IRAQ: EVOLVING YEMENI ATTITUDES TOWARD A POSSIBLE

S E C R E T SANAA 000380

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2013
TAGS: PREL IZ YM UN
SUBJECT: IRAQ: EVOLVING YEMENI ATTITUDES TOWARD A POSSIBLE
WAR


Classified By: Pol/Econ Acting Chief Catherine J. Westley for Reason 1.
5 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: ROYG policy and Yemeni street opinion
publicly oppose a war in Iraq, but the underlying reality is
more nuanced. The public line articulated by Saleh and
senior officials strongly denounces war and advocates
concerted Arab action to prevent it, but includes no/no
expression of support or sympathy for Saddam Hussein. Most
Yemenis remain more concerned with day-to-day matters,
including the poor economy and the upcoming parliamentary
elections, and numerous contacts have expressed support for
removing the Baathi regime if/if this is accomplished with
minimal impact on civilians. UNSC-related diplomacy which
has received dramatic coverage in the West has received
minimal public and media attention in Yemen. Nevertheless,
popular reaction could be vehement and emotional if war
seemed to drag on, or if Iraqi civilians were killed in a
high-profile incident. Contacts almost universally express
hope that the war will be finished quickly. End Summary.


2. (C) Media statements from ROYG leaders continue to
oppose war in Iraq. President Saleh has used domestic media
to maintain a high public profile out of the Non-Aligned
Movement Summit in Malaysia, saying that the NAM meeting and
the upcoming Arab Summit "should not be merely a verbal
phenomenon that repeats words of condemnation and
denunciation." An editorial this week in the official daily
al-Thawra said, "Iraq will be the first field of
confrontation and it is the real test for the capability of
the Arabs and Muslims to defend themselves." At the same
time, opposition to war is couched in terms of support for
the Iraqi people and not Saddam or the Baathi regime.
Numerous influential Yemeni contacts told the Ambassador this
week that the removal of Saddam will be good for the region.
Several predicted that only significant civilian casualties
would elicit a vehement popular reaction in Yemen.


3. (S) Powerful military commander of the northern region
Ali Muhsen Saleh al-Ahmar recently told the DATT that the
Arab people would prefer no war, but the main concern was
about how the "American occupation" would be viewed. He also
said that there could be flashpoints of reaction here in
Yemen, but expressed confidence that the ROYG could handle
it.

4, (C) An official in the President's office told
Pol/Econoff that he wished the war would be over with
quickly, and that if must happen it should happen now without
further delays. This sentiment was echoed to Acting Pol/Econ
Chief by a leading NGO human rights activist who said "get it
over with already." Several journalist contacts expressed
suspicion about American motives in going to war and echoed a
familiar line in regional media: that the timing of the
Middle East Partnership Initiative announcement in December
created questions in Arab minds about what America is "really
trying to do" in this region.


5. (U) At the same time, opposition media hype has been
fairly low-key in recent days. For example, out of three
weekly opposition newspapers, only one contained an article
on Iraq, noting matter-of-factly that a small anti-war
demonstration was held in Taiz. UNSC diplomacy and the
prospect of a new UNSCR has received understated media
attention in Yemen (far less than the President's daily
statements on Iraq),and even contacts firmly opposed to war
do not see efforts by France et al. in the Council as likely
to forestall conflict.


6. (C) Yemeni public reaction is opposed to a possible war;
however, the vehemence of opposition is not as acute as
concern for internal Yemeni matters and the Palestinian
issue. With parliamentary elections coming in two months'
time and a worsening economy, many Yemenis are more concerned
with how to feed their families.


7. (C) Comment: President Saleh and other government
leaders are playing up their opposition rhetoric, partially
as a means to keep the "street" in line. However, the
underlying reality in Yemen is a studied balance of support
for the Iraqi people and conspicuous non-support for Saddam.
Those Embassy contacts who urge a quick end to a war they see
as inevitable appear to be fatigued by the limbo imposed by
the last several months' wait, and perhaps concerned about
what a prolonged war would mean for internal Yemeni issues
like the parliamentary elections. End Comment.

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