Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03SANAA3008
2003-12-23 11:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

UPDATE ON ROYG HR MINISTER'S INCIDENT AT FRANKFURT

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM YM 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 003008 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM YM
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON ROYG HR MINISTER'S INCIDENT AT FRANKFURT
AIRPORT

REF: SANAA 2890 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for Reasons 1.5 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 003008

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM YM
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON ROYG HR MINISTER'S INCIDENT AT FRANKFURT
AIRPORT

REF: SANAA 2890 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for Reasons 1.5 (b,d)


1. (C) As part of Post's investigation into security
procedures at Frankfurt Airport affecting official ROYG
travelers, DCM met with United Airlines officials on December
18 to explore the incident. Background: When transferring
to United Airlines in Frankfurt, the Minister of Human Rights
was subject to stringent security checks without regard to
her official status, and she chose to not travel to
Washington rather than be subject to these checks (reftel).
End Background.


2. (C) The DCM met with a United Airlines security official
to gain more information about their security policies and
practices. The official confirmed that United, along with
other U.S.-flag carriers, is subject to TSA guidelines.
According to the United official, TSA guidelines include the
following:

-- CTX screening of all baggage and random computer selection
of some bags for physical search;

-- Passenger screening at two levels, personal interview and
computerized review. For both, travel from Yemen and/or
Yemeni citizenship triggers additional scrutiny. This policy
of profiling is not random and the United official said that
connection (citizenship and/or point of origin/destination)
to a Middle East country is a major criteria;

-- The computer review selects individuals (including
Amcits) traveling to/from the Middle East for additional
screening without exception. The computer does not/not take
note of whether a given Amcit traveler bears a diplomatic
passport or not and the computer has no field for such
information to be entered into the system. Likewise, no
provision exists for non-American Government officials
traveling on diplomatic passports on diplomatic visas (such
as the ROYG Minister of Human Rights) to be identified.

-- When the computer selects an individual, a security
employee has no discretion to exempt the selected traveler.


3. (C) Pol/Econ Deputy met with Minister al-Suswa December
22 to inform her of the DCM's findings. She said she
appreciated Post looking into the procedures and understood
why they were in place security-wise. She added, however,
that she already turned down an invitation from Northwestern
University because she did not want to "be humiliated" by
traveling on U.S.-flag airlines. She noted that it did not
make sense for security officials to spend extensive time on
official government travelers on diplomatic missions when
there were "bad guys" to catch.


4. (C) Comment: Post confirms that these procedures apply
to all travelers from certain countries. Embassy personnel
have also received increased scrutiny, including extensive
questioning and other search procedures. End Comment.
HULL