Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03SANAA2463
2003-10-08 06:46:00
SECRET
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

NEA A/S BURNS OCTOBER 4 MEETING WITH SALEH: CT

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002463 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2013
TAGS: PREL PTER AMGT EAID PARM MCAP KPAL SA IZ YM ICC DPRK COUNTER TERRORISM ECON COM
SUBJECT: NEA A/S BURNS OCTOBER 4 MEETING WITH SALEH: CT
COOPERATION; ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE; YEMENI-SAUDI CT EFFORTS;
ARTICLE 98; DIPLOMATIC POUCH

REF: A. SANAA 2440

B. SANAA 2410

C. SANAA 1990

Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for reasons 1.5 (b and d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002463

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2013
TAGS: PREL PTER AMGT EAID PARM MCAP KPAL SA IZ YM ICC DPRK COUNTER TERRORISM ECON COM
SUBJECT: NEA A/S BURNS OCTOBER 4 MEETING WITH SALEH: CT
COOPERATION; ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE; YEMENI-SAUDI CT EFFORTS;
ARTICLE 98; DIPLOMATIC POUCH

REF: A. SANAA 2440

B. SANAA 2410

C. SANAA 1990

Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for reasons 1.5 (b and d)


1. (S/NF) Summary: In a 10/4 meeting with President Saleh,
NEA A/S Burns welcomed U.S.-Yemeni CT cooperation and
supported U.S. assistance for Yemen's security and
development. Saleh briefed on expanding Saudi-Yemeni CT
cooperation, which he characterized as better than ever
before, despite (according to him) occasional Saudi
foot-dragging and a continuing flow of terrorist financing
flowing coming from the KSA. Burns stressed the need for an
Article 98 agreement. Saleh asked for a Powell-Qirbi letter
on the subject to help the ROYG reach a positive response.
In a discussion of long-running problems with the diplomatic
pouch and diplomatic support flights for Embassy Sanaa, Saleh
expressed lingering concerns over the volume and
non-transparency of shipments. A/S Burns underscored the
need for cooperation to ensure that the 10/5 support flight
would succeed and set a positive model for the future. In a
private exchange at the meeting's end, Burns reiterated the
U.S. call for Yemen to sever cooperation with North Korea.
Saleh agreed in principle, but cited ongoing talks on the
"defective" SCUDs Yemen received from the DPRK last winter.
Saleh and Burns also exchanged views on Iraq and Palestine.
Septel reports A/S Burns' earlier meeting with FM Qirbi. End
Summary.


2. (C) NEA A/S Burns, accompanied by Ambassador, DCM and
Pol/Econ Chief (notetaker) called on President Saleh 10/4/03

during Burns' 1 1/2-day stay in Yemen. Saleh received the
U.S. delegation in a recently restored old Turkish military
garrison known locally as "the new Pentagon." MFA staffers
confirmed afterward that Saleh intends to use the site as an
alternate venue for high-level meetings, and that the meeting
with A/S Burns marked the first time he had done so.

SALEH: IMPROVEMENT IN COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION WARRANTS
INCREASED ECONOMIC AID


3. (C) Noting that the August visit to Washington DC by
Presidential Advisor Abdelkarim al-Iryani was fruitful, Saleh
quickly shifted to the progress that Yemen has made in
combating terrorism. Pointing to the ROYG's recent success
in disrupting an al-Qaida cell in Sanaa (ref a),Saleh
expressed dissatisfaction with the U.S. media and urged the
USG to be cautious about sharing information with the media
while Yemen is still trying to track down all parts of the
cell. He maintained that the leaking of information has had
a negative impact on the flow of European tourism and
investment to Yemen.


4. (C) Saleh criticized the USG for not providing economic
assistance commensurate with Yemen's contribution to
counter-terrorism efforts. A/S Burns pointed out that Saleh
had voiced a similar concern about CT assistance a year or
two earlier, but that the CT relationship was now well
established. He said a similar positive trend was underway
with respect to economic assistance, and would grow and
become increasingly visible over time as Yemen made progress
on its own economic reforms. Saleh re-emphasized the need
for economic assistance, commenting that the U.S. is a
superpower and should overlook small mistakes and concentrate
on the fact that it needs allies in the region. He recalled
that he was the first Arab leader to visit Washington after
9/11, and suggested that the U.S. convince Saudi Arabia to
exempt Yemen from its debts as a further economic assistance
measure.


5. (C) A/S Burns noted that he had headed the U.S. del at the
10/02 World Bank-sponsored Coordinating Group meeting in
Paris. Saleh interjected that Burns' "excellent" speech had
been the best at the event and positively influenced the
meeting outcome. Underscoring U.S. commitment to expanding
economic assistance to Yemen, Burns noted that Yemen has to
date been the number one beneficiary of program funding under
the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). He continued
that Yemen may also qualify to benefit from the Millennium
Challenge Account (MCA) if it moves forward on essential
reforms, e.g. in civil service, the judiciary and corruption.
Burns urged Saleh to move ahead decisively in these areas.
Saleh asserted that the World Bank, the IMF and the USG need
to understand Yemen's problems, including the population
explosion, absence of tourism, limited oil revenues and
limited export markets for Yemeni goods.


6. (C) A/S Burns referred to U.S. support for the nascent
Yemeni Coast Guard, including the delivery of EDA patrol
craft set for January 2004. Saleh half-jokingly suggested
that the U.S. provide Yemen 15-20 new vessels from the UAE
shipyards, as this would be faster and cheaper than the old,
refurbished craft the USG was sending. Saleh complained that
Yemeni CT cooperation with the United States had caused the
international community to criticize the ROYG's human rights
record. A/S Burns responded that Yemen has moved ahead in
some areas, such as women's rights and increased voter
registration, and had a self-interest in showing the same
determination in other areas of civil society and political
freedoms. This was not a favor to the U.S., but a step
forward for Yemenis.

NEW AL-QAIDA LEADERSHIP; SAUDI ARABIA IS A "DEN" FOR HIDING
TERRORISTS


7. (S/NF) A/S Burns asked Saleh's assessment of recently
expanded security cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Saleh said
it was good, and that recent exchanges of information and of
prisoners was very positive. Nevertheless, the KSA remains a
"den" in which terrorists find safe hideouts, and cutting off
Saudi-origin funding for terrorism must be a priority. Saleh
revealed that he had envisioned a three-way meeting with
Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Mohamed bin Naif to correspond
with the recently postponed visit to Yemen by FBI Director
Mueller. He said he still hoped to arrange such a session
when Mueller's visit is rescheduled. Saleh noted that the
ROYG killed seven Saudis in recent clashes in al-Jawf, Marib
and Houdeidah and that he has passed their names to Mohamed
bin Naif. Saleh passed Ambassador Hull the name Ali al Hajj,
who he said had replaced al-Nasheri as new head of al-Qaida
operations in the Arabian peninsula).


8. (C) Saleh commented the May bombings had an "excellent"
effect on the SAG, as the Saudis are now focused on CT as
they never were previously. Asked by AMB Hull to specify
Yemen's coordinator for the expanding cooperation with the
Saudis, Saleh named two: Interior Minister Alimi handles the
relationship on a political level, while PSO chief Gamish
handles details -- e.g. exchange of telephone numbers, names
and other information on terrorist suspects. In response,
Ambassador noted that Alimi was upbeat on cooperation with
the Saudis, while Gamish told us privately that it was
unproductive. Saleh responded that Gamish was "sensitive"
because the Saudis were often slow to respond to specific
requests for information -- e.g. the KSA's slow response to
Yemen's long-standing request for extraditions.
Nevertheless, said Saleh, overall Saudi-Yemeni CT cooperation
is better than at any time in the past.

ARTICLE 98: REQUEST FOR POWELL-QIRBI LETTER


9. (C) A/S Burns emphasized the importance of reaching a
U.S.-Yemeni agreement on Article 98 promptly, since Yemeni
ratification of the ICC treaty without such an agreement in
place could trigger curtailment of U.S. assistance. Saleh
initially said that Yemen was "opposed," but quickly backed
off as A/S Burns elaborated on the issue. Saleh asked that
an official letter be sent from Secretary Powell to FM Qirbi
spelling out the issue (once again) and the steps Yemen
needed to take. A/S Burns agreed that the USG would provide
such a letter. Saleh concluded that the ROYG would consider
the matter carefully and hopefully offer a positive response.

DIPLOMATIC POUCH/DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FLIGHTS


10. (C) Apparently briefed by Qirbi that A/S Burns intended
to raise U.S. concerns over continuing Yemeni restrictions on
the pouch and diplomatic support flights for Embassy Sanaa,
Saleh pre-emptively raised the issue himself. He complained
that U.S. insistence on importing large volumes of material
and refusing to have it inspected was a violation of the
Vienna Convention and a source of embarrassment for the ROYG.
He fretted that Parliament and the opposition parties were
aware of the issue and pressed the government not to sell out
Yemeni sovereignty by acceding to these excessive U.S.
demands.


11. (C) Saleh then offered a "solution." He said the ROYG
would permit Embassy Sanaa to bring in anything it wished, as
long as it is inspected first. He expanded on this theme,
inviting the Embassy to import even secret/sensitive items --
e.g. "eavesdropping devices," "espionage equipment," weapons,
explosives, bombs, rockets, cameras, computers, etc. -- but
to cooperate with Yemeni authorities in doing so. Inspection
of such "secret" items could be performed in a "locked room"
with only a single Yemeni security official present, after
which the items could be taken immediately to the Embassy
compound. Inspection was unavoidable, however, and must
occur in the airport -- i.e. on Yemeni soil -- rather than at
the Embassy, which was American soil and therefore outside
the scope of Yemeni sovereignty and control.


12. (C) A/S Burns replied that the diplomatic support flight
scheduled for the following day (10/5) would meet the
President's concerns as it contained only five dip pouches --
which, by common assent, were non-inspectable -- and items of
diplomatic cargo which were all inspectable. He asked that
Yemeni authorities cooperate fully to make the 10/5 flight a
shared success which could set the stage for future progress
on this important bilateral issue. (Note: The 10/5
diplomatic support flight was off-loaded in record time with
full Yemeni cooperation. End note.)

IRAQ


13. (C) At Saleh's request, A/S Burns provided an overview of
current conditions and U.S. aims in Iraq. Reviewing themes
covered in his recent meeting with GEN Abizaid (ref b),Saleh
offered a range of "friendly" opinions and advice on Iraq:
the Iraqi army should not have been disbanded; police and
administrative responsibilities must be placed in Iraqi
hands; that former soldiers and former Baathists must be
given an economic stake; restoring security is a top
priority, ahead of creating a model democracy; many
opposition figures who arrived with coalition troops are not
credible. A/S Burns expressed appreciation for FM Qirbi's
helpful role in getting the Iraqi delegation seated in the
Arab League and asked that Yemen maintain such a supportive
posture.

ISRAEL-PALESTINE AND THE ROADMAP


14. (C) Saleh strongly urged the USG to press the parties for
implementation of the roadmap, which he said would give the
U.S. credibility with the Arab countries. He commented that
by overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but refusing to work with
Arafat, the U.S. was using a double standard. A/S Burns
outlined the U.S. approach, stressing commitment to the
roadmap and a two-state solution. President Saleh said Yemen
is against Hamas, adding that Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
Syria, Lebanon and Jordan are all ready to press the
Palestinians to stop the violence, but the U.S. must
guarantee that Israel will stop the settlements. The A/S
agreed that the Palestinians must have a sense of hope if the
extremists are to be marginalized, but emphasized again that
Palestinian performance on security is critically important.
Saleh agreed and said that Yemen is ready to help and
cooperate. He equated a Palestinian state with Israeli
security. (Note: The meeting occurred prior to the 10/4/03
Haifa suicide bombing.)

ROYG-DPRK COOPERATION; SCUDS


15. (S/NF) In a brief private exchange with Saleh at the end
of the meeting, A/S Burns underscored the importance of
cutting off Yemeni cooperation with North Korea. Saleh said
Yemen had taken the decision to do so, including the
Houdeidah naval base, but discussions were underway regarding
the "defective" SCUDs imported last winter (ref c). This
could lead to either a North Korean refund payment to Yemen
or possibly a DPRK technical team to visit Yemen and effect
repairs. A/S Burns cautioned again that Yemen should limit
all interaction with North Korea.


16. (U) This cable was cleared by NEA A/S Burns.
HULL