Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03THEHAGUE2220
2003-09-04 09:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

IAEA/IRAN: DUTCH MFA ON IAEA BOG NONCOMPLIANCE

Tags:  KNNP PARM PREL MNUC IR NL IAEA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002220 

SIPDIS

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2013
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL MNUC IR NL IAEA
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: DUTCH MFA ON IAEA BOG NONCOMPLIANCE
RESOLUTION

REF: A. STATE 249878


B. THE HAGUE 2173

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARY DALY FOR REASONS
1.5 (B AND D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002220

SIPDIS

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2013
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL MNUC IR NL IAEA
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: DUTCH MFA ON IAEA BOG NONCOMPLIANCE
RESOLUTION

REF: A. STATE 249878


B. THE HAGUE 2173

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARY DALY FOR REASONS
1.5 (B AND D).


1. (C) Summary: Poloffs delivered ref A demarche to Dutch
MFA Nonproliferation Chief Paul Wilke on September 3. The
Dutch agree that a noncompliance resolution on Iran is
warranted, but believe it may have to wait for Dir.
ElBaradei's final report in November. According to Wilke
there is "no unity" within the EU on Iran, and it will be
difficult to gain consensus for a resolution at this time.
Wilke said MFA was awaiting the results of September 5-6 EU
FM's Gymnich meeting, as well as PM Balkenende's and FM de
Hoop Scheffer's September 3 meetings in Washington. Wilke
noted that a high-level Iranian official had recently told
the GONL that Iran enjoyed no benefits under the NPT, and
that pushing for a resolution in the present climate may
result in even less Iranian cooperation. Wilke suggested a
two-pronged approach of getting Iran to sign up to an
Additional Protocol and agreeing to full cooperation with the
IAEA, and also looking to move Iran away from elements of
their program that will lead to a breakout capability.
Despite his own view that a noncompliance resolution is not
achievable at this time, Wilke said if the Dutch saw the
possibility of a resolution at the September BOG meeting,
they would unquestionably support it. End Summary.


2. (C) Poloffs made ref A points to Dutch MFA
Nonproliferation Chief Paul Wilke on September 3. Wilke
reiterated his previous comments (ref B) that the Dutch agree
with U.S. arguments in support of a noncompliance resolution
on Iran, and that there is no argument about the seriousness
of the contents of the latest ElBaradei report.
Nevertheless, Wilke said that tactically it might be
advisable to wait until November to push for a resolution so
as to coincide with Dir. ElBaradei's final report. He saw no
unity in the EU on Iran, and said it would be difficult to
gain consensus at this time. Wilke noted that Iran will be
on the agenda at the upcoming September 5-6 EU FMs Gymnich
meeting and said the MFA was looking to the results of that
meeting as well as PM Balkenende and FM de Hoop Scheffer's
meetings in Washington that day to determine next steps.


3. (C) Further to his comments on the lack of unity in EU on
Iran, Wilke said the Germans opposed a noncompliance
resolution at this time. He suggested that Germany might
conclude that even if Iran has nuclear weapon capability, it
still may not be an immediate threat to Europe and NATO. He
underlined that it is precisely due to these divergences in
perspective that more time is needed to gain support for a
resolution. Concerning the Iranians, Wilke said that Iranian
MFA Deputy Director General for International and Political
Affairs Ali Asghar Soltanieh had recently told Dutch MFA
Deputy Political Director Herman Schaper that Iran enjoyed no
benefits under the NPT. Wilke said that pushing for a
resolution in the present climate may cause Iran to become
less cooperative with IAEA, possibly giving them an excuse to
withdraw from the NPT altogether. In Wilke's view, a
two-pronged approach is necessary in dealing with Iran:
obtaining Iranian accession to an Additional Protocol and
providing full cooperation with the IAEA, and also
international efforts to move Iran away from those elements
of its program that will lead it to a breakout capability.
Despite the lack of unity in the EU and his own view that a
noncompliance resolution was not achievable at this time,
Wilke reiterated that if the Dutch saw a possibility for
gaining a noncompliance resolution, they would "jump on it."
SOBEL