Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03SANAA606
2003-03-28 12:13:00
SECRET
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

TFIZ01: YEMEN - ROYG WALKING A TIGHTROPE

Tags:  PREL PGOV IZ YM DOMESTIC POLITICS 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000606 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ YM DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: TFIZ01: YEMEN - ROYG WALKING A TIGHTROPE

REF: A. SANAA 593

B. SANAA 585

C. SANAA 338

D. SANAA 255

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Alan G. Misenheimer for Reasons
1.5 (b,d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000606

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ YM DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: TFIZ01: YEMEN - ROYG WALKING A TIGHTROPE

REF: A. SANAA 593

B. SANAA 585

C. SANAA 338

D. SANAA 255

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Alan G. Misenheimer for Reasons
1.5 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: ROYG is determined to stay ahead of
regional and Yemeni opinion and maintain its bilateral
relations with the U.S. Yemeni leadership continues to
oscillate between condemnation of the U.S. for the war in
Iraq and its stated commitment to protect foreigners,
particularly Americans, and continue CT cooperation in Yemen.
End summary.

--------------
PRE-WAR: A TIME OF RHETORIC
--------------


2. (C) Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, ROYG, like
many of its Arab neighbors, expressed its opposition to the
use of force in Iraq and the importance of Iraqi compliance
with the inspection regime. President Saleh, FM Qirbi, and
other senior officials availed themselves of the media and
numerous regional and international conferences, including
the Arab League, OIC, and the NAM summits, to clarify and
expand upon the ROYG position. Specifically, FM Qirbi noted
that the U.S. and its allies should not be hasty in the use
of military force (ref C),and, on February 8, predicted that
war in Iraq would "destabilize the delicate situation" in the
region (ref D).


3. (C) ROYG organized a series of internal demonstrations
to signal their support for the people of Iraq, the
inspection program, and opposition to the use of force.
Orderly and non-violent, these demonstrations resembled
political rallies, with pictures of President Saleh rather
than Saddam.


4. (S/NF) Privately, the same senior officials
characterized U.S.-Yemen relations as "good" and "very
important." Behind closed doors, ROYG officials never
objected to, and even welcomed, regime change, but were
concerned about the commencement of hostilities so close to
Yemen's April 27 parliamentary elections and U.S. plans for a
"new" Iraq. President Saleh positioned himself and his party
in an effort designed to limit the influence of extremist
factions, both political and Islamic.

--------------
HOSTILITIES COMMENCE
--------------


5. (C) At the outbreak of hostilities in Iraq, ROYG

statements were low-key and non-confrontational (ref A).
ROYG called for the cessation of hostilities in Iraq and
declared ROYG commitment to a peaceful resolution through
legitimate channels -- namely the UN, the Arab League, and
the Non-Aligned Movement.

--------------
UNDER PRESSURE FROM GOI, ROYG CHANGES TACK
--------------


6. (C) ROYG is under diplomatic and media pressure by the
Iraqi government. Iraqi VP Taha Ramadan followed his 3/23
statement (ref B) in which he described Yemen and its
government as hopeless, with a 3/25 statement (text in para
10) addressing the Arab regimes who are "aiding the
aggressors", namely Yemen. Ramadan asked why these regimes
do not "demand the closure of the U.S. and British embassies
instead of killing their own people when they head for these
embassies to demonstrate" -- another direct reference to the
violent demonstration on 3/21 near U.S. Embassy Sana'a.


7. (C) In a March 25 response President Saleh strengthened
his previously low-key comments saying "there is no
justification for the American and British aggression against
Iraq, it is against every resolution in international law..."
Saleh also accused the U.S. of allowing Israel to take
"advantage of the aggression against Iraq to carry out its
own terrorism campaign against the Palestinian people."


8. (C) During a 3/25 meeting between ROYG Speaker of
Parliament Abdallah Bin-Husayn Al-Ahmar and the Iraqi Charge
d'Affaires to Yemen, Husayn Sadiq Khalifa, Al-Ahmar expressed
what he declared as the attitude of Yemeni leadership,
government, and people: that the "Anglo-American aggression"
against Iraq is considered aggression against the whole Arab
and Islamic community. This is an election year and
Al-Ahmar's comments are similar to statements made by other
Yemeni officials who are trying to hold on to their
constituencies in the tide of emotions sweeping the region
since the beginning of the war. This tone is also an attempt
to bolster Yemen's Arab and Islamic credentials during this
time of regional uncertainty.

--------------
ULEMA STATEMENT
--------------


9. (C) In the midst of increasing ROYG rhetoric, the Yemeni
Ulema (council of religious scholars) released a relatively
balanced statement after its March 24th session. The
meeting's stated purpose was "to review the unjust aggressive
war that is being waged against the Iraqi Arab and Muslim
people by the leadership of the United States and its ally
Britain, and those behind them." The Ulema condemned the
unjust aggression and called for a boycott of goods from the
aggressor states, a breaking of the Iraqi blockade, and the
provision of material and moral support to Iraq and
Palestine. However, the last paragraph of their statement
entreated Yemenis to continue expressing opinions by peaceful
means and to refrain from damaging public or private
property, even if it belongs to the citizens of aggressor
states.


10. (C) The Ulema were tapped as leaders of a peaceful,
government-organized anti-war march on March 27. This
reflects Saleh's ongoing effort to ensure that the Islamist
opposition party, Islah, cannot use the war as an electoral
issue against the ruling party. The 3/27 march was a
transparent attempt to pre-empt possible unauthorized
demonstrations following Friday prayers on March 28. That
attempt was successful and there were no demonstrations on
3/28.

--------------
EXCERPTS OF THE IRAQI VP'S PRESS CONFERENCE
--------------


11. (U) Excerpts from Iraqi Vice President Taha Yasin
Ramadan's March 25 news conference:

-- Why do the Arabs supply the aggressors oil to operate
their war machine? Why don't they stop supplying oil to the
states of aggression? Why don't they close their airspace
and land and sea routes to prevent the activities of the
states of aggression?

-- Why don't they demand the closure of the U.S. and British
embassies instead of killing their own people when they head
for these embassies to demonstrate? They defend the safety
and security of the personnel at the embassies of the
aggressors but do not give a damn or offer anything to
protect the safety and security of the Iraqi people. They
may not sever diplomatic relations because they are incapable
of doing so. But they should tell them: Withdraw the
personnel at your embassies because we cannot be responsible
for their security.

End text.

HULL