Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03SANAA3009
2003-12-23 11:12:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

PM SENIOR ADVISOR BODINE'S 12/17 MEETING WITH

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 003009 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

PM FOR AMBASSADOR BODINE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2013
TAGS: PREL PTER PARM PGOV KDEM YM COUNTER TERRORISM TERFIN DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: PM SENIOR ADVISOR BODINE'S 12/17 MEETING WITH
SALEH: U.S. AND SAUDI CT COOPERATION, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION,
YEMENIS' REJECTION OF "EXTREME" POLITICAL PARTIES

REF: A. SANAA YM IIR 6 906 0004 04/DRAGON FIRE


B. SANAA 2773

C. SANAA 2552

D. SANAA 2440

E. SANAA 2701

Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for reasons 1.5 (b and d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 003009

SIPDIS

NOFORN

PM FOR AMBASSADOR BODINE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2013
TAGS: PREL PTER PARM PGOV KDEM YM COUNTER TERRORISM TERFIN DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: PM SENIOR ADVISOR BODINE'S 12/17 MEETING WITH
SALEH: U.S. AND SAUDI CT COOPERATION, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION,
YEMENIS' REJECTION OF "EXTREME" POLITICAL PARTIES

REF: A. SANAA YM IIR 6 906 0004 04/DRAGON FIRE


B. SANAA 2773

C. SANAA 2552

D. SANAA 2440

E. SANAA 2701

Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for reasons 1.5 (b and d)


1. (S/NF) Summary: In an extended 12/17 meeting with
President Saleh, PM Senior Advisor Bodine welcomed
U.S.-Yemeni CT cooperation and, along with the Ambassador,
requested greater access for U.S. interrogation teams.
Supporting U.S. assistance for Yemen's security and
development, Ambassador Bodine and the Ambassador calmed
Saleh's concerns with the December visit of an Export and
Border Security (EXBS) team to the Haradh border crossing
point. Saleh and Ambassador Bodine also exchanged views on
Iraq and former Secretary Baker's successful efforts on debt
rescheduling. Saleh briefed on the advanced status of the
Saudi-Yemeni border demarcation. Ambassador Bodine's meeting
with FM Qirbi will be reported septel. End Summary.


2. (C) PM Senior Advisor Ambassador Barbara Bodine,
accompanied by the Ambassador, DCM and Pol/Econ Chief
(notetaker) called on President Saleh on December 17 during
Bodine's 2-day stay in Yemen. The meeting lasted an hour and
forty-five minutes.

SALEH: SAUDI CT COOPERATION IS NOT A PRECEDENT FOR U.S.
ACCESS TO DETAINEES


3. (S/NF) In response to Ambassador Bodine's question about
developments on the CT front, Saleh cited to the recent
apprehension of Abu Asim (refs a and b),and the rolling up
of "3 or 4 cells" related to al-Qaida. He noted there has
been no recent violence and that "tribal kidnapping is over."
He gave a brief overview of the al-Sharif cell's proposed
targets (refs c and d),which included the British and
Italian Embassies, the French cultural center, ROYG officials
and buildings, as well as the American Ambassador. He said
that most importantly, "those arrested had all graduated from

holy Mecca," and included one Yemeni-American and ten Saudis.
Saleh claims that Yemen has gotten ten suspects from the
Saudis, 8 of them Yemeni, and has requested four more.


4. (S/NF) Saleh said Yemen has focused on stopping terrorist
financing and that cutting off financial resources has
noticeably improved things. He then said that when the ROYG
got names from Abu Asim, they invited Saudi officials to
Yemen. Both Ambassador Bodine and the Ambassador strongly
advocated that Yemen should accord the same privileged access
to U.S. experts. Saleh stated that on December 16 he gave
instructions to ORCA to see key detainees, including Hadi
Dulqum, in order to "clear up any doubts" that they were in
custody and immediately got on the phone with Presidential
Security Office (PSO) Chief General Gamish to confirm that
the visits had taken place. Both Ambassadors pointed out
that this was not the same as approval for appropriately
trained U.S. experts to directly interrogate the detainees.
Saleh insisted that the Saudi situation is different because
of the flow of money from Saudi Arabia and that the Saudi
officials only got information and were not permitted to
directly question the detainees. Following a second call to
Gamish, Saleh explained that the information provided to the
Saudis concerned Abdo Abdullah al-Khatani and a possible
terrorist attack at a wedding in Saudi Arabia. He suggested
that if the U.S. wants information, it should give the
questions to the PSO in writing. He later amended this and
said the U.S. could submit questions to the detainees related
to "threats to the U.S. or terrorist elements in Yemen" and
the ROYG would relay their answers.


5. (S/NF) The Ambassador pointed out that the arrest and
questioning of Saddam Hussein produced information that led
to arrests of more militants, which prevented further
terrorism and saved lives. Saleh claimed that Saddam is a
totally different situation because of the U.S. occupation.
He continued that the U.S. can have information, through the
PSO, that relates to "U.S. interests, headquarters, citizens
or employees," but that he will not permit the direct U.S.
interrogation of any Yemeni. The Ambassador raised the issue
of Abu Asim -- the ROYG insisted he was in al-Jowf, but the
Ambassador told Saleh and PSO that Abu Asim was in Sana'a,
which was correct and resulted in his arrest (ref e). Saleh
acknowledged good U.S.-Yemen cooperation, but complained that
U.S. demands equated to U.S. interference in Yemeni internal
affairs.


6. (S/NF) Saleh berated the Ambassador for "provoking" him
and protested that there is a military guard for the U.S.
Embassy compound, but not one soldier in front of the Yemeni
Embassy in Washington. The Ambassador reasoned that there
should be a practical way to meet the interests of both sides
without violating the Yemeni constitution and cited a number
of countries, including Pakistan, Jordan and Saudi Arabia,
where we were able to find an acceptable solution. Saleh
agreed that the issue could be discussed, but emphasized that
Yemen is "not under U.S. mandate" and that it would deal with
the U.S. on its own terms. He said that cooperation should
be done under the auspices of an agreement and complained
that Yemen submitted a working paper/security MOU to
Washington that was rejected. The Ambassador noted that the
U.S. has already gone beyond the terms of any proposed MOU.


7. (S/NF) Saleh was upset by the Export and Border Security
(EXBS) team's visit to Haradh on December 7. He claimed that
members of the team demanded to see passports and lists of
names to know exactly who was crossing back and forth from
Yemen to Saudi Arabia. (Note: The team did not inspect
either passports or any lists, as far as we know. End note.)
Both Ambassadors assured him that the purpose of the program
is to strengthen border security. The visit was only to
assess what procedures are already in place and to determine
what technical assistance the U.S. could best provide. Saleh
retorted that the visit was done in a "provoking manner" and
that the region is a "pit of terror" that Yemen is trying to
keep calm. He continued to insist that Yemen welcomes
training and equipment, but that he would prefer to sign an
MOU regarding the exchange of information. Even when
confronted with the facts that the MFA had helped arrange the
trip and that the team was accompanied by Yemeni officials,
Saleh's response was that Yemen cooperates with the U.S.
"like no one else in the region or world," but the U.S.
administration provides only promises. He again said he
would not be provoked and that the U.S. needs to stop its
"internal intervention."


8. (S/NF) Turning to the issue of money, Saleh railed that
Yemen got $20 million for vehicles, and that it was promised
$21 million if Abu Asim was arrested. He complained that
there are now additional conditions and that the U.S. is
attempting to renegotiate terms. Both Ambassadors assured
him that the U.S. is not trying to bargain, but Saleh
interrupted that FBI Director Mueller promised a $5 million
reward for Jaber al-Banna and that he is now being told that
the reward is only for American citizens. (Comment:
Director Mueller made no/no such promise during his visit to
Sana'a.) Ambassador Bodine said that assistance and
cooperation are both part of an on-going process and
highlighted the increased programming for security, military
and political cooperation since her departure over two years
ago.


9. (S/NF) Saleh expressed deep dissatisfaction with what he
characterized as the United States, lack of recognition of
Yemen,s counter-terrorism accomplishments and complained
that he has not heard "thank you.8 In response, the
Ambassador said &shookran8 (&thank you" in Arabic) several
times. He also asked whether Saleh had been briefed on the
three U.S. planes that recently arrived carrying supplies and
equipment for the Central Security Forces (CSF),the PSO, and
the Presidential Guard and whether Deputy Prime Minister
Sofan had told him of the progress on a 416(b) agreement for
dry milk products. Saleh dismissed the 416(b) plan, but both
Ambassadors encouraged him to reserve judgment. Saleh
bragged that the ROYG is the &police force of the region8
and bemoaned U.S. &stinginess,8 but promised to maintain
the level of security even if cooperation were to cease.


10. (S/NF) Towards the end of the meeting, Saleh said he
would like to see greater transparency, and denied that he
was trying to &twist arms,8 calling such an approach
undemocratic. The Ambassador noted that there are problems
in every important U.S. bilateral relationship. He explained
that we will continue to ask for more cooperation, but that
it will be done in an appropriate way that will not create
problems for Yemen, and that we will continue to try to
expand our support for development, cultural and security
cooperation. Saleh reiterated his request for transparency
and praised the idea of fruitful cooperation based on mutual
trust, saying without trust, cooperation is meaningless. He
said &we are ready8 and asked both Ambassadors to carry
back the correct impression, closing with the observation
that &the problem with the Europeans is that they are not
like the Americans, who are open and frank.8 Ambassador
Bodine echoed this sentiment and reassured Saleh that his
candor is appreciated and that trust and honesty is important
for a healthy relationship. Saleh said only the future will
tell, but Ambassador Bodine noted that the past is a good
guide.

SALEH ON IRAQ: U.S. Should "Distribute the Cake" to France
and Germany

11. (C) Saleh inquired about Ambassador Bodine's involvement
in Iraq. She commented on strong Iraqi efforts to rebuild
their country. Saleh said that if the situation improves, it
will good for the U.S., but if it worsens, it will be the
responsibility of the U.S. administration. Expressing
confidence that the situation will improve, Ambassador Bodine
commented that some Iraqis were afraid that Saddam would
return and that with his capture the Iraqi people can now
begin to look to the future, not over their shoulder to the
past. Calling former Secretary James Baker a friend, Saleh
noted the success of his trips to Germany and France and said
that the U.S. should "distribute the cake" and reconsider
giving France and Germany a role in Iraq's reconstruction.


12. (C) Citing Oman and Bahrain, Saleh referred positively to
the region's gradual steps toward democracy and said that
Oman is taking "smart" steps to quell unjustified fears about
democratic elections. He noted Yemen's progress on local
councils since 2001, and cited the fact that there were 7,000
candidates "from every village" this time around. He said
that the recent local council by-elections for 92 seats
yielded 8 seats for Islah and 4 seats for YSP. He also said
that the GPC reclaimed 19 seats formerly held by Islah and
that this represents the public's rejection of Islamic
extremists. (Comment: Islah is Islamist but not all elements
are extremist. Its leadership encompasses a broad spectrum
that includes both moderate and extreme elements. End
comment.)


13. (C) Ambassador Bodine commented that it is important to
maintain balance in the system and that the GPC would lose
credibility if it captured 99.5 percent of the vote. Saleh
acknowledged the point and said that the GPC wants others to
participate and advocates complete transparency. He joked
that Islah always claims that they know the election results
in advance - if they win, it should have been by more; if
they lose, it was rigged, but there is always an excuse at
the ready for any outcome. He reiterated that Yemenis are
not happy with the more radical/extremist parties and noted
that the socialists left a poor legacy by pushing for
separation and expounding bad economic policy. He said that
he has called on the opposition parties to form a joint forum
and provided financial support for its formation, an effort
he claims is aimed at making sure the ruling party (GPC) does
not get 99.5% of the vote.

YEMEN-SAUDI BORDER DEMARCATION IN FINAL STAGES


14. (C) Saleh said that they are finalizing the technical
review of the Yemen-Saudi land border. He claims that Yemen
has spent $1.1 billion on the project, which is being done by
a German company and a Lebanese sub-contractor.

COMMENT: SALEH'S PUBLIC FACE DOES NOT ALWAYS MIRROR HIS
PRIVATE MESSAGE


15. (S/NF) Comment: Some of Saleh,s blustering about
&provocation8 may have been posturing for his advisors and
others in the room (there was one ringer later identified as
a Nassarite "cultural" advisor). Iryani tried to give us a
heads up at the start of the meeting asking Ambassador Bodine
if she had a "private message" for the President. We missed
the hint. Had the meeting taken place in private or with
fewer participants, Saleh may have been more willing to admit
that U.S.-Yemen CT cooperation has, in spite of its
successes, not yet fully evolved and has room for
improvement. Clearly recognizing that the tone of the
meeting was more confrontational than the situation
warranted, Presidential Advisor Abdelkarim al-Iryani (who was
present at the meeting) called Ambassador Bodine on December
18 to apologize on behalf of President Saleh and reiterate
Yemen and Saleh's confidence in the fundamental strength of
the relationship. End Comment.


16. (U) This cable was cleared by Ambassador Bodine.

HULL