RUSSIAN DEPUTY FM TRUBNIKOV ON MOLDOVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002508

SIPDIS

OPS PLEASE PASS TO D STAFF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MD PARM NL RU OSCE EUN
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DEPUTY FM TRUBNIKOV ON MOLDOVA

Classified By: Political Counselor Mary E. Daly for reasons 1.5 (b and
d)


1. (C) Summary: At a September 30 bilateral meeting in The
Hague, Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Trubnikov told
EUR/SNEC Ambassador Perina that he would soon be calling the
Deputy Secretary with specific ideas on how the U.S. and
Russia can cooperate on Moldova. Trubnikov claimed that he
and the Russian MFA were doing everything possible to move
forward the Transnistria status negotiations and the
withdrawal of weapons under the Istanbul Commitments.
Certain other individuals and ministries were hampering the
effort, however. Nonetheless, Putin had the right
intentions, Smirnov had been called to Moscow to be
"seriously pressured," and even the weapons withdrawal could
be finished largely on time if the Transnistrians allow two
loading areas--Colbasna and Tiraspol. Trubnikov also agreed
with the Dutch to start expert-level talks on a Russian-EU
peacekeeping force. End Summary.


2. (C) Perina began by telling Trubnikov that the U.S. was
concerned and puzzled by Russian actions. We wanted Moldova
to be an example of successful U.S.-Russian-EU cooperation in
solving a regional conflict, but Russian actions put us at
cross-purposes. The arms withdrawal had stopped, and the
Deputy Head of Putin's Presidential Administration--Dmitri
Kozak--seemed to be working unilaterally in the region. This
could lead to real problems for all of us at the Maastricht
OSCE Ministerial.


3. (C) Trubnikov said he was aware of U.S. concerns and
suspicions. But we should know that Kozak was dispatched by
Putin at Voronin's request, and without his (Trubnikov's)
knowledge or advice. Kozak was an expert constitutional
lawyer who was trying to give Voronin what he wants in a
legal document. But the political job of persuading Smirnov
to accept such a document could not be done by Kozak, nor was
Kozak negotiating any security guarantees.


4. (C) Trubnikov said that putting pressure on Smirnov was
still a problem. He (Trubnikov) and the MFA were doing
everything possible to exert such pressure, but certain other
individuals and ministries were hampering their efforts.
Some people had "material interests" in Transnistria, and
others saw it as an outpost of continued Russian influence.
This was all silly because Russia would always have influence
in Moldova, but it afforded Smirnov protection. Trubnikov
admitted that Russia had "a lot" of compromising information
about Smirnov and his family, but it was held by other
ministries and not in the hands of the MFA.


5. (C) Nonetheless, Putin wanted to help Voronin. Smirnov
was currently being summoned to Moscow to be "seriously
pressured" on both the political talks and the arms
withdrawal. Trubnikov predicted that there would be an
agreed political document before the end of the year. Even
the arms withdrawal could come near completion if Smirnov
allowed two loading and dispatch points--Colbasna and
Tiraspol. Trubnikov said he realized that arms withdrawal
had to be back on track before the Maastricht Ministerial and
predicted that it would be.


6. (C) When asked where this left the security guarantees,
Trubnikov admitted that some in Moscow would like to see a
permanent Russian military presence in Moldova. However, the
MFA understood that this would cause big political problems
for Voronin and diplomatic problems for Russia. A
multilateral force and mandate would have to be negotiated at
the right time. Trubnikov avoided further comment on this
subject.


7. (C) Perina stressed that the U.S. wanted to work with
Russia to ensure that Moldova becomes a joint success and not
a source of recrimination and suspicion. He asked Trubnikov
how the U.S. could help to produce such positive outcomes.


8. (C) After a pause, Trubnikov said he had been thinking
about the same thing since his telephone conversation the
previous week with Deputy Secretary Armitage. He wanted to
give it more thought and see how the Moscow meetings with
Smirnov progress. He promised to call the Deputy Secretary
soon, however, with some specific ideas on how the U.S. and
Russia could cooperate constructively on Moldova.


9. (C) Following the meeting, Ambassador Perina compared
notes with Dutch OSCE coordinator Daan Everts, who had also
met with Trubnikov. Trubnikov's comments at both meetings
were similar. However, Everts added that Trubnikov agreed to
the start of expert-level talks with the Dutch on a possible
Russian-EU peacekeeping force in Moldova. Everts said he
would issue formal invitations for the Russians to come to
The Hague in a week or two.


10. (C) Comment: Everts was elated after his meeting with
Trubnikov, believing that some agreements on Moldova might
still be achieved in time for the Maastricht Ministerial.
Trubnikov has failed to deliver on Moldova before, however,
and appeared particularly resentful of Voronin's request to
bring someone new like Kozak into the process. Still,
Trubnikov appeared sensitive to the problems that could
result from unilateral Russian actions in Moldova and sincere
in his wish to avoid them in any Transnistria settlement.
Continued U.S. and EU pressure on the Russians will be
necessary to keep open any chance of positive results on
Moldova in time for Maastricht.


11. (U) Ambassador Perina has cleared on this cable and
provided the above comment.
SOBEL