Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03THEHAGUE2129
2003-08-25 08:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

OSCE POLICE TRAINING IN IRAQ: DUTCH CIO NEEDS UNSC

Tags:  UK IZ NL OSCE KINL 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002129 

SIPDIS

EUR FOR DAS BRADTKE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X6
TAGS: UK IZ NL OSCE KINL
SUBJECT: OSCE POLICE TRAINING IN IRAQ: DUTCH CIO NEEDS UNSC
COVER

REF: A. SECSTATE 240159

B. THE HAGUE 2096

Classified By: DCM Daniel Russel Reason 1.5 (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002129

SIPDIS

EUR FOR DAS BRADTKE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X6
TAGS: UK IZ NL OSCE KINL
SUBJECT: OSCE POLICE TRAINING IN IRAQ: DUTCH CIO NEEDS UNSC
COVER

REF: A. SECSTATE 240159

B. THE HAGUE 2096

Classified By: DCM Daniel Russel Reason 1.5 (d)


1. Dutch OSCE coordinator Dan Everts briefed DCM on the
outcome of his late August 22 meeting with FM de Hoop
Scheffer on reftel demarche. Everts said that while the FM -
like Everts - supported the idea of OSCE assistance to police
training in Iraq, he could not simply decide to send an
assessment mission on his own authority (or at the request of
a member state). Everts said that the FM shared the view
that other key members (e.g., the Russians, Germans, French
and Italians) needed to be brought on board first or the
initiative would go nowhere. The proposal to send a mission
out of area to Iraq would be controversial; to act without
getting support in key capitals would guarantee resistance in
an organization that operates only by consensus.


2. DCM responded that there was a precedent for OSCE
out-of-area operations in Afghanistan and insisted that the
spadework was already underway in Vienna. We would no doubt
work capitals as well. An assessment team could bring back
the information needed to frame the issue for decision within
the OSCE. Events repeated that the issue was not any lack of
willingness on the Dutch part - the FM saw the value of the
mission. It was simply not something that the CIO could do
on his own hook without causing other members to dig in their
heels. Even Afghanistan, which "had not been easy and is not
really going anywhere", was an OSCE partner for cooperation.


3. Everts said that the CIO judged that the best prospect for
getting to "Yes" in the OSCE would be if the UN Security
Council provided a mandate. A request from the UNSC would
moot the question of why the OSCE would get involved beyond
the borders of even a partner country. Pressed further by
DCM, Everts suggested that, if not the UNSC, perhaps a call
by the G-8 would be sufficient to provide the kind of
multilateral "blessing" needed to launch this effort, and
would make it an easier sell by signaling all OSCE members
that the key countries were already on board.
SOBEL