Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03TEGUCIGALPA2530
2003-10-29 17:00:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Cable title:  

FY 2004 EIPC NOMINATION FOR HONDURAS

Tags:  KSPR MARR MCAP MOPS PINS HO 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 TEGUCIGALPA 002530 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR PM/CPP, WHA/CEN, AND WHA/PPC
OASD/SOLIC (HPANITZ)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KSPR MARR MCAP MOPS PINS HO
SUBJECT: FY 2004 EIPC NOMINATION FOR HONDURAS

REF: STATE 280521

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 TEGUCIGALPA 002530

SIPDIS

STATE FOR PM/CPP, WHA/CEN, AND WHA/PPC
OASD/SOLIC (HPANITZ)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KSPR MARR MCAP MOPS PINS HO
SUBJECT: FY 2004 EIPC NOMINATION FOR HONDURAS

REF: STATE 280521


1. Per reftel, Embassy Tegucigalpa hereby submits its FY 2004
Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC)
initiative request.


2. SUMMARY: Honduras is fresh and fertile ground for a new
peacekeeping program. As a member of the Coalition of the
Willing, Honduras has deployed 370 troops (task force
Xatruch) to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The
Government of Honduras (GOH) has also indicated a keen
interest in further developing its ability to deploy troops
in support of internationally sanctioned peacekeeping
operations. This is new for Honduras, which historically has
not participated in peace operations to any significant
extent. For several years, Honduras has provided a small
peacekeeping team of 12 Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF)
observers in the Western Sahara. While the HOAF still
participates in this mission, and will provide another 370
troops in February 2004 to relieve its troops currently in
Iraq, the GOH lacks the resources to develop an ongoing
training operation that would support training for meaningful
participation in future peacekeeping operations (PKOs). END
SUMMARY


3. Honduras transitioned to civilian control of the military
in 1996 and the HOAF is now firmly under civilian control. A
1999 constitutional amendment established direct civilian
control over the armed forces through a civilian Minister of
Defense. The amendment also replaced the position of the
Armed Forces Commander in Chief, who had standing equal to
that of the country's President, with that of Chief of the
Joint Staff. In April 2002, Congress passed the Organic Law
of the Armed Forces to solidify civilian control over the
military. Moreover, the Honduran Constitution expressly
encourages the HOAF to undertake broader missions such as
disaster assistance, humanitarian assistance and other
"social mandates."


4. In recent years, the HOAF responded quickly and
effectively to assist its regional neighbors in the wake of
various disasters and crises. Both its strong civilian
control and track record of assisting other nations in crisis

situations are evidence of an emerging professional
institution, which in Post's opinion strongly supports the
HOAF as a good candidate to undertake international missions
for peacekeeping purposes. The primary hindrance for the
HOAF is lack of appropriate training and training instructors.


5. Honduras is a strong regional ally and was the first
nation in the Western Hemisphere to sign and ratify an
Article 98 Agreement with the United States. The GOH has
demonstrated a willingness to host a vast array of U.S.
military training and operational opportunities, and in
September 2004 Honduras will host SOUTHCOM's regional
peacekeeping exercise PKO North. Senior HOAF officers have
expressed a strong desire to assume regional and
international roles in peacekeeping missions. The Honduran
military is currently involved in several initiatives to
expand their knowledge and capabilities in the PKO arena.
The HOAF is willing to dedicate time, manpower, and scarce
resources in order to become more involved in the
international peacekeeping effort.

--------------
MISSION GOALS RELATED TO EIPC OBJECTIVES
--------------


6. Given the opportunity to increase its participation in
peacekeeping missions, Honduras could contribute to regional
stability. EIPC funding would provide the GOH with the means
to expand its involvement in international PKOs, increase its
professionalization, and foster its contribution to the
general stability of the region.


7. Specifically, EIPC funding for Honduras would support
Performance Goal four of Post's FY 2005 Mission Performance
Plan (MPP)--Stable, Secure Regional Partners. The Tactics
delineated under both Strategies one and two relate to EIPC
objectives. Strategy one focuses on expanding the HOAF's
ability to achieve its constitutionally mandated missions by
transforming it into a modern 21st century military force
able to contribute to a variety of regional efforts.
Strategy one also includes as a tactic the provision of EIPC
funding to develop and train peacekeeping units.

--------------
U.S. INTERESTS SERVED BY HOAF PARTICIPATION
--------------


8. U.S. interests are directly advanced by the establishment
of enhanced peacekeeping capability in Honduras. The
addition of Honduran troops to the international pool of
countries available for peace operations will free up U.S.
military forces for other worldwide missions--notably, the
war against terrorism. Honduras is a proven ally in Latin
America as well as a valuable partner in dealing with the
international community, and can be counted upon to support
U.S. national security objectives.


9. The genesis of a peacekeeping unit in Honduras will result
in better training and readiness for the HOAF, and will
contribute to the worldwide effort in peace operations.
Moreover, the establishment of such a unit would expand the
role of Honduras in regional efforts, and could potentially
lead to the creation of a unified Central American
peacekeeping organization. Such regional military
integration is a top U.S. policy priority for Central America.


10. Regional integration in Central America is important to
resolving pervasive problems that exist in all countries of
the region, such as the stagnant economic situation,
long-standing border disputes, international organized crime
and illegal drug trafficking. Additionally, regional
stability and integration are cornerstones for improved
regional counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts--both
high priorities of the U.S. in the region.


11. Honduras is a participant in Operation Iraqi Freedom and
currently has 370 troops stationed in Iraq directly involved
in PKO efforts. The GOH also participates, on a limited
basis, in international operations related to peacekeeping
and is willing to provide forces to other international
missions.

--------------
REGIONAL INFLUENCE
--------------


12. The Central American countries are all relatively small
(Honduras is roughly the size of Tennessee) and poor. For
this reason, regional economic integration is a mutual
strategy pursued by all Central American countries, and
Honduras has demonstrated its ability to cooperate and
function as a team player. Though one of the poorer nations
in Central America, Honduras has established itself as a
leader in regional issues, and stands to gain greater
regional importance from accepting a regional responsibility
for PKO.


13. Honduras is centrally located, possesses vast training
areas, and maintains easy access for both U.S. and third
nation training opportunities. A recent example is Honduras'
hosting of the multi-national disaster exercise, FUERZAS
ALIADAS 2002 (in March 2002),in which 24 other nations,
multiple international organizations and non-governmental
organizations trained in Tegucigalpa for two weeks in a
regional disaster scenario.


14. EIPC funds would give Honduras the ability to begin
laying the groundwork for the establishment of a Central
American Peace Support Operations (PSO) Center, capable of
training Honduran individuals and units, as well as other
Central American participants--perhaps with an eye toward
future expansion, making it possible to offer training to
other Latin American countries.


15. Honduras should first develop its own dedicated PKO
unit--starting at the platoon level and expanding to at least
the company level. Once Honduras develops and implements its
own unit, it may ultimately be feasible to establish a
Central American PKO unit--along the lines of regional
multi-national units recently created in other theaters.
With Honduras providing the site for training, each
participating nation could supply forces with a fixed
rotation of key leadership positions. The eventual goal
would be the establishment of a Central American
battalion-level force, capable of deployment within the
region, hemisphere, or on worldwide missions under United
Nations mandate--potentially relieving the necessity for U.S.
forces to perform those missions.

16. Honduran leaders (including military leaders) have made
great strides in working together on regional economic
integration, counternarcotics efforts, etc. Post believes
that Honduras, along with its Central American neighbors, has
the requisite leadership ability and spirit of regional
cooperation to work on a regional plan for peacekeeping
operations. In fact, this is a concept that HOAF officials
have already advanced at the Conference of Central American
Armed Forces.


17. The geographic location of Honduras, along with the
presence of Joint Task Force-Bravo (Soto Cano Air Base) (the
only forward deployed U.S. military base in Latin America),
makes it a logical Latin American country in which to invest
EIPC funds to develop a viable regional peacekeeping force.

--------------
POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR PEACE OPERATIONS
--------------


18. Currently, because the HOAF has not yet begun a formal
peacekeeping program, peacekeeping is not a part of defense
military financing in Honduras. The HOAF operates under
severe financial constraints, and only minimal funding is
allocated for peacekeeping. The HOAF does not have a
dedicated PKO unit or training program. Nevertheless, the
Honduran military has a keen interest in developing and
implementing a PKO unit, and seeks to build a unit gradually.
The Hondurans have identified as one of their goals the
establishment of a PKO unit and a training program over the
course of the next 2 to 3 years. The GOH will be looking to
veterans from Iraq to initially staff this unit.


19. The Maduro Administration and the HOAF leadership are
committed to the underlying tenets of international
peacekeeping, and have a genuine interest in developing PKO
capacity. Financial constraints will be an issue with which
the GOH must contend, but the political will to develop and
implement a peacekeeping force exists. The current Honduran
deployment to Iraq makes this a propitious moment to engage
Honduras with a peacekeeping initiative.

--------------
MILITARY TRAINING OBJECTIVES
--------------


20. Peace Support Operations (PSO) Center: The project would
be a five-year project, extending from FY 04 through FY 08.
The long-term objective would be to sponsor a Central
American Regional PSO Training Center--eventually responsible
for training PKO units from any of the Central American
nations, as well as "train-the-trainer" courses, and
expanding as suitable to other Latin American nations.


21. The first three years would involve the establishment of
the center and the development of the curriculum. Depending
on the progress with respect to the center,s capacity to
train units, the goal would be to commence training the first
pilot classes by the end of FY 05. During FY 06-07, course
development and sustainment would continue, and the first
regular courses and unit training exercise would commence.
The overall objective would be to complete the five-year
project by having a self-sustaining center, capable of
continued instruction and development, uninhibited by reduced
budget support from the USG.


22. In order to achieve its own sustainable PKO unit over the
next 3 to 5 years, Honduras will need to start out at the
lowest levels--initially establishing one dedicated PKO
platoon, which will eventually serve as the cadre for the
establishment of a company-size unit. The objective is to
have a fully equipped PKO company in place by FY 07, which
could deploy independently, as part of a Central American
battalion within the region, or as part of a global United
Nations mission.


23. The ultimate objective of the PSO would be to develop a
Central American Regional PSO Training Center, eventually
responsible for training PKO units from all of the Central
American nations.

--------------
PROPOSED PROJECTS AND FUNDS REQUESTED
--------------

24. In order to effectively implement and sustain a
developing program, we request USD $500,000. Per reftel,
Post outlines below how this money would be dedicated to
enhance Honduras' peacekeeping training capabilities:

(1) Phase I Visit by CCMR and NAWC-TSD to assess current
Honduran efforts in PSO education and training. The intent
is to exchange information and identify counterparts. Cost
approximately $20,000 for the training case, and $20,000 for
equipment.

(2) Phase II Instructors' Course. 15 to 20 officer
instructors attend the course in Monterey. Cost
approximately $40,000, including travel/per diem.

(3) Initial Phase III Mobile Education Team(MET) (3 to 4
personnel) visit to Honduras to develop curriculum and expand
on to-be-determined PSO topics resulting from Phases I and
II. Cost - approximately $90,000.

(4) Initial equipment purchase, to include electronic
classrooms, communications equipment, staff training software
and modules, and multi-source audio-visual equipment. Cost -
approximately $100,000.

(5) Language lab/language lab books and publications. Cost -
$50,000.

(6) In country Phase IV conducted jointly by CCMR and the
Honduran PSO Center (or its education equivalent based upon
the Honduran progress in program development). Cost will vary
according to length - approximately $100,000.

(7) Follow-on equipment purchases. Cost - $80,000.

--------------
CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE HOAF
--------------


25. Literacy - The single point of entry for Honduran
officers is through their academy system. Accordingly, all
officers are completely literate in Spanish. A small
percentage of those officers are bilingual in English, and
regularly attend U.S. military courses through IMET. The
average enlisted soldier (in today's military, a volunteer)
is far less educated. For those who receive some formal
education, it is rarely above the sixth grade level. The
exception is the Air Force, where airmen with a high school
level education fill some of the more technical positions,
and many attend IMET courses in the U.S. It is noteworthy to
mention that the Army feels a need to further educate its
enlisted soldiers, and employs teachers to provide elementary
education during some duty hours.


26. Level of Training/Readiness - Within the Army, all
battalions are approximately one-third of their strength of
15 years ago, and equipment (primarily U.S. FMS case) is in
poor condition. The fundamental problem for all branches of
the HOAF is a serious lack of funding for both training of
personnel and maintenance of equipment.


27. The Army trains well with the limited funds they receive.
Moreover, during the course of the last year the Army has
benefited from a significant amount of training with U.S.
Special Operations Forces (SOF). These bilateral training
opportunities have substantially improved the tactical
capabilities of the troops. This improvement is particularly
noteworthy amongst the Honduran units that hosted multiple
SOF deployments.


28. The Air Force continues to make progress in the
maintenance of their aircraft, and manages to keep
approximately half of the fleet flyable at any given time.


29. The Honduran Navy is experiencing more serious
difficulties, with an old fleet that shows the effects of age
and limited maintenance funds. The Navy has benefited
recently, however, from deploying seized go-fast boats once
used by narcotraffickers.


30. Discipline - As a rule, the Honduran military is fairly
well disciplined, and failure to follow orders and
insubordination are not tolerated.


31. Leadership - Shortly after he took office in January
2002, President Maduro appointed a new Minister of Defense,
Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Staff, and commanders
of the Army and Navy. Overall, the Joint Staff and the
service Chiefs are competent leaders, and have a firm grasp
of the strengths and limitations of the HOAF. The magnitude
of this transfer of leadership underscores the strong
civilian control of the military.


32. Loyalty to Government/Constitution - In January of 1999,
the constitution was amended to abolish the position of
military commander in chief of the HOAF, thus codifying
civilian authority over the military. Honduras now has a
civilian Minister of Defense (MOD) and a Chief of the Joint
Staff who heads the HOAF. Civilian control is well accepted
by the HOAF, and the transition to civilian control has
resulted in greater transparency and fiscal accountability.
The current MOD, Federico Breve, enjoys an excellent
relationship with the HOAF military leadership. The military
has embraced its new roles and missions as provided by the
President and Congress with little or no disruption.


33. Morale - HOAF morale is good. The HOAF reports that
soldiers' morale has increased, because they feel they have a
useful role. The PKO opportunity would allow the HOAF to
maintain high morale in peacetime by making soldiers feel
like they are contributing to their society and participating
in an international security role.


34. Indicators of Corruption, Past or Present - Over the
course of the last several years, human rights vetting has
shown no involvement in atrocities. While in general,
corruption continues to be a problem in Honduras, Post has no
credible evidence of recent cases of corruption amongst the
current military top brass or HOAF officials.
Palmer