Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03TEGUCIGALPA619
2003-03-07 21:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Cable title:  

GOH OPEN TO CUBA RESOLUTION IN GENEVA; REITERATES

Tags:  PREL PGOV ETTC PINR ASEC EAID HO CU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000619 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA, WHA/CCA,WHA/CEN,
INR, S/CT, AND DS/ICI/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETTC PINR ASEC EAID HO CU
SUBJECT: GOH OPEN TO CUBA RESOLUTION IN GENEVA; REITERATES
CONCERN ABOUT CUBAN MEDDLING IN INTERNAL HONDURAN POLITICS

REF: TEGUCIGALPA 03206

Classified By: Ambassador Larry Palmer; Reasons 1.5 (B),and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000619

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA, WHA/CCA,WHA/CEN,
INR, S/CT, AND DS/ICI/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETTC PINR ASEC EAID HO CU
SUBJECT: GOH OPEN TO CUBA RESOLUTION IN GENEVA; REITERATES
CONCERN ABOUT CUBAN MEDDLING IN INTERNAL HONDURAN POLITICS

REF: TEGUCIGALPA 03206

Classified By: Ambassador Larry Palmer; Reasons 1.5 (B),and (D).


1. (C)SUMMARY: WHA Deputy Assistant Secretary Dan Fisk
discussed Cuba in meetings with President Maduro, Foreign
Minister Perez-Cadalso and Minister of Defense Fred Breve
during his February 6-7 visit to Honduras. Foreign Minister
Guillermo Perez-Cadalso indicated that Honduras might be
willing to vote for/co-sponsor a Cuba human rights resolution
at the UN Commission on Human Rights, further noting that
Honduras may obtain a seat on the commission. Defense
Minister Frederico Breve in another meeting once again raised
concerns about Cuban meddling in internal Honduran politics.
In the meeting with President Maduro, Fisk noted that
President Maduro had raised concerns about Cuban meddling in
Honduran affairs with former WHA A/S Reich in mid-2002. Fisk
also reiterated the United States' disappointment with the
way the restoration of full diplomatic relations between
Honduras and Cuba had been handled in the last days of the
previous Flores government. While the U.S. preference would
be to have President Maduro reconsider the status of GOH-Cuba
relations, Fisk asked that, should Honduras name an
Ambassador to Havana, at a minimum it should appoint a
forceful advocate for human rights and civil society. END
SUMMARY


2. (C) The issue of Cuba was raised in DAS Fisk's February
6-7 meetings with President Maduro, Foreign Minister
Perez-Cadalso, and Minister of Defense Fred Breve. In his
meeting with the Foreign Minister, Fisk noted that the U.S.
remained disappointed in the Honduran decision to normalize
fully relations with Cuba and stated that the U.S. preference
would be to have the decision reconsidered, appreciating the
difficulty of such a move. He also noted, from his
discussions with the GOH Ambassador to the U.S., that
Washington was aware that there was some continuing

discussion within the GOH over the naming of a Honduran
ambassador to Cuba. Fisk encouraged the GOH not to move
ahead at this time, adding that if the GOH felt compelled to
do so, the U.S. hoped it would appoint a strong advocate for
human rights and civil society as the first Honduran
ambassador to Cuba. Fisk emphasized the U.S. assessment
that there has been no noticeable improvement in the human
rights situation in Cuba and urged the GOH to engage Cuba on
this issue, especially since President Maduro had raised it
directly with then-A/S Reich last year.


3. (C) Fisk reiterated these same points in his meeting with
President Maduro as well and added that the U.S. would
appreciate being given some forewarning if the GOH decided to
move forward with naming an ambassador to Cuba. Maduro once
again claimed to have been completely uninformed of the
decision by the outgoing government to normalize relations
with Cuba. He added a new wrinkle this time, telling Fisk
that he had opposed the decision and had so communicated that
view to the outgoing Honduran government.


4. (C) DAS Fisk asked FM Perez-Cadalso for Honduras' support
on the annual Cuba human rights resolution at the UN
Commission on Human Rights. Perez-Cadalso replied that
Honduras shared U.S. concerns about the human rights
situation in Cuba and would be inclined to co-sponsor a
resolution again this year. More significantly,
Perez-Cadalso informed Fisk that Honduras was working to
obtain GRULAC support for one of the Latin American seats on
the UNCHR. While Perez-Cadalso did not offer an
unconditional Honduran vote in favor of a Cuba CHR
resolution, he reaffirmed strongly that insistence on
greater respect for human rights in Cuba was a fundamental
tenet of Honduran foreign policy toward the island. He added
that given this context, the GOH would likely co-sponsor a
resolution this year and would consider voting for a
resolution as well.


5. (C) Fisk mentioned that President Maduro's call to then
WHA Assistant Secretary Otto Reich about Cuban meddling in
internal affairs was not the only concern we had heard in the
region about Cuban interference in internal affairs. He added
that in his meeting earlier in the day MOD Breve had also
raised the issue. (In addition, President Maduro also
touched on this problem in his meeting with DAS Fisk the next
day.) Fisk advised the FM that if Cuba meddles in Honduras,
the GOH could send a strong message back by appointing an
ambassador who would engage on democracy and human rights
issues there. He told the FM that the GOH would need a tough
person in Havana to deal with the Cubans, someone who could
send a message. The FM accepted this point. However, he
noted that with more than 600 Hondurans now studying medicine
in Cuba, it was very important to have a Honduran diplomatic
presence there.


6. (C) During his meeting with DAS Fisk, MOD Breve asked
about the resurgence of leftist group activities throughout
Latin American and opined that he felt there was an evident
effort to coordinate activities, themes, and tactics across
the region, particularly in Central America. Breve said the
GOH was concerned about the sources of funding for some labor
unions and NGOs in Honduras and noted that there appeared to
be a link to Cuban intelligence. Fisk expressed agreement
that this resurgence was worrisome and commented that Cuba
was neither the sole source of support nor the threat it had
once been. He also cautioned Breve that in democratic
societies political opposition exists and that civil dissent
was a legitimate form of political expression. Fisk conceded
the need to be wary of efforts to manipulate that opposition,
but pointed out that recognizing Cuba had not helped Honduras.


7. (C) Breve then bemoaned the Liberal Party ties to Cuba and
charged that the two sides were working together to promote
the leftist agenda in Honduras. He also opined that it was
now obvious that the Liberals had normalized relations with
Cuba in order to obtain resources to fund their political
opposition to the Nationalist government.


8. (C) COMMENT: Given FM Perez-Cadalso's comments, we
believe that Honduras could be a possible co-sponsor of a
Cuba resolution. Maduro's and Breve's comments on Cuban
meddling follow a consistent pattern of concern that we are
hearing. However, as with so much in Honduras, there seems
to be little or no effort to take action against the Cubans
or to actually substantiate the alleged connections.
Interestingly, FM Perez-Cadalso is the first GOH official
(and we would have thought least likely on the national
security team) to suggest a willingness to take action by
reviewing the status of Cuban doctors in Honduras. He added
that he would try to remove them if they were involved in
inappropriate political activities. (There was a noticeable
physical reaction against this comment by Vice Foreign
Minister Anibal Quinonez, a career foreign service officer,
who was in the meeting.) Finally, Maduro's comment that he
opposed normalization of relations with Cuba prior to the
previous government's decision should be added to the annals
of revisionist history. At best, his transition advisors
preserved his plausible deniability; at worst he acquiesced
in the decision.
Palmer