FOLLOW-UP REGARDING HOST GOVERNMENT ACTION AGAINST

S E C R E T SANAA 000605

SIPDIS

NOFORN
TERREP

DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT,
S/ES-O, RSOS FOR ABU DHABI, AMMAN, ANKARA, BEIRUT,
DAMASCUS, ISLAMABAD, LONDON, MANAMA, BANGKOK, NEW DELHI,
CAIRO, RIYADH,

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2013
TAGS: ASEC PTER CASC PREL YM COUNTER TERRORISM EAC
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP REGARDING HOST GOVERNMENT ACTION AGAINST
POSSIBLE EMBASSY ATTACK

REF: A. TD-314/17398-03

B. SANAA 00602

C. SANAA 00603

Classified By: RSO TIMOTHY E. LAAS, FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)


1. (S/NF) Summary: On March 27 at 0145 local, Yemen's
Political Security Organization (PSO) officers arrested three
members of a terrorist cell and confiscated explosives per
REFTELS. End Summary.


2. (S/NF) On the afternoon of 27 March 2003, the Ambassador
called on PSO Chief Gamish to discuss follow-up to possible
Iraqi attack plot described in REFTELS. The PSO Director
informed Ambassador three suspected IIS operatives were
arrested by PSO at 0145 on 3/27. Explosives were also found
in the house, apparently confirming threat information from
REFTEL source.


3. (SBU) RSO considers the post's current security
configuration as appropriate to adequately protect USG
personnel and facilities while in the "Stand Fast" mode.
Under Stand Fast operations the potential for an attack
against a "soft target" is minimized because movements of
Embassy officers are restricted to essential movements only
in a armored vehicle monitored by the RSO with random ROYG
marked police car escorts.


4. (S/NF) Post has been in a Stand Fast posture since
receiving the preliminary threat information. As noted in
REFTEL A, source indicated that residences of the DAT and
Public Affairs Officer were to be targeted along with the
Egyptian Embassy and a local travel agency that works for
British Airways. The American Embassy was identified by
REFTEL source as a surveilled potential target, but was
dropped from the target list as "two difficult". Source
indicated that the attack cell intended to throw a small IED
timed or remote control device over the wall of the selected
Embassy residences. RSO notes that such an act would run a
substantial risk of detection and armed confrontation due to
perimeter security coverage which includes one armed ROYG
officer at the front gate, "as directed" Surveillance
Detection activities, PSO spot coverage on the residential
perimeters, one mobile patrol unit visiting each post three
times per one eight hour shift, and hourly radio checks with
one unarmed LGF post on the inside of the each compound.


5. (SBU) U.S. Embassy-related facilities in Sanaa including
residences have aggressive perimeter and access control
policies. Embassy security was recently made more
restrictive with a new prohibition against Foreign Service
National's parking on the Embassy compound. Post will be
reassessing all there arrangements in light of this
experience, and seek to learn as much as possible from source
about how U.S.-related sites were surveilled and targets
chosen.

HULL