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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
03SANAA503 2003-03-17 11:42:00 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

TERRORIST FINANCE: NEXT STEPS REGARDING SABAA BANK

Tags:   CVIS ETTC EFIN PTER PREL KVPR YM TERFIN 
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					  S E C R E T SANAA 000503 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR EB/ESC/ESP (GGLASS), S/CT (FOX), NEA (GRAPO AND
HEFFERNAN), TREASURY FOR GENERAL COUNSEL (DAUFHAUSER), OFAC
DIRECTOR (RNEWCOMB), DAS FOR TERRORISM AND VIOLENT CRIMES
(JZARATE), AND TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM FINANCING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2013
TAGS: CVIS ETTC EFIN PTER PREL KVPR YM TERFIN
SUBJECT: TERRORIST FINANCE: NEXT STEPS REGARDING SABAA BANK

REF: 2002 STATE 252456

Classified By: AMB: EJHULL FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)



1. (S/NF) Embassy Sanaa has now reviewed the targeting
report noted in para three/reftel. While the report cited
several disturbing examples that may implicate Saba Islamic
Bank (SIB) in supporting terrorist financing, the report also
stated that the USG had information only on a few specific
transactions through SIB by terrorists and that these did not
specify complicity of bank officials. Embassy Sanaa believes
that it would not/not be prudent to designate SIB without
more and better information to substantiate its possible role
in terrorist financing.



2. (S/NF) Embassy Sanaa will review and follow up on the
various sub-reports cited in the targeting report; we note
that these were submitted over several years and may involve
issues of context, changed circumstances, and information
overtaken by events. We will seek additional,up-to-date
information on the ownership of SIB and the activities of
Hamid Al-Ahmar in particular.



3. (S/NF) We assume as well that U.S. investigators working
the cases of Sheikh Mohammed Hasan Ali Al-Moayad and the
so-called "Yemeni money-laundering" ring in the U.S. will be
seeking any information that might substantiate SIB and
Al-Ahmar activities in terrorist financing. We note that the
targeting report, which was compiled prior to the arrest of
Sheikh Al-Moayad and to publication of news about the
money-laundering case, made reference to both of these.
Further investigation along these lines may therefore be
directly relevant.



4. (S/NF) As Embassy Sanaa noted in our previous message on
this issue (2002 Sanaa 3726), we believe that designation of
Shaykh 'Abd al-Majid Al-Zindani could serve U.S.
counter-terrorism interests, especially if we can tie him to
Al-Qa'ida, and get UN endorsement. Our belief is that USG
efforts should give primary focus to Shaykh Al-Zindani's
history and activities, and that this is more likely to
produce results that could lead to ROYG decisions in our
mutual interests. Hamid Al-Ahmar and Sabaa Islamic Bank may
be secondary/secondary targets for subsequent action as
further supporting information becomes available. In any
event, prior to possible designation of Al-Zindani, Hamid
Al-Ahmar, and/or Sabaa Islamic Bank, we need to develop
additional evidence, and follow where that evidence may lead
with appropriate decisions.
HULL