Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03SANAA602
2003-03-27 04:43:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

IRAQI SOURCE PROVIDES THREAT-RELATED INFORMATION

Tags:  ASEC PTER CASC PREL YM COUNTER TERRORISM 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SANAA 000602 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
TERREP

FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/ARP,
NEA/EX

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2013
TAGS: ASEC PTER CASC PREL YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: IRAQI SOURCE PROVIDES THREAT-RELATED INFORMATION
ON POSSIBLE EMBASSY ATTACK

REF: 03/26/2003 RSO TIM LAAS - DS/IP/NEA RD STEVE

GLEASON SECURE TELCON

Classified By: RSO TIM LAAS, FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)

S E C R E T SANAA 000602

SIPDIS

NOFORN
TERREP

FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/ARP,
NEA/EX

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2013
TAGS: ASEC PTER CASC PREL YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: IRAQI SOURCE PROVIDES THREAT-RELATED INFORMATION
ON POSSIBLE EMBASSY ATTACK

REF: 03/26/2003 RSO TIM LAAS - DS/IP/NEA RD STEVE

GLEASON SECURE TELCON

Classified By: RSO TIM LAAS, FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: On March 26 Italian Ambassador to Yemen
called on AMB Hull stating that he had information regarding
an Iraqi plot to bomb the U.S. Embassy on March 27. Italians
arranged for an alleged IIS operative responsible for the
plot to come to Embassy Sanaa for interview by ORCA. Subject
was cooperative and provided credible information on the
planned attack, which he said he did not/not wish to carry
out. Embassy arranged with Yemeni Political Security
Organization for other members of the attack cell, with their
explosive devices, to be seized evening of 3/26. Post is
considering appropriate follow-on security steps. END SUMMARY.


2. (S/NF) On March 26, 2003, at approximately 1700, Italian
Ambassador to Yemen Giacomo San Felice visited Embassy Sanaa
and called on AMB Hull. Ambassador San Felice stated that he
had information regarding an Iraqi IIS operative who intended
to bomb the U.S. Embassy the following day, March 27.


3. (S/NF) Following discussion in a meeting including ORCA,
DCM and RSO, Italians arranged for the suspected IIS
operative and a friend to come to Embassy Sanaa. They
arrived at approximately 1800. After thorough security
screening procedures, they entered the Chancery and were
separately interviewed by ORCA.


4. (S/NF) RSO provided walk-ins' cellular phones to Embassy
assets for exploitation.and will forward the information
separate channel.


5. (S/NF) The walk-in claims to be an IIS asset in command
of an operational cell. ORCA finds his claim convincing.
The man stated he had orders to attack Embassy Sanaa using
multiple IEDs comprised of 6.8 kg of TNT rigged for timed or
command detonation. The Iraqi operative stated that the
explosives were to be delivered in unspecified packages,
three with timers and two built for detonation by remote
control. The cell realized that the explosions would have
limited physical effect on the well-fortified Embassy, but
desired a political effect from the attempt. The cell also
undertook surveillance of DATT and PAO residence and Egyptian
consulate. The individual has agreed to cooperate, terminate
the attack and turn over cell members and explosives.
Further details will be provided via ORCA reporting,
including knowledge of attacks in 11 other countries.


6. (S/NF) Based on information provided by the walk-in,
ORCA arranged with ROYG Political Security Organization (PSO)
to seize the explosive devices and the three other members of
the attack cell evening of March 26. Accordingly, RSO
believes the attack plan outlined in this report has been
thwarted.


7. (S/NF) RSO will brief Embassy security assets to be
vigilant regarding methods of explosive delivery with use of
timers or remote control devices. Post will decide on
appropriate follow-on security measures.

HULL