YEMEN-DPRK: SCUD REPAIRS, NO FUTURE MILITARY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002550

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2013
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL ADCO ADPM YM
SUBJECT: YEMEN-DPRK: SCUD REPAIRS, NO FUTURE MILITARY
COOPERATION

REF: A. SANAA 4024

B. SANAA 3853

C. SANAA 1990

Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for Reasons 1.5 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Defense Minister Aliwa informed Ambassador on
10/20 that an August visit of North Korea's Deputy Minister
of Industry had yielded agreement for DPRK experts to install
replacement parts needed to restore defective SCUDs to
operational status. In response to precise questioning by
Ambassador, Aliwa stressed that the missiles would be
repaired, not enhanced, and that the repairs would mark the
end of Yemeni military cooperation with the DPRK. He noted
that the ROYG had cancelled plans for North Korean
construction of a naval facility at Hodeida, and was seeking
an alternative contractor: perhaps China or Japan. Aliwa
said he was briefing the Ambassador in accordance with
Saleh's decision -- following the visits of U/S Bolton and
NEA A/S Burns -- to end military cooperation with North
Korea. End Summary.


2. (C) Ambassador, accompanied by DCM and OMC Chief, called
on Defense Minister BG Abdullah Ali Aliwa on 10/20 at the
latter's request. Aliwa was joined by senior military staff
and Dirham Saidi of the MFA's Americas Desk. Aliwa explained
that the virtually unprecedented attendance of an MFA
representative at a MoD meeting reflected the ROYG's desire
to maintain internal coordination of DPRK-related contacts
with the U.S. Embassy.

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SCUD Repairs
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3. (C) Aliwa said he had requested the meeting at the behest
of President Saleh to "keep the USG in the picture" on ROYG
contacts with North Korea. He noted that the briefing was
consistent with Saleh's commitment -- following the 6/03
visit of U/S Bolton, as reviewed in the early October visit
of NEA A/S Burns -- to end contacts with North Korea
(reftels).


4. (C) The Minister briefly recounted Yemen's "problem": some
of the SCUDs received in 12/02 were non-functional because
certain components were old and defective. At Yemen's
request, a senior DPRK official -- the Deputy Minister of
Industry -- had visited during August to discuss the matter.
(Note: The visit was not/not publicized in Yemen. End Note)
Yemen's demand for a monetary refund was not accepted, but
after 10 days of negotiation a "solution" was agreed. North
Korea is to send a team of experts with the spare parts
necessary to restore the defective missiles to working order.
They will come "soon," and remain as long as necessary to
complete the job.

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No Missile Upgrade; No Future Cooperation
--------------


5. (C) Ambassador questioned Aliwa closely for further
details. The Minister appeared unable to address technical
aspects -- e.g. what parts are defective: propulsion?
guidance? -- but gave repeated and emphatic assurance that
the process would involve merely repair. There will be no
upgrade, no extension of range, and no enhancement of missile
capabilities in any respect. In response to further
questioning, BG Aliwa stressed that there would be no further
payment by Yemen, as the repairs were within the scope of the
old agreement under which the missiles were delivered.
Moreover, the presence of the North Korean technical team
would not be prolonged or evolve into some new technical
cooperation. They would depart once the work was complete,
and Yemeni technicians were prepared to assume comprehensive
responsibility for the SCUDs in Yemen's arsenal.


6. (C) Ambassador reminded Aliwa that the USG had repeatedly
made clear its view that Yemen should cease all contact with
the DPRK, and that this was the outcome Washington wanted to
see.

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Hodeida Port: Seeking Alternative Contractors
--------------


6. (C) In response to follow-on questioning by Ambassador,
Aliwa affirmed that Yemen had dropped plans for DPRK
construction of a military port facility in Hodeida. He said
the ROYG was seeking an alternative, perhaps China or Japan.


7. (C) Embassy Sanaa coordinates with Japanese Embassy on
DPRK-related issues, and on 10/21 DCM briefed Japanese DCM on
Aliwa's message. He said Japanese were unaware of the North
Korean deputy minister's August visit to Yemen. He confirmed
that Saleh had asked the recently arrived Japanese Ambassador
for Tokyo to support Hodeida port construction. Japanese
Ambassador declined, however, because of domestic legal
constraints on aid projects with military applications.

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Comment
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8. (C) Aliwa's briefing seems to confirm the course the ROYG
has steered on North Korea since U/S Bolton's 6/03 visit:
visible action to curtail bilateral cooperation, but also a
desire to get and keep the existing stock of SCUDs
operational. The fact that the ROYG briefed the Embassy
(albeit two months after the DPRK official's visit) is
positive.
HULL