TFIZ01: AMBASSADOR URGES HONDURAN FM PEREZ-CADALSO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEGUCIGALPA 000824

SIPDIS

STATE FOR TFIZ, IO, PM, S/CT, S/WCI, DRL, NP, AND L
STATE FOR WHA, WHA/CEN, WHA/CCA, WHA/USOAS, AND WHA/PPC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM AORC KTIA KAWC IZ HO KICC
SUBJECT: TFIZ01: AMBASSADOR URGES HONDURAN FM PEREZ-CADALSO
TO MAKE STRONGER PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUPPORTING U.S. ON IRAQ

REF: A. STATE 82391


B. OLSEN/KELLY E-MAIL 04/01/03

C. STATE 81638

D. TEGUCIGALPA 789

E. KELLY/PALMER E-MAIL 03/21/03

F. 02 TEGUCIGALPA 3318

Classified By: Ambassador Larry Palmer; Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary. Ambassador met April 1 with Honduran
Minister of Foreign Affairs Guillermo Perez-Cadalso to
discuss a wide range of issues, with a focus on Iraq and
combating terrorism. Ambassador urged the GOH to make
stronger public statements on Iraq, including on Iraqi war
crimes, and criticized the recent statement by the Honduran
UN PermRep as "empty." Perez-Cadalso said that the GOH would
definitely provide troops to support the U.S. in post-war
Iraq, and pledged to work with the Ministry of Defense to get
a formal letter offering support to the USG. Ambassador
pressed the FM on the need to ratify the ICC Article 98
Agreement with the U.S., sign/ratify five outstanding UN and
two OAS counterterrorism conventions/protocols, and support
the USG candidacy for the UNESCO Executive Board. The FM
pledged that the GOH would support the final draft of the
UNCHR resolution on Cuba, reiterated the GOH's desire for an
18-month extension of TPS, and noted the tougher language in
the 2002 Human Rights Report on extrajudicial killings and
corruption in Honduras. End Summary.


2. (U) Ambassador and PolOff met April 1 with Honduran
Minister of Foreign Affairs Guillermo Perez-Cadalso Arias at
the MFA to discuss Iraq and other key issues. The meeting
followed the Ambassador's March 28 meeting with Honduran
President Ricardo Maduro (septel).

Iraq: GOH Needs to be Publicly Supportive
--------------


3. (C) Ambassador thanked FM Perez-Cadalso for the GOH's
support for the U.S. as a member of the Coalition of the
Willing on Iraq. The Foreign Minister said that he was the
highest ranking representative of foreign governments in
attendance at a recent briefing at the State Department for
representatives of the coalition, during his recent trip to
Washington (ref E). Ambassador told the FM that the USG was
not happy with Honduran UN PermRep Manuel Acosta Bonilla's
statement during the March 26 United Nations Security Council
open debate on Iraq. It was a weak and empty statement that
did not show support for the USG position on Iraq, said the
Ambassador. Ambassador emphasized that he had already
discussed with President Maduro March 28 the USG's
disappointment with the statement (septel). Ambassador told
FM Perez-Cadalso that the USG needed stronger support from
coalition partners, and urged the GOH to speak out publicly
in support of U.S. policy on Iraq. Perez-Cadalso made it
clear that he had gotten the message, but he neither
criticized the PermRep nor pledged to make a more forceful
public statement on Iraq.


4. (C) Ambassador reiterated that the USG was watching
closely Honduran statements, or lack thereof, on Iraq. The
comparison with El Salvador, which has made repeated public
statements of support on U.S. Iraq policy, already offered
troops in a post-war Iraq, and has ratified virtually all
counterterrorism conventions, was not favorable to Honduras.
Ambassador said he understood that the war was a potentially
difficult issue for the GOH, but emphasized that the neutral
UN statement by the Honduran PermRep was seen by the USG as a
lost opportunity for the GOH to publicly support U.S. policy
on Iraq.

Iraqi War Crimes - FM Asks for Written Material
-------------- --


5. (SBU) Ambassador delivered ref C demarche on Iraqi war
crimes, which PolOff had delivered March 31 to MFA DG for
Foreign Policy AMB Mario Fortin. The FM asked for a brief
written report from the U.S. detailing the points raised by
the Ambassador. Perez-Cadalso said that the GOH needed this
before making any statement to the press. Ambassador said
that the Embassy would request it from the Department. Post
has since asked WHA/CEN to find out when the "public
diplomacy package" on this issue mentioned in the cable will
be ready to give to Posts to release to host governments and
the press, and if there was anything in the meantime that the
Department can provide posts for use as a non-paper or fact
sheet to the GOH, preferably in Spanish (ref B).

Honduras Will Offer Troops for Post-War Iraq
--------------


6. (S) Ambassador raised the issue of possible GOH
participation in post-war "phase IV" operations in Iraq,
saying that both President Maduro (septel) and Minister of
Defense Fred Breve had previously given the Embassy
indications of support. Ambassador emphasized that the USG
needed a formal written offer of support from the GOH
detailing the kind of assistance the GOH was prepared to
provide. Perez-Cadalso said that the answer was yes, the GOH
would provide troops, and that he would talk with MOD Breve
and work on getting a formal offer of support to the USG.

ICC Article 98 Agreement: Congress a Potential Problem
-------------- --------------


7. (C) When asked about the status of ratifying the ICC
Article 98 Agreement between the U.S. and Honduras,
Perez-Cadalso confirmed that it had not yet been sent to
congress for approval. The FM said it was a difficult time,
given the ongoing war in Iraq, for the GOH to seek
congressional approval of this controversial agreement.
Ambassador underlined that the USG would remember favorably
countries that stood by the U.S. during the war in Iraq, and
noted that this support might include taking tough steps such
as this. Perez-Cadalso asked Ambassador for USG assistance
to urge Congress, especially the opposition Liberal Party, to
support approval of the agreement. Ambassador said that the
Embassy would be happy to talk to congressional leaders about
the importance of approving the agreement. (Note: The
Liberal Party is opposed to U.S. policy on Iraq.
Perez-Cadalso evidently believes that this may fuel potential
Liberal Party opposition to an ICC Article 98 Agreement.
Post notes that the GOH had months since the September 19,
2002 signing of the agreement in which the GOH could have
introduced the agreement to congress for approval prior to
the start of the war in Iraq. End Note.)

Honduras Moving Slowly on Counterterrorism Conventions
-------------- --------------


8. (SBU) Ambassador gave the FM a Spanish-language copy of
the IAEA's 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection on
Nuclear Materials (which WHA/CEN had obtained with the
assistance of NP/NE and U.S. Mission Vienna). PolOff told
the FM that the Embassy hoped to soon have Spanish-language
texts of the two ICAO and two IMO counterterrorism (CT)
conventions/protocols also outstanding. (In fact, with the
assistance of IO and Embassy London, WHA/CEN obtained copies
of the two IMO CT conventions/protocols which Post sent to
the FM April 2. Post now only needs the two ICAO
conventions/protocols, with the assistance of ConGen
Montreal.) This was in addition to the Spanish-language
texts of the two OAS CT conventions (obtained by WHA/CEN with
the help of WHA/USOAS and delivered to the FM during WHA DAS
Fisk's February 6 meeting with him.) which the FM claimed
would soon be sent to congress for approval. Ambassador made
clear the USG's desire that Honduras sign and/or ratify all
seven outstanding CT conventions as quickly as possible. The
FM told Ambassador that the CT conventions would not be
controversial in Congress, but blamed the Casa Presidencial
for some of the delay in forwarding the CT conventions to
congress. (Note: The DCM has raised the issue of the CT
conventions/protocols with Minister of the Presidency Luis
Cosenza in a March 12 meeting and a March 28 letter. End
Note.)

GOH Will Support Final Draft of UNCHR Resolution on Cuba
-------------- --------------

9. (C) In response to Ambassador's request for the GOH to
co-sponsor the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
(UNCHR) resolution on Cuba (as it had done in 2002),the FM
said that his understanding was that the Peruvian draft
resolution was still circulating for comments. Once the
draft was finalized, Perez-Cadalso said that the GOH would
support it. AMB Fortin told PolOff April 1 that the GOH had
a copy of a draft resolution sponsored by Peru, Costa Rica,
and Nicaragua.

UNESCO Executive Board - Noncommittal Response from FM
-------------- --------------


10. (U) Ambassador demarched FM on the upcoming re-entry of
the U.S. into UNESCO, and urged the GOH to support the USG
candidacy for the UNESCO Executive Board as requested in a
dip note. Perez-Cadalso was noncommittal. PolOff, who had
previously demarched AMB Fortin on the issue (ref D),called
Fortin after the meeting to confirm that the scheduled date
for the election was October 10, 2003, in response to a
question from the FM, who mentioned that the Honduran
Ambassador in Geneva would be changing prior to October.

TPS - GOH Makes Another Plea for 18 Month Extension
-------------- --------------


11. (SBU) Ambassador gave Perez-Cadalso a copy of the letter
from the Secretary to the FM on the Honduran request for an
extension of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Hondurans,
that thanked Perez-Cadalso for his March 18 letter and
explained that a decision was pending (ref A). The FM
reiterated that the GOH was seeking an 18-month extension of
TPS. The Ambassador said that he would relay this request to
Washington.

FM Notes Criticism in Human Rights Report
--------------


12. (SBU) Ambassador gave FM a copy of the final version of
the Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Honduras for

2002. PolOff had given an embargoed copy to AMB Fortin March
31, which the FM said he had skimmed that afternoon.
Perez-Cadalso noted that the criticism on extrajudicial
killings and corruption was somewhat tougher than the 2001
report, and said that the timing of the release of the report
was difficult. He said that it was difficult for the GOH to
be criticized by the USG at the same time it was supporting
the U.S. on Iraq.

MFA Gets the Message on Iraq
--------------


13. (S) Comment. FM Perez-Cadalso understood Ambassador's
direct message that the GOH, as a member of the coalition,
needed to express its public support for U.S. policy on Iraq
in a more forceful manner. His definitive answer that the
GOH would provide troops in some capacity for post-war Iraq
was positive, but his failure to pledge to make a more
forceful public statement on Iraq was not. On most issues
the MFA is a cautious institution, and Perez-Cadalso is often
an embodiment of that caution. He has not taken any bold
initiatives as Foreign Minister but has conscientiously
carried out Maduro Administration foreign policies. It is
important to note that he is not a member of the tight Maduro
inner circle. (In fact, his removal has been the subject of
ongoing speculation since December 2002.) Nevertheless, Post
believes that Perez-Cadalso and President Maduro understand
that as a member of the coalition on Iraq, the GOH needs to
make bolder public statements. End Comment.
Palmer