Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03STATE23994
2003-01-28 02:43:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

TERRORIST FINANCING - UPDATED NONPAPER ON AL

Tags:  PTER EFIN ECON PREL SA IS JO 
pdf how-to read a cable
O 280243Z JAN 03
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 
CIA WASHDC 0000
NSC WASHDC 0000
SECDEF WASHDC 0000
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD 0000
TREASURY DEPT WASHDC 0000
USDOC WASHDC 0000
US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHDC
USDOE WASHDC 0000
S E C R E T STATE 023994 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/23/13
TAGS: PTER EFIN ECON PREL SA IS JO
SUBJECT: TERRORIST FINANCING - UPDATED NONPAPER ON AL
HARAMAIN

REF: STATE 22362

(U) CLASSIFIED BY EB A/S E. ANTHONY WAYNE, REASONS 1.5
(B,D).

S E C R E T STATE 023994


E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/23/13
TAGS: PTER EFIN ECON PREL SA IS JO
SUBJECT: TERRORIST FINANCING - UPDATED NONPAPER ON AL
HARAMAIN

REF: STATE 22362

(U) CLASSIFIED BY EB A/S E. ANTHONY WAYNE, REASONS 1.5
(B,D).


1. (S) THIS CABLE REPLACES THE EARLIER VERSION OF THE NON-
PAPER SENT OUT IN REFTEL. PLEASE DISCARD EARLIER VERSION.
CHANGES THAT HAVE BEEN MADE, IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST
CONVEYED BY NSC STAFF, ARE THE FOLLOWING: REFERENCE TO
U.S. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OF U.S. BRANCH HAS BEEN
DELETED AND DELETIONS HAVE BEEN MADE TO SECTION
III(A) (1) (A).


2. (S) IN MEETINGS ON JANUARY 28, S/CT COFER BLACK AND NSC
RAND BEERS SHOULD DELIVER THE NONPAPER IN PARA 3, AS
APPROPRIATE.


3. (S - RELEASABLE TO SAUDI ARABIA) BEGIN NONPAPER:


I. INTRODUCTION

ONE OF THE TOP COUNTER-TERRORISM PRIORITIES OF THE UNITED
STATES IS TO DEEPEN THE LEVEL OF THE ONGOING DIALOGUE
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SAUDI ARABIA RELATING TO
FINANCIAL FLOWS TO AL-QA'IDA. RECENT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTING INDICATES THAT AL-QA'IDA IS HAVING TROUBLE
RAISING MONEY AND THAT IT IS MORE RELIANT THAN EVER ON
SAUDI FINANCIAL SOURCES, PARTICULARLY WEALTHY DONORS AND
FUNDING DIVERTED FROM CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS. ALTHOUGH
REPORTING USUALLY DOES NOT SPECIFY THE IDENTITIES OF
DONORS AND CORRUPT CHARITABLE OFFICIALS, WE BELIEVE EVEN
THESE MORE GENERAL LEADS WILL ALLOW OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS TO
IDENTIFY AND LOCATE TERRORIST SUPPORTERS. FINDING THESE
PEOPLE AND STOPPING THE FINANCIAL FLOWS - WHETHER THROUGH
PUBLIC OR PRIVATE ACTION - WOULD SERIOUSLY IMPEDE THE AL-
QA'IDA LEADERSHIP'S ABILITY TO RECONSTITUTE THE GROUP AND
LAUNCH DEVASTATING NEW ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES, SAUDI
ARABIA, AND ELSEWHERE.

MOVING EXPEDITIOUSLY TO CUT FUNDING IS CRITICAL BECAUSE
RECENT REPORTING SUGGESTS AL-QA'IDA IS POISED TO ATTACK
TARGETS WITHIN THE KINGDOM USING MONEY IT HAS RAISED FROM
SAUDI SOURCES. WE HAVE AND WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE YOU
WITH SUCH INFORMATION LINKING SAUDI FINANCIERS TO AL-
QA'IDA PLOTS IN SAUDI ARABIA.

-- FOR EXAMPLE, IN LATE DECEMBER 2002, A DETAINEE REVEALED
THAT AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVES HAD RECEIVED 25,000 SAUDI RIYALS
FOR PLANNED ATTACKS AGAINST US TARGETS IN SAUDI ARABIA
USING AK-47 ASSAULT RIFLES AND HAND GRENADES.

-- A SENIOR AL-QA'IDA REPRESENTATIVE SAID HE HAD HEARD AL-

QA'IDA OPERATIVES DISCUSSING PLOTS AGAINST ARAMCO
FACILITIES IN SAUDI ARABIA.

SOME AL-QA'IDA SUPPORTERS HAVE OPPOSED TO ATTACKS WITHIN
THE KINGDOM ONLY BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE SUCH ATTACKS WOULD
JEOPARDIZE ONGOING FUNDRAISING AND LOGISTICAL ACTIVITIES.

IN OCTOBER, A SAUDI-BASED FINANCIAL FACILITATOR ADVISED AN
AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE ALONG THESE LINES. HIS STATEMENT
SUGGESTS THE OPERATIVES ARE CURRENTLY RAISING FUNDS WITHIN
THE KINGDOM.

II. AL-QA'IDA'S FINANCIAL SITUATION

RECENT REPORTING INDICATES THAT AL-QA'IDA'S FINANCIAL
NETWORK HAS BEEN DISRUPTED AND THAT IT IS RECEIVING FEWER
FUNDS. THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO FREEZE THE ASSETS OF
TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS HAS PLAYED A ROLE IN THIS
SUCCESS. PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT HAVE BEEN AL-QA'IDA'S
LOSS OF A SECURE BASE IN AFGHANISTAN, THE DETENTION OF
NUMEROUS AL-QA'IDA FINANCIAL OFFICIALS, AND DONORS'
RELUCTANCE TO CONTRIBUTE BECAUSE THEY FEAR PUNISHMENT OR
ARE DISENCHANTED WITH THE LACK OF ATTACKS. FOR EXAMPLE:

-- AS EARLY AS MARCH, AN ASSOCIATE OF A SENIOR USAMA BIN
LADIN LIEUTENANT COMPLAINED THAT HIS SOURCE OF FINANCIAL
DONATIONS HAD DRIED UP AND THAT HE WAS "FORCED TO BEG FOR
FUNDS."

-- IN MARCH, AN AL-QA'IDA ASSOCIATE WHO MANAGES AN
UNIDENTIFIED FUNDRAISING WEBSITE INDICATED THAT DONATIONS
FOR THE JIHAD "WOULD SOON DRY UP" WITHOUT CURRENT
INFORMATION FROM THE FRONT TO ATTRACT FUNDS.

-- IN MARCH, A SENIOR FIGURE IN BIN LADIN'S PROPAGANDA
NETWORK INDICATED THAT CONTRARY TO HIS EXPECTATIONS,
CONTRIBUTIONS WERE LACKING.

-- A DETAINEE REVEALED THAT AS OF LATE 2002 IT HAD BECOME
EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR AL-QA'IDA TO TRANSFER MONEY TO
OPERATIVES. REPORTS OVER THE LAST TWO MONTHS INDICATE
THAT AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVES IN IRAN, PAKISTAN, AND YEMEN ARE
IN NEED OF MONEY.

-- IN OCTOBER, ONE AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE SPOKE OF DEVELOPING
PROPAGANDA "TO BOOST DONOR CONFIDENCE," WHILE ANOTHER AL-
QA'IDA MEMBER WORRIED THAT A FAILED OPERATION WOULD STOP
DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS.

-- IN OCTOBER, A SENIOR AL-QA'IDA MEMBER RECEIVED DRAFT
PLANS FOR A TERRORIST OPERATION TO BE PRESENTED TO
PROSPECTIVE BENEFACTORS. THIS FOLLOWED OTHER REPORTING
INDICATING AL-QA'IDA WAS HAVING TROUBLE ATTRACTING MONEY
FROM HARD-CORE SAUDI DONORS, WHO WERE "CLAMORING TO SEE
THE FRUITS OF THEIR DONATIONS." THE PLANS PRESUMABLY WERE
INTENDED TO ENCOURAGE DONATIONS.

AS FUNDS BECOME SCARCE, AL-QA'IDA IS TRYING TO REBUILD ITS
FINANCIAL NETWORK TO SUSTAIN ITS LEADERSHIP AND FUND NEW
ATTACKS. REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT AL-QA'IDA IS TURNING TO
LONGSTANDING SOURCES OF MONEY IN SAUDI ARABIA, NOTABLY
WEALTHY DONORS WHO PROVIDE MONEY WITTINGLY AND CHARITIES
FROM WHICH CORRUPT OFFICIALS DIVERT MONEY. DURING
CUSTODIAL INTERVIEWS IN MID-2002, A SENIOR AL-QA'IDA
REPRESENTATIVE SAID THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT
FOR AL-QA'IDA AMONG WEALTHY SAUDIS. HE SAID THE SUPPORT
IS LARGELY FINANCIAL BUT ADDED THAT SAUDI SUPPORTERS ALSO
FACILITATE TRAVEL IN AND OUT OF THE KINGDOM. THE SENIOR
AL-QA'IDA REPRESENTATIVE SAID THE SUPPORT IS TYPICALLY
"COVERT," AS SUPPORTERS FEAR THEY WILL BE PUNISHED IF TIES
TO AL-QA'IDA BECAME KNOWN.

MONEY THAT ORIGINATES IN THE KINGDOM IS DISPERSED TO AL-
QA'IDA MEMBERS IN AFGHANISTAN, INDONESIA, IRAN, PAKISTAN,
THE PHILIPPINES, YEMEN, AND OTHER COUNTRIES WHERE KEY AL-
QA'IDA OPERATIVES HAVE RELOCATED OVER THE PAST YEAR
FOLLOWING THE LOSS OF AFGHANISTAN AS A SAFEHAVEN. FOR
EXAMPLE, AL-QA'IDA MEMBERS IN YEMEN-A KEY PLATFORM FOR
OPERATIONAL PLANNING IN THE GULF-ARE GETTING THE MAJORITY
OF THEIR FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM SAUDI ARABIA. IN MAY,
SAUDI-BASED AL-QA'IDA FACILITATOR AND CURRENT DETAINEE ABD
AL-RAHMAN AL-QASIMI SUGGESTED MOST TERRORIST OPERATIONS IN
YEMEN WERE FUNDED BY INDIVIDUALS "AT HIS LOCATION," I.E.
SAUDI ARABIA.

ACCORDING TO A VARIETY OF RECENT REPORTING INCLUDING
STATEMENTS BY KEY AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVES, WEALTHY DONORS -
PROBABLY MAINLY BUSINESSMEN - HAVE PROVIDED THE BULK OF
AL-QA'IDA'S FUNDING SINCE AT LEAST THE LATE 1990S. AS AL-
QA'IDA STRUGGLES TO REGROUP, IT IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED
IN TAPPING THIS SOURCE OF FUNDS BECAUSE OF THE SPEED WITH
WHICH SMALL GROUPS CAN PROVIDE TENS OR HUNDREDS OF
THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS. MOST OF THE REPORTING WE HAVE ON
RECENT AL-QA'IDA EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE MONEY INDICATES THE
GROUP PREFERS TO APPROACH DONORS DIRECTLY. FOR EXAMPLE:

-- A SENIOR AL-QA'IDA REPRESENTATIVE IDENTIFIED SEVERAL
SAUDIS AS PROVIDERS OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO AL-QA'IDA,
INCLUDING IBADAH AL-MAKKI, A SAUDI NATIONAL WHO USED TO
SEND TRAINEES AND MONEY, AND SAWAD AL-MADANI, A SAUDI WHO
SUPPLIED AL-QA'IDA WITH MEN, EXPERTISE, EQUIPMENT, AND
MONEY.

-- OTHER SAUDI DONORS IDENTIFIED BY A SENIOR AL-QA'IDA
REPRESENTATIVE INCLUDE ANJANSHAH, A SAUDI NATIONAL WHO
USED TO SEND "A LOT" OF MONEY TO BIN LADIN LIEUTENANT ABU
ZUBAYDAH; QUTAYBAH, A SAUDI NATIONAL WHOSE POSITION AS A
MOSQUE IMAM ENABLED HIM TO RAISE FUNDS FROM "ORDINARY
PEOPLE" AND SEND THE FUNDS FOR THE JIHAD; AND THABIT, A
SAUDI NATIONAL WHO HAS EXTENSIVE RELATIONS WITH SHAYKHS
FROM WHOM HE GETS "GOOD" DONATIONS FOR THE JIHAD.

-- ANOTHER DETAINEE TOLD INTERROGATORS IN EARLY 2002 THAT
SAUDI DONORS HAD PROVIDED $106,667 FOR OPERATIVE TRAVEL.
IN APRIL THE DETAINEE ADMITTED THAT HE COLLECTED $100,000
FROM MOSQUES AND WEALTHY INDIVIDUALS IN SAUDI ARABIA. THE
DETAINEE ALSO TOLD INVESTIGATORS THAT AL-QA'IDA COLLECTED
FUNDS FROM SAUDI MERCHANTS IN THE AREAS OF AL-QASIM AND
RIYADH. THE FUNDS WERE SENT TO AFGHANISTAN VIA RANDOMLY
SELECTED SAUDI EXTREMISTS TRAVELING TO JOIN AL-QA'IDA
FORCES.

CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS (NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
OR "NGOS") ARE A SECOND SOURCE OF MONEY FOR AL-QA'IDA.
ALTHOUGH SEVERAL NGOS THAT SUPPORTED AL-QA'IDA, SUCH AS
WAFA AND MAKTAB AL-KHIDMAT, HAVE BEEN SHUT DOWN, WE ARE
CONCERNED THAT THEIR DONORS ARE STILL AT LARGE. REPORTING
INDICATES AL-QA'IDA AND AFFILIATED TERRORIST GROUPS ARE
STILL RECEIVING MONEY FROM SAUDI CHARITIES WITHIN THE
KINGDOM, VIA CORRUPT OFFICIALS WHO DIVERT CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS TO SUPPORT THE GROUP. FOR EXAMPLE, IN A
POSSIBLE EFFORT TO GIVE AL-HARAMAIN HEADQUARTERS AND
FOREIGN DONORS PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY TO CHARGES THAT FUNDS
SENT TO INDONESIA WERE FUNNELED TO EXTREMISTS, IN LATE
2001 AL-HARAMAIN ROUTED FUNDS TO THE INDONESIA MISSION
THROUGH A THIRD PARTY INSTEAD OF DIRECTLY TO JAKARTA
DIRECTOR AL-AMOUDI.

-- AL-HARAMAIN'S INDONESIA OFFICE HAS TIES TO SEVERAL AL-
QA'IDA AFFILIATED INDIVIDUALS-INCLUDING UMAR FARUQ-AS WELL
AS JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH (JI) LEADER ABU BAKAR BASHIR (VARIANT
BA'ASYIR).

-- HIGH-RANKING JI MEMBERS, INCLUDING IMAM HANAFEI, HAVE
BEEN KNOWN TO CONSORT WITH THE "COMMITTEE OF SHAYKHS,"
RAISING A POSSIBLE LINKAGE BETWEEN SAUDI MONEY, INDONESIAN
MILITANT GROUPS, AND AL-QA'IDA.

III. OPPORTUNITY TO FURTHER REDUCE AL-QA'IDA'S FUNDING

AL-QA'IDA'S SERIOUS FINANCIAL PROBLEMS SUGGEST THAT
EFFORTS TO FIND AND BLOCK MONEY FLOWS PRESENT AN
OPPORTUNITY TO DISRUPT TERRORISTS' OPERATIONS AND PREVENT
THE CENTRAL LEADERSHIP FROM REBUILDING THE ORGANIZATION BY
FINDING AND SHUTTING OFF THE MONEY FLOW FROM MAJOR DONORS
AND FROM CORRUPT OFFICIALS OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS.


A. CUTTING CHARITY TIES TO AL-QA'IDA

RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANT HUMANITARIAN WORK UNDERTAKEN BY
CHARITIES, THE FACT THAT TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS DIVERT
RESOURCES INTENDED FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES AND SOMETIMES
CORRUPT THEIR EMPLOYEES IS PARTICULARLY APPALLING. WE
RECOGNIZE AND APPRECIATE THE STEPS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF
SAUDI ARABIA HAS ALREADY TAKEN, AS WELL AS YOUR COMMITMENT
TO CONTINUE TO TAKE STEPS TO PROTECT AGAINST ABUSE OF
ISLAMIC CHARITIES BY TERRORISTS. IT IS EXTREMELY
DIFFICULT TO UNCOVER CORRUPTION IN CHARITIES AND TO
PREVENT FUTURE OCCURRENCES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE US

INVESTIGATION OF THE BENEVOLENCE INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION,
HAS BEEN LONG AND DIFFICULT, AND WE HAVE YET TO ACQUIRE
ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO INDICT THE FOUNDERS OF BIF FOR
COMPLICITY IN TERRORIST SUPPORT.

ACCORDINGLY, ENSURING CHARITABLE FUNDS ARE NOT DIVERTED TO
TERRORISTS IS LIKELY TO BE A LONG PROCESS. BETTER
OVERSIGHT OF CHARITIES' SPENDING AND VETTING OF THEIR
EMPLOYEES EVENTUALLY WILL MAKE IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR
TERRORISTS TO DIVERT FUNDS FROM THEM. IN THE NEAR TERM,
REMOVING OFFICIALS ENGAGED IN TERRORIST SUPPORT AND
QUESTIONING THEM TO UNCOVER OTHER COMPLICIT OFFICIALS
WOULD QUICKLY REDUCE DIVERSIONS OF MONEY TO AL-QA'IDA.


1. A PRIORITY CASE: THE AL-HARAMAIN ISLAMIC
FOUNDATION

A CHARITY OF GREAT IMMEDIATE CONCERN IS AL-HARAMAIN
ISLAMIC FOUNDATION. OF COURSE WE RECOGNIZE THAT AL-
HARAMAIN PROVIDES LEGITIMATE HUMANITARIAN AID, BUT WE
REMAIN VERY CONCERNED THAT PERSONNEL IN ALMOST HALF OF ITS
50 OFFICES, INCLUDING PERSONNEL WITHIN THE KINGDOM, ARE
AIDING AND ABETTING AL-QA'IDA AND ITS AFFILIATED TERRORIST
GROUPS.

WE UNDERSTAND THAT WE HAVE ALREADY PROVIDED YOUR
GOVERNMENT WITH SOME INFORMATION ON AL-HARAMAIN'S
ILLEGITIMATE ACTIVITIES SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER; HOWEVER, WE
NOW HAVE A MORE COMPLETE PICTURE ON THE CHARITY'S
COMPLICIT EMPLOYEES AS WELL AS HOW IT SUPPORTS TERRORIST
GROUPS.

NEW INFORMATION WE HAVE COMPILED ON AL-HARAMAIN INDICATES
THAT, IN ADDITION TO THE BOSNIA AND SOMALIA BRANCHES
AGAINST WHICH WE HAVE TAKEN JOINT ACTION, OFFICIALS OF
SEVERAL OTHER BRANCHES AROUND THE WORLD HAVE TIES TO AL-
QA'IDA AND RELATED TERRORIST GROUPS. AMONG THESE BRANCHES
IS THE US BRANCH. IN ADDITION TO CURRENT AND FORMER AL-
HARAMAIN OFFICIALS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED WITH YOU,
RECENT REPORTING IMPLICATES THE CHARITY'S DIRECTOR, SHAYKH
AQIL IBN 'ABDUL-'AZIZ AL-'AQIL. FINALLY, WE REMAIN
CONCERNED ABOUT RECENT REPORTS INDICATING THAT AL-
HARAMAIN'S BRANCH OFFICES IN BOSNIA AND SOMALIA CONTINUE
TO RECEIVE FUNDS FROM AL-HARAMAIN HEADQUARTERS DESPITE OUR
JOINT ASSET FREEZE. WITH YOUR HELP, WE CAN LEARN MORE,
AND STOP THE ABUSE OF AL-HARAMAIN BY TERRORISTS.


A. INFORMATION PROVIDED PREVIOUSLY ON THE AL-
HARAMAIN ISLAMIC FOUNDATION

AS YOU KNOW, VARIOUS U.S. INTERLOCUTORS HAVE DISCUSSED
WITH YOUR VARIOUS AGENCIES OF YOUR GOVERNMENT A RANGE OF
CONCERNS ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AL-HARAMAIN ISLAMIC
FOUNDATION SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001. WE HAVE ALSO
PROVIDED INFORMATION TO YOU ABOUT THE BASIS OF THESE
CONCERNS, AND WE APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THEM.
THE FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES THOSE PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS, THE
INFORMATION PROVIDED, AND THE ACTIONS TAKEN.

-- ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, FROM AUGUST 1998 - NOVEMBER 2002,
WE HAVE PROVIDED REPORTS TO AND/OR ASKED FOR ASSISTANCE
FROM THE MUBAHITH RELATED TO THE ACTIVITIES OF AL-
HARAMAIN. SEVERAL OF OUR REPORTS AND INQUIRIES RELATED TO
THE POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF AL-HARAMAIN OFFICIALS IN AL-
QA'IDA'S BOMBINGS OF US EMBASSIES IN EAST AFRICA. OF
PARTICULAR NOTE AMONG THESE IS MU'AMMAR AL-TURKI ABD AL-
WAHHAB AL-DAHKIL. WE ALSO HAVE PROVIDED LEADS ON SEVERAL
OTHER AL-HARAMAIN OFFICIALS WHO HAVE BEEN REPORTED TO HAVE
TIES TO AL-QA'IDA, INCLUDING FOR EXAMPLE:

INFORMATION IN LATE 1999 AND LATE 2001 NOTING HOW AL-
HARAMAIN EMPLOYEES IN GENERAL HELPED AL-QA'IDA WITH
FINANCIAL AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT
SOME FUNDS WERE FLOWING FROM AL-HARAMAIN THROUGH THE
REMITTANCE FIRM AL-BARAKAT TO AL-QA'IDA'S ALLY, AL-ITTIHAD
AL-ISLAMI (AIAI).

A LEAD TO MAHMUD BAHAZIQ, SUSPECTED FINANCIER OF PAKISTANI
TERRORIST GROUP LASKAR-E-TAYYIBA WHO MAY HAVE TIES TO AL-
HARAMAIN.

-- ON JANUARY 16, 2002, AMBASSADOR JORDAN AND ASSISTANT
SECRETARY BURNS PROVIDED TO CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH AND
FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD A PROPOSAL FOR JOINT U.S. AND SAUDI
ACTION TO FREEZE THE ACCOUNTS OF, AMONG OTHERS, THE AL-
HARMAIN OFFICES IN BOSNIA AND SOMALIA. INFORMATION
PROVIDED IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL INCLUDED:

AL-HARAMAIN TIES TO UBL, EIJ, AND AL-GAMA'AT AL-
ISLAMIYYAH: AN UNSPECIFIED BRANCH OFFICE OF AL-HARAMAIN
PROVIDED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO THE EIJ AND UBL ASSOCIATES
BY DIVERTING BOTH FUNDING AND SUPPLIES FROM LEGITIMATE NGO
ACTIVITIES. AL-HARAMAIN WAS USED AS COVER FOR THE BOSNIA-
HERZOGOVINA-BASED EGYPTIAN TERRORIST GROUP, AL-GAMA'AT AL-
ISLAMIYYAH. AL-HARAMAIN MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN FUNDED
DIRECTLY BY USAMA BIN LADIN. ELEMENTS OF AL-HARAMAIN WERE
INVOLVED IN TRAFFICKING ARMS IN SUPPORT OF ISLAMIC
EXTREMISTS IN BOSNIA-HERZOGOVINA.

AL-HARAMAIN TIES TO SOMALIA'S AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISLAMI (AIAI):
AS OF APRIL 1999, AN UNSPECIFIED BRANCH OF AL-HARAMAIN HAD
FINANCIAL LINKS TO KENYA-BASED AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISLAMI
(AIAI),A MAJOR TERRORIST GROUP WITH LINKS TO AL-QA'IDA.
AIAI HAS TRAINED AN ARMED MILITIA WHICH HAS BEEN WAGING A
RUTHLESS CAMPAIGN FOR CONTROL OF THE GEDO REGION IN
SOMALIA. AN UNSPECIFIED BRANCH OF AL-HARAMAIN SUPPORTED
AIAI IN AL WAQ, SOMALIA, BY SENDING RELIEF FOOD TO AIAI
MEMBERS IN AIAI CAMPS.

AL-HARAMAIN TIES TO SDGT WAFA HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATION:
TWO AL-HARAMAIN REPRESENTATIBVES, ABU 'ABDULLAH AND ABU
MUHAMMAD, ACCOMPANIED ABDUL AL-SABUR (REPRESENTATIVE OF
ABU ABDUL-AZIZ, AKA ABU 'ABDULLAY, THE HEAD OF THE WAFA
HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATION IN KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN),TO
AFGHANISTAN, WHERE THEY WERE TO MEET AFGHAN OFFICIALS
REGARDING THE OPENING OF AN AL-HARAMAIN OFFICE IN
AFGHANISTAN.

AL-HARAMAIN TIES TO SDGT MAKHTAB AL-KHIDMAT (MK): AL-
HARAMAIN MAINTAINED MK FUNDS, "THE BULK OF THE REMAINDER
OF THE ORIGINAL SUM OF MONEY (USD 2.5 MILLION)," IN ITS
RAWALPINDI ACCOUNTS. THE FUNDS CAME FROM DONATIONS OF MK.

AL-HARAMAIN STAFFED BY UBL ASSOCIATES AND OTHERS WITH
TERRORIST TIES: UBL ASSOCIATES HAVE OCCUPIED KEY

POSITIONS IN AL-HARAMAIN OFFICES OVERSEAS. IN 1997, AL-
HARAMAIN KENYA-BRANCH EMPLOYEES WERE ARRESTED AND EXPELLED
FOR PLANNING A TERRORIST ATTACK AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
SOME OF THIS PLANNING OCCURRED WITHIN THE AL-HARAMAIN
OFFICE. AL-HARAMAIN OFFICIAL, SALAH A.Q. AL-THIBANI, RAN
THE AL-HARAMAIN-ALBANIA OFFICE. AL-THIBANI IS A CLOSE
ASSOCIATE OF UBL OPERATIVE FAHID AL-SHAHRI. THIBANI WAS
ALSO FOUNDER OF THE IIRO.

AL-HARAMAIN FUNDING OF ISLAMIC JIHAD MOVEMENTS IN YEMEN:
AS OF MARCH 1999, AN UNSPECIFIED BRANCH OFFICE OF AL-
HARAMAIN SUPPORTED THE ISLAMIC JIHAD MOVEMENT AND ITS
ASSOCIATED FACILITIES IN YEMEN.

AL-HARAMAIN EFFORT TO REDUCE CORRUPTION OF THE NGO: AL-
HARAMAIN SENIOR DIRECTORS HAVE SOUGHT TO INSTITUTE
MANAGERIAL TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR PROSPECTIVE REGIONAL
OFFICES' CHIEFS AS A WAY TO REDUCE THE CHANGES THAT
ISLAMIC ACTIVISTS WITH A POLITICAL OR TERRORIST AGENDA
WILL BE ABLE TO MISUSE AL-HARAMAIN FUNDS OR OTHER
RESOURCES.

-- BASED IN LARGE PART ON THIS INFORMATION AND ADDITIONAL
DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR JORDAN AND TREASURY SECRETARY
O'NEILL IN MARCH, 2002, THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA AND
THE UNITED STATES AGREED JOINTLY TO REFER THE BOSNIA AND
SOMALIA BRANCHES OF AL-HARAMAIN TO THE UNITED NATIONS
SANCTIONS COMMITTEE FOR ACTION UNDER UNSCR 1267.

-- IN MAY, 2002, TREASURY OFAC DIRECTOR NEWCOMB LED A
DELEGATION TO SAUDI ARABIA AND MET WITH VARIOUS OFFICIALS
TO DISCUSS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, MEASURES TAKEN BY THE
GOVERNMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF AL-
HARAMAIN AND OTHER CHARITIES.

-- IN SEPTEMBER, 2002, U.S. EMBASSY OFFICIALS DISCUSSED
WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY DIRECTOR FOR INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS HH DR. PRINCE TURKI BIN MOHAMMED AL-KABIR
AL-SAUD, U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT PRESS REPORTS THAT AL-
HARAMAIN BOSNIA HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO RE-OPEN, DESPITE THE
UN SANCTIONS. IN OCTOBER, 2002, AMBASSADOR JORDAN AND
STATE DEPARTMENT COUNTER-TERRORISM COORDINATOR AMBASSADOR
FRANCIS X. TAYLOR DISCUSSED THESE SAME CONCERNS WITH
MINISTER OF INTERIOR PRINCE NAYIF.

-- IN OCTOBER 2002, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE AL LARSON
RAISED OUR CONCERNS ABOUT AL-HARAMAIN WITH CROWN PRINCE
ABDULLAH AND FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD AL-FAISAL.

-- IN NOVEMBER, 2002, STATE DEPARTMENT ASSISTANT SECRETARY
ANTHONY WAYNE ASKED CROWN PRINCE ADVISOR ADEL AL-JUBEIR
WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA WAS LOOKING CLOSELY
AT AL-HARAMAIN AND ITS OPERATIONS, GIVEN THE EXPERIENCE
WITH THE BOSNIA AND SOMALIA BRANCHES.

THE UNITED STATES APPRECIATES VERY MUCH THE EFFORTS OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA TO ADDRESS THESE CONCERNS,
INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR THE JOINT REFERRAL TO THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW MECHANISMS TO OVERSEE
THE ACTIVITIES OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS.


B. NEW INFORMATION ON THE AL-HARAMAIN ISLAMIC
FOUNDATION

DESPITE THE JOINT EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE
KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA TO CONTROL THE MISUSE OF AL-
HARAMAIN RESOURCES BY TERRORISTS, A GROWING BODY OF
REPORTING INDICATES THAT PERSONS WORKING IN SEVERAL
COUNTRIES IN AFRICA, ASIA, AND EUROPE FOR AL-HARAMAIN
ISLAMIC FOUNDATION (HIF) HAVE SUPPORTED -- AND MAY
CONTINUE TO SUPPORT -- ISLAMIC TERRORIST GROUPS.
REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT ABOUT 20 AL-HARAMAIN FIELD OFFICES
AND REPRESENTATIVES OPERATING IN 50 COUNTRIES IN AFRICA,
ASIA, EUROPE, AND NORTH AMERICA, AS WELL AS ITS
HEADQUARTERS IN SAUDI ARABIA, APPEAR TO BE PROVIDING
FINANCIAL AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO AL-QA'IDA.

-- AS INDICATED PREVIOUSLY, HIF OFFICIALS PROVIDE
FINANCIAL AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO BIN LADIN ASSOCIATES AND
OTHER RADICALS BY DIVERTING FUNDS AND SUPPLIES FROM
LEGITIMATE ACTIVITIES. FOR EXAMPLE, KENYAN AUTHORITIES
DE-REGISTERED AL-HARAMAIN AS WELL AS THREE OTHER NGOS FOR
"SUBVERSIVE" ACTIVITIES BY ITS EMPLOYEES FOLLOWING THE
AUGUST 1998 BOMBING IN NAIROBI.

-- OTHER EXTREMIST GROUPS - SUCH AS AL-ITTIHAD AL-
ISLAMIYA, HAMAS, EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD, LASHKAR-I-
TAYYIBA, AND FOREIGN MUJAHIDIN IN BOSNIA AND CHECHNYA -
GET FUNDING FROM HIF OR USE AL-HARAMAIN AS A FRONT FOR
FUNDRAISING AND OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES.

THE U.S. JUDGES THAT HIF DIRECTOR SHAYKH 'AQIL IBN 'ABDUL-
'AZIZ AL-'AQIL, WHO MANAGES AL-HARAMAIN'S BUSINESS ON A
DAY-TO-DAY BASIS, IS PROVIDING FUNDS TO OFFICES WITH
TERRORIST TIES IN WAYS THAT WILL AVOID FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
SCRUTINY, SUCH AS USING PERSONAL BANK ACCOUNTS TO TRANSFER
OFFICIAL HIF FUNDS.

ANALYSIS OF REPORTING SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER INDICATES THAT
HIF HEADQUARTERS HAS CHANGED THE WAY IT SENDS FUNDS TO
OFFICES ENGAGED IN SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITIES TO PREVENT THE
MONEY FROM BEING IDENTIFIED OR SEIZED BY FOREIGN
OFFICIALS. AL-HARAMAIN INCREASINGLY SENDS MONEY TO
INDIVIDUALS' ACCOUNTS IN ADDITION TO TRANSFERRING FUNDS TO
BRANCH OFFICES. WE HAVE ALSO NOTED TRANSFERS THAT
ORIGINATED FROM SENIOR HIF OFFICIALS' PERSONAL ACCOUNTS,
INCLUDING SHAYKH 'AQIL IN SAUDI ARABIA, TO PERSONAL
ACCOUNTS OF KNOWN HIF AFFILIATES. HIF ALSO EMPLOYS
COURIERS TO MOVE MONEY OUTSIDE ELECTRONIC BANKING SYSTEMS.

-- AS OF EARLY APRIL 1999, AL-HARAMAIN USED A CENTRALIZED
SYSTEM THAT PROHIBITS INDIVIDUALS FROM ALLOCATING FUNDS
WITHOUT THE PERSONAL APPROVAL OF THE FOUNDATION'S
DIRECTOR. GIVEN THIS SYSTEM, THE QUESTIONABLE TRANSFERS
SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 SUGGEST THAT GREAT SCRUTINY SHOULD
BE GIVEN TO SHAYKH 'AQIL.

-- HIF HEADQUARTERS IS LAYERING TRANSFERS, A PRACTICE THAT
CONCEALS THE ORIGINATOR AND DESTINATION OF THE TRANSFERS.
HIF HAS REPEATEDLY SENT MONEY TO A BAHRAINI ACCOUNT
BELONGING TO AN UNSPECIFIED SENIOR HIF OFFICIAL RESIDING
IN SAUDI ARABIA, WHO SUBSEQUENTLY SENDS THE FUNDS TO HIF
ACCOUNTS IN NIGERIA.

-- REPORTING INDICATES THAT HIF SENT FUNDS FROM A HIF
ACCOUNT IN SAUDI ARABIA TO AN AL-ANSAR WELFARE TRUST IN
KASHMIR. AL-ANSAR WELFARE TRUST IS A FRONT FOR LASHKAR-I-
TAYYIBA (LT) AND TEHRIK UL-MUJAHIDIN, WHICH HAVE BEEN
LISTED BY THE UNITED STATES AS TERRORIST GROUPS.

-- IN MID-NOVEMBER 2001, UNSPECIFIED AL-HARAMAIN OFFICIALS
MET WITH THE LEADERSHIP OF WAFA, AN NGO RUN BY AL-QA'IDA,
TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF WAFA OPENING AN HIF BRANCH
IN IRAN TO FACILITATE THE TRANSFER OF FUNDS TO AL-QA'IDA
AFTER WAFA ASSETS WERE FROZEN.

-- HIF EMPLOYEES' ACCOUNTS IN ALBANIA PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED
MONEY FROM AN HIF OFFICIAL ACCOUNT AT AL-RAJHI BANK, BUT
IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS TRANSFERS HAVE BEEN COMING FROM THE
PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF HIF'S EUROPEAN COMMITTEE DIRECTOR,
HESHAM AL-MASHARI.

INDIVIDUALS WORKING IN SAUDI EMBASSIES IN SEVERAL
COUNTRIES APPEAR TO BE WITTING OF, AND SOMETIMES
ASSISTING, HIF BRANCH OFFICES THAT SUPPORT EXTREMIST
GROUPS. FOR EXAMPLE, REPORTING INDICATES THAT AS OF LATE
SEPTEMBER 2001 ACCREDITED SAUDI DIPLOMATS AT THE SAUDI
EMBASSY IN BOSNIA COORDINATED FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM AL-
HARAMAIN TO FORMER ARAB MUJAHIDIN IN BOSNIA. DIPLOMATS IN
ANOTHER EMBASSIES HAVE OFFERED TO CONCEAL AL-HARAMAIN
DOCUMENTS FROM LOCAL OFFICIALS.

AFRICA. REPORTING INDICATES AL-HARAMAIN MAINTAINS A
PRESENCE IN ABOUT A DOZEN AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND SUPPORTS
SEVERAL EXTREMIST GROUPS, PARTICULARLY SOMALIA'S AL-
ITTIHAD AL-ISLAMI (AIAI). AL-HARAMAIN ALSO MISUSES ITS
STATUS AS A CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION TO FUND ISLAMIST
POLITICAL PARTIES AND CIVIC GROUPS IN EAST AFRICAN
COUNTRIES - INCLUDING DJIBOUTI AND COMOROS ISLANDS. IN
SOME INSTANCES, THE FUNDING EXTENDS TO SUPPORTING
SECTARIAN VIOLENCE.

-- AS INDICATED PREVIOUSLY, AL-HARAMAIN EMPLOYEES PROVIDED
COVER AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR AL-QA'IDA CELLS, INCLUDING
THOSE IN THE 1998 US EMBASSY BOMBINGS IN KENYA AND
TANZANIA. REPORTING INDICATES MOST OF AL-HARAMAIN'S FIELD
OFFICE DIRECTORS IN EAST AFRICA ARE AWARE OF AND SUPPORT

THE ORGANIZATION'S AID TO MILITANT EXTREMISTS, AND AT
LEAST SOME TOP-LEVEL OFFICIALS FROM AL-HARAMAIN'S
HEADQUARTERS CONDONE THE FUNDING OF MILITANT EXTREMIST
GROUPS.

REPORTING SUGGESTS AL-HARAMAIN'S TOP PRIORITY IN AFRICA IS
SUPPORTING AIAI. AIAI - DESIGNATED BY THE US DEPARTMENT
OF TREASURY UNDER U.S. EXECUTIVE ORDER 13224 AS A FOREIGN
TERRORIST GROUP - SEEKS TO ESTABLISH AN ISLAMIC STATE IN
"GREATER SOMALIA" INCLUDING PARTS OF ETHIOPIA, DJIBOUTI,
AND KENYA. UNSPECIFIED HIF OFFICES WORLDWIDE COLLECT
FUNDS TO PROVIDE AIAI FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO ESTABLISH
ISLAMIC SCHOOLS, COURTS, AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS IN AIAI-
INFLUENCED TERRITORY. HIF HAS ALSO HELPED THE FACTION
DEVELOP ITS INSURGENT AND TERRORIST CAPABILITIES.

-- IN 2002, AL-HARAMAIN ARRANGED TRAVEL FOR AIAI MEMBERS
TO SAUDI ARABIA, PROBABLY TO HELP THEM AVOID ANTICIPATED
US MILITARY ACTION IN SOMALIA.

-- IN 2001, HIF PROVIDED HUMANITARIAN COVER FOR
UNIDENTIFIED ARABS TRAVELING TO SOMALIA TO TRAIN AIAI
MILITARY RECRUITS. AS OF LATE 2001, AL-HARAMAIN RAN A
MILITARY TRAINING/RECRUITMENT CENTER IN MOGADISHU WITH
AIAI. YOUNG MEN ATTENDING THIS CENTER RECEIVED PHYSICAL
FITNESS, MARKSMANSHIP, AND SIMILAR TRAINING.

-- DURING SEPTEMBER 2002 AL-HARAMAIN ACCOUNTANTS IN
SOMALIA EXCHANGED $2 MILLION FOR SOMALI SHILLINGS AT
MOGADISHU'S BAKARA MARKET, WHICH OCCURRED AFTER THE JOINT
DESIGNATION OF AL-HARAMAIN'S OFFICES IN SOMALIA.

-- AS OF MID-MARCH 2002, AL-HARAMAIN IN MOGADISHU, SOMALIA
WAS SCHEDULED TO HOST A CONFERENCE WITH MEMBERS OF AL-
QA'IDA ATTENDING.

-- IN 1999, HIF MAINTAINED VILLAS IN SOMALIA USED TO STORE
EXPLOSIVES AND TRAIN AIAI MEMBERS FOR JIHAD OPERATIONS.

AL-HARAMAIN ALSO SUPPORTS AIAI FROM ITS OFFICES AND
REFUGEE CAMPS IN KENYA. IN 2001-2002, REPORTING INDICATED
THAT AL-HARAMAIN'S KENYAN OFFICES ALSO PROVIDED SUPPORT
AND COVER TO AIAI OPERATIVES AS WELL AS FUNDED AIAI
RECRUITMENT EFFORTS IN THE COUNTRY.

-- IN 2002, AL-HARAMAIN'S DIRECTOR IN TANZANIA - RAMZI BEN
MIZAUNI - FUNDED THE MOSQUES IN THE COUNTRY MOST ENGAGED
IN MILITANT ACTIVITY AND ABUSED THE NGO'S TAX-FREE STATUS
TO IMPORT GOODS AND FUNDS IT USED TO SUPPORT MILITANT
ACTIVITIES.

-- IN 2001, A GROUP OF UP TO 20 MUSLIM MILITANTS, AT LEAST
SOME OF WHOM WERE PROBABLY AL-QA'IDA FIGHTERS FLEEING
AFGHANISTAN, TRAVELED FROM AFGHANISTAN TO KENYA AND
TANZANIA UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF AL-HARAMAIN.

-- IN 1999, THE HEAD OF AL-HARAMAIN'S MOSQUE DIRECTORATE,
SHAYKH ABDALLAH GILID AL-MARZUQI, PROVIDED FUNDS TO
PROMINENT TANZANIAN ISLAMIC MILITANTS WHO, IN 1998, HAD
DISTRIBUTED MONEY TO ISLAMIST DEMONSTRATORS SO THAT THEY
COULD TURN VIOLENT.

-- AS INDICATED PREVIOUSLY, AL-HARAMAIN OFFICIALS WERE
IMPLICATED IN AN ABORTED PLOT TO ATTACK THE US EMBASSY IN
NAIROBI IN 1997. MORE SPECIFICALLY, IN THE FALL OF 1997,
THE AL-HARAMAIN PROJECT MANAGER IN NAIROBI, ABDEL MALIK,
WAS POSSIBLY PLANNING TO ASSASSINATE US CITIZENS IN
NAIROBI, AND INSTRUCTED THREE INDIVIDUALS TO CONTINUE
SURVEILLANCE OF THE US EMBASSY. THESE ASSOCIATES OF AL-
HARAMAIN IN KENYA REPORTEDLY POSTPONED AN ATTACK AGAINST
THE US EMBASSY IN NAIROBI UNTIL AFTER THE KENYAN GENERAL
ELECTIONS. THE DECISION TO POSTPONE THE ATTACK WAS MADE
FOLLOWING A 5 SEPTEMBER 1997 VISIT BY THE KENYAN POLICE TO
THE AL-HARAMAIN OFFICE IN ISIOLO, KENYA.

BALKANS. DOCUMENTS SEIZED IN THE BALKANS SUGGEST THAT
EMPLOYEES AT HIF OFFICES IN ALBANIA, BOSNIA, CROATIA, AND
KOSOVO SUPPORTED AL-QA'IDA AND AFFILIATED GROUPS.
INDIVIDUALS IN EACH OF THESE OFFICES WERE FUNDED BY OR
WORKED WITH BIN LADIN.

-- E-MAILS FROM AL-QA'IDA MEMBERS FOUND IN 2002 ON
COMPUTERS CONFISCATED FROM THE AL-HARAMAIN OFFICE IN
TRAVNIK, CROATIA CONTAINED INSTRUCTIONS TO ATTACK AN SFOR
BASE IN TUZLA.

-- FOLLOWING THE 11 SEPTEMBER TERRORIST ATTACKS, OFFICIALS
AT THE AL-HARAMAIN OFFICE IN KOSOVO DESTROYED ALL
DOCUMENTS THAT COULD LINK THE ORGANIZATION TO MILITANT OR
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. IN LATE 2001, HIF OFFICIALS DECIDED
TO TEMPORARILY MAINTAIN A LOW PROFILE BEFORE RESUMING
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES.

-- ABU MUNZER, AN AL-HARAMAIN OFFICIAL IN SAUDI ARABIA,
URGED ANOTHER AL-HARAMAIN EMPLOYEE TO DIVERT THE FUNDS OF
AN UNSPECIFIED DONATION TO THE NEW FACILITY (OSTROGATAIS)
DESIGNED TO REPLACE AL-HARAMAIN IN BOSNIA.

-- IN MAY AND JUNE 2002, A SENIOR BOSNIAN-BASED HIF
OFFICIAL WAS IN CONTACT WITH AN AL-QA'IDA-ASSOCIATED
MILITANT WHO WAS PLANNING A TERRORIST ATTACK USING TOXINS
AND POSSIBLY EXPLOSIVES.

INDONESIA. RECENT REPORTING INDICATES THAT HIF OFFICES IN
INDONESIA SUPPORT AL-QA'IDA AND OTHER EXTREMIST GROUPS.
AFTER LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR TIES TO LOCAL EXTREMISTS
AND ASSURING THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT IT WOULD ENGAGE IN
"SOCIAL WELFARE" PROJECTS, AL-HARAMAIN APPEARS TO HAVE
ASSUMED A KEY ROLE IN FACILITATING FUND TRANSFERS TO
EXTREMISTS AFFILIATED WITH LOCAL TERRORIST GROUPS AND
SUPPORTING MILITANT EXTREMISM AMONG LOCAL MUSLIMS.

REPORTS INDICATE THAT SUPPORT FOR TERRORIST GROUPS CAME
FROM THE MOST SENIOR LEVELS OF HARAMAIN WITHIN INDONESIA.
SAUDI NATIONAL AHMAD AL-AMOUDI, DIRECTOR OF THE AL-
HARAMAIN BRANCHES IN INDONESIA, MET PRIVATELY IN MARCH
2000 WITH JAFAR UMAR THALIB, LEADER OF THE INDONESIAN
EXTREMIST GROUP LASKAR JIHAD. AL-AMOUDI NOTED THAT AL-
HARAMAIN WAS WORKING WITH THALIB ON SEVERAL ONGING
"PROJECTS." BECAUSE AL-AMOUDI IS SUSPECTED OF HAVING BEEN
INVOLVED IN RECRUITING MUJAHIDIN TRAINEES IN THE 1990S, WE
BELIEVE THE "PROJECTS" ARE RELATED TO TERRORIST OR
EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES.

-- AL-AMOUDI, WHO WE BELIEVE IS CURRENTLY RESIDING IN
SAUDI ARABIA, WAS ONE OF THREE PRIMARY SOURCES OF FUNDING
FOR JAKARTA-BASED AL-QA'IDA FACILITATOR 'UMAR FARUQ. HE
FREQUENTLY DISBURSED LARGE AMOUNTS OF CASH TO FARUQ TO
PROCURE WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES, AND OTHER ITEMS. FARUQ ALSO
ADMITTED THAT HE DELIVERED $99,000 TO AL-AMOUDI IN APRIL
2002 AT THE REQUEST OF AL-HARAMAIN'S DAMMAM, SAUDI ARABIA,
OFFICE DIRECTOR, AND TOLD INTERROGATORS IN JULY THAT HE
ALSO RECEIVED FUNDS FROM ANOTHER OPERATIVE THROUGH AL-
HARAMAIN. IN LATE 2001 AL-HARAMAIN ROUTED FUNDS THROUGH
A THIRD PARTY INSTEAD OF DIRECTLY TO AL-HARAMAIN JAKARTA
DIRECTOR AL-AMOUDI.

AL-HARAMAIN WAS ACTIVE IN INDONESIA AND CULTIVATED TIES TO
LOCAL MILITANT EXTREMIST GROUPS BEFORE OFFICIALLY OPENING
ITS JAKARTA OFFICE IN MID-JULY 2000. AN AL-HARAMAIN
CONTRACTOR TRAVELED TO INDONESIA IN 1998. AL-HARAMAIN'S
SEASONED STAFF MAY HAVE HELPED THE CHARITY GET ITS
INDONESIA OPERATIONS ON LINE QUICKLY.

AL-AMOUDI PREVIOUSLY SERVED AT AL-HARAMAIN OFFICES IN
PAKISTAN AND AZERBAIJAN AND MAY HAVE WORKED WITH JAKARTA
DEPUTY DIRECTOR ADAM NASIR WARSHA IN BANGLADESH. WARSHA
ALSO CLAIMED HE RECEIVED MILITARY TRAINING FROM THE
TALIBAN AND/OR FOUGHT IN AFGHANISTAN.

AL-HARAMAIN MAY BE CONTINUING TO USE ITS PRESENCE IN
INDONESIA TO IDENTIFY LOCAL RECRUITS FOR JIHAD TRAINING IN
INDONESIAN CAMPS AND ABROAD; THERE HAVE BEEN INDICATIONS
THAT AL-HARAMAIN EMPLOYEES HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN
RECRUITING MUJAHIDIN TRAINEES IN THE PAST.

-- FARUQ NOTED THAT AL-HARAMAIN HAD PURCHASED A POWERBOAT
-- PROBABLY TO ASSIST JIHADISTS - IN AMBON.

AL-HARAMAIN MAY ALSO SUPPORT MILITANT EXTREMISTS THROUGH
LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS-FARUQ NOTED IN CUSTODIAL INTERVIEWS
THAT KOMPAK, THE PARAMILITARY WING OF THE INDONESIAN

RADICAL ISLAMIC GROUP DEWAN DAKWAH ISLAMIYAH INDONESIA,
RECEIVED UNSPECIFIED ASSISTANCE FROM AL-HARAMAIN.

PAKISTAN. THE ISLAMABAD OFFICE OF HIF ALSO APPEARS TO
HAVE SUPPORTED AL-QA'IDA. THE DIRECTOR OF THE HIF OFFICE
IN ISLAMABAD SOUGHT PERMISSION FROM THE RIYADH OFFICE IN
JULY 2002 TO CEASE OPERATIONS FOR UP TO THREE MONTHS TO
AVOID SCRUTINY FROM LOCAL AUTHORITIES.

UNITED STATES. THE PATTERN OF AL-HARAMAIN'S OPERATIONS
OBSERVED INTERNATIONALLY CAN BE OBSERVED IN THE OPERATIONS
OF THE US-BASED OFFICES.

-- THE AL-HARAMAIN OFFICES IN THE UNITED STATES WERE
OPENED IN 1997 BY PIROUZ SEDAGHATY AND SOLIMAN ALBUT'HE
AKA SOLIMAN HAMAD AL BATAHI, WHO HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A
RANKING OFFICIAL OF AL-HARAMAIN. SEDAGHATY AND ALBUT'HE
ARE LISTED AS OFFICIALS OF THE US AL-HARAMAIN OPERATION
ALONG WITH AQIL AQIL AND AL-HARAMAIN'S DIRECTOR OF AFRICAN
OPERATIONS, MANSOUR AL-KADI. AQIL IS BELIEVED TO BE
IDENTICAL TO SHAYKH AQIL IBN 'ABDUL-'AZIZ AL-'AQIL, THE
MANAGING DIRECTOR OF AL-HARAMAIN.

-- SEPARATE REPORTS LINK AL-KADI TO INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED
WITH THE 1998 EMBASSY BOMBINGS IN KENYA AND TANZANIA.
RECENT REPORTING REVEALED THAT THE HIF'S US-BASED OFFICES
RECEIVED $500,000 FROM BIN LADIN. THESE FUNDS WERE
REPORTEDLY USED TO PURCHASE MOSQUES THAT WOULD BE USED FOR
RECRUITING EFFORTS. ADDITIONALLY, AL-HARAMAIN HAS
PROVIDED FUNDS TO INDIVIDUALS IN THE UNITED STATES THAT
HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN INVOLVED IN JIHADIST PARAMILITARY
TRAINING.

-- SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER, SOLIMAN ALBUT'HE, A/K/A SOLIMAN
HAMAD AL BATAHI, WHO HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A RANKING
OFFICIAL OF AL-HARAMAIN, HAS PROVIDED OVER $20,000 TO
INDIVIDUALS RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES THAT REPORTEDLY
HAVE PARTICIPATED IN JIHADIST PARAMILITARY TRAINING.
THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE NOT PREVIOUSLY KNOWN TO BE
ASSOCIATED WITH AL-HARAMAIN.


B. CUTTING DONOR TIES

PROBABLY THE BIGGEST, MOST IMMEDIATE IMPACT ON AL-QA'IDA'S
ABILITY TO FINANCE ITSELF WOULD COME FROM CUTTING OFF THE
FLOWS OF FUNDS FROM MAJOR DONORS. REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT
A SMALL NUMBER OF WEALTHY PEOPLE PROVIDE MUCH, PERHAPS
MOST, OF AL-QA'IDA'S MONEY. REPORTING - INCLUDING
INTERVIEWS WITH DETAINEES - INDICATES THAT SAUDI DONORS
ARE SENDING TENS OR HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS
DIRECTLY TO AL-QA'IDA FUNDRAISERS THROUGH BANKS, HAWALA
DEALERS, AND CASH COURIERS. CUTTING OFF THIS FLOW -
THROUGH PUBLIC OR NON-PUBLIC MEANS - WOULD SERIOUSLY
IMPEDE THE AL-QA'IDA LEADERSHIP'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN THE
GROUP'S COHESION AND SPONSOR NEW ATTACKS.

UNFORTUNATELY, REPORTING SELDOM PROVIDES THE TRUE NAMES OF
DONORS OR FUNDRAISERS. IN MANY CASES, REPORTING REFERS
ONLY TO NICKNAMES, HONORIFIC TITLES, OR COVER NAMES ("NOMS
DE GUERRE"). IN ONLY A FEW CASES, SUCH AS UBAYDAH AL-
QAHTANI, HAS THERE BEEN ENOUGH INFORMATION TO IDENTIFY THE
PROBABLE TRUE NAME OF THE PERSON. ADDITIONAL REPORTING
AND DETAINEE INTERVIEWS HAVE PROVIDED SOME CLUES THAT
COULD HELP IDENTIFY ADDITIONAL DONORS; HOWEVER, SUCH
IDENTIFICATIONS WILL REQUIRE VIGOROUS ANALYSIS AND
QUESTIONING OF KEY SUSPECTS.

-- FIRST, THE LARGE AMOUNTS OF MONEY INDIVIDUAL DONORS ARE
ABLE TO PROVIDE SHARPLY NARROWS THE POSSIBLE RANGE OF
SUSPECTS. MOST MAJOR DONORS PROBABLY ARE WEALTHY
BUSINESSMEN OR MEMBERS OF WEALTHY BUSINESS FAMILIES.

-- SECOND, THE DONORS PROBABLY ARE IDEOLOGICALLY COMMITTED
TO AL-QA'IDA. OUR REPORTING INDICATES THAT THEY WANT AL-
QA'IDA TO LAUNCH ATTACKS. THEY ARE NOT JUST PAYING MONEY
IN EXCHANGE FOR "PROTECTION" (THAT IS, AS A BRIBE TO KEEP
AL-QA'IDA FROM ATTACKING THEIR INTERESTS).

-- FINALLY, MANY OF THE DONORS PROBABLY KNOW EACH OTHER
AND MAY EVEN COOPERATE. ONE SENIOR AL-QA'IDA DETAINEE,
FOR EXAMPLE, NOTED THAT AL-QA'IDA'S FINANCE COMMITTEE HAD

A BUSINESS SUBCOMMITTEE WHOSE DUTIES INCLUDED FUNDRAISING.
SOME REPORTED DONORS AND FUNDRAISERS, SUCH AS WA'IL
JULAYDAN, MAINTAIN BUSINESS, CHARITABLE, AND PERSONAL
CONNECTIONS WITH EACH OTHER, STRENGTHENING OUR SUSPICION
THAT A LOOSE DONORS' NETWORK EXISTS.

GIVEN THESE FACTORS, WE HOPE TO ENGAGE WITH YOU BEGINNING
IN LATE FEBRUARY OR EARLY MARCH OF THIS YEAR IN A DETAILED
DISCUSSION OF INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION RELATED TO TWO
PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN LINKED TO AL-QA'IDA - SHAYKH ADIL
BATTERJEE AND WA'IL JULAYDAN. THROUGH THIS DISCUSSION, WE
HOPE TO GAIN A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THEIR TIES TO
AL-QA'IDA AS WELL AS TO IDENTIFY OTHER FINANCIAL
SUPPORTERS OF TERRORISTS. INDEED, JULAYDAN COULD PROVIDE
INFORMATION ON OTHER DONORS AND FUNDRAISERS, WHICH MAY BE
MORE IMPORTANT THAN TAKING FURTHER ACTION AGAINST
JULAYDAN. EVEN IF THEY DO NOT COOPERATE, PUTTING
TOGETHER US AND SAUDI INFORMATION ON BATTERJEE'S AND
JULAYDAN'S PAST AND CURRENT TIES TO AL-QA'IDA AND OTHER
POSSIBLE DONORS SHOULD ALLOW IMPROVED ASSESSMENTS OF THE
GROUP'S FINANCIAL NETWORK.

CAPTURING AND QUESTIONING FUNDRAISERS, SUCH AS UBAYDAH AL-
QAHTANI, SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE KEY LEADS TO THE NETWORK. A
HIGH PRIORITY IS CAPTURING THE HEAD OF AL-QA'IDA'S FINANCE
COMMITTEE, SHAYKH SA'ID AL-MASRI. ALTHOUGH HE IS
EGYPTIAN, SHAYKH SA'ID MAY WELL HAVE DETAILED INFORMATION
ON DONORS FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES.


POWELL