Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03SANAA2753
2003-11-19 20:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

INTERIOR MINISTER ALIMI: NO DETAINEES RELEASED

Tags:  PTER PREL YM COUNTER TERRORISM 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002753 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA. DS/DSS,
CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2013
TAGS: PTER PREL YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: INTERIOR MINISTER ALIMI: NO DETAINEES RELEASED
YET; MOAYED REACTION STILL CALM; NO TIMELINE FOR USS COLE
TRIALS

REF: A. SANAA 2743


B. SANAA 2700

C. SANAA 2701

D. SANAA 2454

Classified By: CDA Alan G. Misenheimer for Reasons 1.5 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002753

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA. DS/DSS,
CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2013
TAGS: PTER PREL YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: INTERIOR MINISTER ALIMI: NO DETAINEES RELEASED
YET; MOAYED REACTION STILL CALM; NO TIMELINE FOR USS COLE
TRIALS

REF: A. SANAA 2743


B. SANAA 2700

C. SANAA 2701

D. SANAA 2454

Classified By: CDA Alan G. Misenheimer for Reasons 1.5 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Charge called on Interior Minister Alimi
11/19 to express concern over Yemen's reported release of 92
security detainees (refs). Alimi said that U.S. concerns had
not been ignored, because no/no detainees had yet been
released. None slated for release had committed acts of
violence inside or outside Yemen. Each of the 92 must
provide sworn, written assurances of good conduct, and
parallel guarantees from family members, before release can
occur. PSO Chief Gamish will decide when the required
standard of assurances has been met. Alimi said Embassy
Sanaa will &immediately8 receive name and biodata on any
detainee actually released, and agreed to discuss with Gamish
possible sharing of such data prior to release. He offered
no estimate of when releases might occur, but indicated none
was imminent. On numbers, Alimi confirmed that 54 of the
&candidates8 for release are from the Hattat/Abyan
engagement, and 38 are detained on suspicion of affiliation
with al-Qaeda or other extremist groups. Alimi, the ROYG,s
polished &good cop,8 was at pains to put an upbeat spin on
the announced release of detainees, but important questions
remain unanswered. Local reaction to the Moayed extradition
(minimal) and pending prosecution of Cole suspects (timetable
uncertain) were also discussed. End Summary.


2. (C) On 11/19 Charge, joined by Acting LEGATT and Pol/Econ
Deputy, called on Interior Minister Dr. Rashad al-Alimi to
press U.S. concerns over the ROYG,s 11/17 announcement that
92 security detainees had been released (ref xx). Charge
reminded Alimi that the USG had repeatedly requested
consultation prior to any detainee release (refs b and c),
including in FBI Director Mueller,s 11/5 meeting with
President Saleh, and Yemen,s failure to consult prior to
announcing releases had caused disappointment and concern in
Washington.


3. (C) Alimi said he was briefed on Charge,s meeting with FM

Qirbi the previous day, and welcomed the chance to &correct
misperceptions8 caused by ROYG media releases. He said
Saleh and Yemen,s security services took seriously their
responsibility for security in Yemen, and also recognized
that the USG shared in responsibility for security and CT
efforts regionally and globally. Thus, he said, there must
be complete coordination and transparency between the two
sides.

DETAINEES MUST MEET CONDITIONS FOR RELEASE; NONE INVOLVED IN
VIOLENCE INSIDE OR OUTSIDE YEMEN WILL BE RELEASED


4. (C) Alimi stressed repeatedly that no/no detainees have
yet been released, so U.S. concerns have not been ignored.
Rather than an instant mass release, the ROYG had initiated a
process whereby each of 92 detainess could win release by
meeting conditions set by Saleh. Those who failed to do so
would remain in jail. None of the detainees slated for
release had committed acts of violence inside or outside
Yemen. &This is a red line we will not cross,8 said Alimi.
He emphasized that any detainee who had committed a violent
act would be referred to the Attorney General for prosecution.

NUMBERS


5. (C) In response to questioning by Charge and Acting
LEGATT, Alimi summarized the breakdown of numbers as follows.
Under Yemen,s dialogue program, teams of religious scholars
(ulema) engaged 150 detainees over the past year. PSO Chief
Gamish had eliminated 58 of those from consideration from
release. Of the remaining 92 ) all now candidates for
release ) 54 had surrendered themselves with Khalid Abdul
Nabi following the Hattat/Abyan engagement. Alimi described
these as non-ideological men in need of jobs, and noted that
Abdul Nabi himself "was never arrested." The other 38 were
arrested in various places on suspicion of al-Qaeda
membership or other extremist affiliation.

PROCESS


6. (C) The Minister explained that the announcement of
detainees slated for release began a process whereby each
individual must to provide written, sworn assurance (a) that
he will follow the law and avoid extremist contacts, (b) that
he will not attempt to travel outside Yemen without ROYG
permission, and (c) that he will report to police when/if
called. Each detainee must also obtain parallel
guarantees/assurances from family, friends, tribe and
business/social associates, who must all: (a) attest to their
own belief that the detainee has reformed, (b) agree to
inform the police should he misbehave, and (c) tell police
where he is when/if asked.


7. (C) Political Security Organization Chief Ghaleb al-Gamish
will assess when the required standard of assurances is met,
and any detainee fails to meet that standard will remain in
jail. Alimi noted that the release process was based on
positive experience from the release of a smaller number of
detainees during Ramadan 2002, including creation of a
network of informers who had exposed terrorist sleeper cells.
Moreover, the requirement of assurances from family members
and other associates turned Yemen,s tight-knit tribal/family
structure to the advantage of the security services )
particularly because relatives would be reluctant to offer
assurances unless sincerely convinced the detainee will keep
his promises. The 11/17 public announcement of releases was
calculated, in part, to spur detainees and their relatives to
provide the assurances.


8. (C) Once a detainee obtains the necessary assurances, and
is approved for release, the PSO will inform the Ministry of
Interior, which places him on the ROYG,s security
&blacklist8 as a person forbidden to travel out of Yemen.
When asked, Alimi said that the "blacklist" entails the entry
of each name into the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP)
system.


9. (C) Alimi repeatedly declined to offer any timeline for
when actual releases might begin. While noting that the
process of obtaining assurances could take as little as a few
days if a detainee,s family were committed to supporting
him, Alimi insisted that the &comprehensive" and
"time-consuming" nature of the process would mean that no
release is imminent.

USG WILL RECEIVE NAMES OF ALL RELEASED DETAINEES


10. (C) Dr. Alimi said that the PSO would &immediately8
provide to Embassy Sanaa the name and full biodata of any
detainee released. Acting LEGATT said names should be
provided now, before release. Failing that, the explanations
provided by Alimi were inconsistent with the 11/5
Mueller-Saleh conversation and insufficient to address U.S.
concerns. Moreover, U.S. authorities should not have first
learned of ROYG detainee release plans via press reports.
Alimi said he understood the misunderstanding stemmed from
press reports that said detainees were already released when
they were not. He offered to discuss the matter further with
PSO Chief Gamish to explore whether names could be provided
prior to actual release.


11. (C) When asked about obtaining the names of detainees
released during Ramadan last year, Alimi expressed surprise
that the PSO had not provided them. Charge confirmed that
the Embassy had not received them. Alimi said he would
discuss this meeting with PSO Chief Gamish in "complete
detail" and also raise the question of last year,s detainee
releases. Above all, concluded Alimi, the United States and
Yemen need not worry about detainee releases, and should
focus on apprehending terrorists who remained at large )
particularly Abu Asim al-Makki, Jamal al-Badawi and Fadl
al-Quso ) because they are the ones who can pose an active
threat.

USS COLE SUSPECTS TO TRIAL SOON?


12. (C) Charge asked about press reports that more than 60
detainees, including suspects in the USS Cole case, would
move to trial in December. Alimi was uncertain. He said he
would like to see prosecution move quickly, but expressed
concern that the Moayed extradition and instability in Iraq
could negatively affect public reaction. He noted that
escaped Cole suspects Jamal al-Badawi and Fadl al-Quso could
potentially be tried in absentia. (Note: Post will pursue
the question with the Attorney General,s office.)

MOAYED REACTION CALM; ROYG REMAINS VIGILANT


13. (C) Charge thanked Alimi for heightened security
preparations in conjunction with the extradition of Sheikh
Mohamed al-Moayed from Germany to the United States, and
observed that public reaction had been muted. The Minister
agreed, noting that the MOI had no indication of
demonstrations or disturbances planned for the impending
weekend. The ROYG is nonetheless taking precautionary
security measures, said Alimi, and will pay close attention
to Friday mosque sermons that could inflame reaction. He
added that the ROYG was making "widespread efforts,"
including media outreach, to keep the situation calm and
avert repercussions. He noted that Yemen,s Embassy in
Washington is working with Moayed,s family and supporters to
arrange his defense, concluding that the ROYG will now depend
on the "justice and fairness" of the American judicial system.

--------------
Comment
--------------


14. (C) Alimi, the ROYG,s polished &good cop,8 was calm
and conciliatory throughout the meeting. He was aware of
U.S. concerns (from Charge,s meeting with FM Qirbi the
previous day),and was at pains to deemphasize the issue and
emphasize Yemen,s intention to provide notification when a
release does occur. Unfortunately he could provide no idea
of when that might be, nor any promise that biodata will be
provided prior/prior to any release. This may be in part
because the process resides with the PSO rather than the MOI,
but we will continue working all channels with the ROYG to
seek further answers.
MISENHEIMER