
--------------


14. (SBU) The facilitator for "Captive Use" appears ready
to push for a decision at a Special EC Session in hopes of
adopting the decision at CSP-8. A revised text, which
accommodates Indian concerns, is being circulated by the
facilitator and should achieve broad support. However, we
understand Germany may still have reservations about any
"Captive Use" decision that does not apply equally to
Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals. The decision, as
written, is in accordance with U.S. guidance.


15. (U) Javits sends.
SOBEL