Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03THEHAGUE2484
2003-09-30 16:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

RESCHEDULING US IRAQ CORE GROUP VISIT TO THE HAGUE

Tags:  EAID NL PREL 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002484 

SIPDIS

DOD FOR U/S ZAKHEIM, DEPARTMENT FOR A/S WAYNE AND A/S
JONES, TREASURY FOR A/S QUARLES
EUR/UBI FOR S.HOLLIDAY, EB FOR BILL GRANT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2008
TAGS: EAID NL PREL
SUBJECT: RESCHEDULING US IRAQ CORE GROUP VISIT TO THE HAGUE

REF: A. STATE 270486


B. 9/30 SOBEL-WAYNE AND SOBEL-ZAKHEIM TELCONS

Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel for Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002484

SIPDIS

DOD FOR U/S ZAKHEIM, DEPARTMENT FOR A/S WAYNE AND A/S
JONES, TREASURY FOR A/S QUARLES
EUR/UBI FOR S.HOLLIDAY, EB FOR BILL GRANT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2008
TAGS: EAID NL PREL
SUBJECT: RESCHEDULING US IRAQ CORE GROUP VISIT TO THE HAGUE

REF: A. STATE 270486


B. 9/30 SOBEL-WAYNE AND SOBEL-ZAKHEIM TELCONS

Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel for Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Embassy recommends rescheduling proposed
October 3 delegation visit to the Hague to ensure sufficient
Dutch ministerial participation. We believe a White House
call to PM Balkenende would significantly enhance the
prospects for success. End Summary.


2. (C) Due to a Friday October 3 Council of Ministers
meeting as well as an early morning special session on urgent
EU matters, the GONL is unable to set up a suitable meeting
at cabinet level for the U.S. delegation led by U/S Zakheim,
A/S Wayne, and A/S Quarles. Ambassador Sobel prevailed on
Deputy PM/Finance Minister Gerrit Zalm to agree to a very
early morning breakfast and to make best effort to persuade
other relevant ministers to attend. Zalm warned, however,
that he and others could only be available for 30-40 minutes.
Thus far, only one State Secretary has confirmed attendance.


3. (C) Embassy recommends that instead of a stop on
October 3, an appropriate senior USG team schedule a visit
before the Madrid conference that will allow both the broad
participation and the time necessary to persuade the Dutch
cabinet to take a political decision to reverse policy on
Iraq reconstruction. (Note: in circa April 2003 the Dutch
cabinet notified parliament of a decision not/not to provide
bilateral support for Iraq reconstruction. Instead, the
GONL is spending EUR 65 million on troop deployment, EUR 21
million on humanitarian aid, EUR 3 million for seed money for
Dutch companies in Iraq, and EUR 800K on police training.
End Note.)


4. (C) Because it will be a significant political
decision for the GONL to agree to bilateral support for
reconstruction, we believe our chances of success will be
greatly enhanced if the U.S. delegation can meet at the
ministerial level, and in a format that will allow adequate
time to allow for discussions and ensure participation by all
relevant ministries. We see an opportunity to build on PM
Balkenende's extremely successful September 3 visit to
Washington and recommend a phone call or message to the PM
from the White House -- either President or Vice President --
urging that his government meet this challenge. Such a call
would make clear to the GONL that the USG envoys to the Hague
come at the White House's behest.


5. (C) In the meantime, we propose to ask the Minister of
Finance and Minister of Foreign Affairs, who we deem to be
most sympathetic to our message, to begin advocacy at the
October 3 cabinet meeting for a policy shift. We will
reinforce the point that the stakes in Iraq are so great that
we must succeed. We will press the Dutch to see this as a
strategic necessity, not merely a financial or developmental
problem. We would welcome additional guidance from
Washington agencies in crafting our message to the Dutch
cabinet.
SOBEL