GEN ABIZAID'S 9/19 MEETING WITH SALEH: EMPHASIS ON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002410

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR IZ YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: GEN ABIZAID'S 9/19 MEETING WITH SALEH: EMPHASIS ON
CONTINUED CT COOPERATION; ROYG ARREST OF AL-QAIDA CELL IN
YEMEN

Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for reasons 1.5 (a),(d)


1. (S/NF) Summary: In his first visit to Yemen, GEN Abizaid,
CDR USCENTCOM, met with the Country Team and called
separately on Chief of Staff Qasimi (septel) and President
Saleh. Saleh briefed the CDR on the ROYG's discovery and
arrest of a terrorist cell over the previous few days. Saleh
revealed that the cell had planned to target the U.S. and UK
Ambassadors, in addition to senior Yemeni officials and the
Central Bank. He undertook to share full details of the
operation via intel channels over coming days. Saleh
provided an upbeat account of Yemen's CT cooperation with
Saudi Arabia, and engaged in an extended discussion of
challenges facing coalition forces in Iraq. Yemeni media
featured GEN Abizaid's meetings and robust U.S.-Yemeni
security cooperation. End Summary.

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Yemeni-Eritrean Relations
--------------


2. (C) GEN Abizaid, accompanied by CJTF-HOA Commander BG
Robeson, Ambassador, DCM (notetaker) and OMC Chief called on
President Saleh at the Presidency during a 5-hour visit to
Yemen on 9/19/03. The CINC noted that he had just visited
Asmara and bore greetings to Saleh from President Isaias.
Saleh welcomed this, noting that Yemeni-Eritrean relations
were OK except for some disputes over traditional fishing
which were "not big."

-------------- ---
CT Cooperation; al-Qaida Cell in Sanaa
-------------- ---


3. (S/NF) In response to questioning by the CDR, Saleh stated
that U.S.-Yemeni cooperation was good, although the USG
processes were slow. The CDR expressed appreciation for
Yemen's CT cooperation, and observed that it was showing good
results. In reply, Saleh revealed that ROYG authorities had
recently scored a major success: breaking up an al-Qaida cell
in Sanaa that had planned a series of terrorist attacks,
including a strike against the Ambassador.


4. (S/NF) Referring to a written report, Saleh provided the
following selected details from the ROYG investigation:

-- The attack against the Ambassador was to involve RPGs
followed up by a car bomb. Saleh said that the group had
targeted the Ambassador twice (nfi). The actual attack was
to be carried out by Saudi nationals.

-- One member of the group was to bring al-Qaida money
from Saudi Arabia to purchase TNT and missiles. Saleh
mentioned two types of missiles: "loo" and "milal" (as heard).

-- Other targets on the cell's hit list included: the
British ambassador; former Yemeni PM Abdelkarim al-Iryani;
Defense Minister Aliwa; Military Chief of Staff GEN Qasimi;
PSO Chief Gamish; Interior Minister Alimi; PM Bajammal; and
the Yemeni Central Bank. (Comment: Embassy has briefed UK
Ambassador)

-- Yemeni authorities in Sanaa discovered the plot by
chance, when criminal investigation of a "girl" in connection
with a moral offense (nfi) turned up documents linking her
with an al-Qaida cell operating in the city. The group,
including two Saudis, two Syrians, the girl and one Yemeni,
was headed by Omar Abdel Rahman al-Sharif, whom Salah
described as the man who had succeeded Abu Ali al-Harithi as
head of al-Qaida operations in Yemen. Sharif and the others
are in custody.


5. (S/NF) Saleh did not provide a linear account of the
alleged plot or the Yemeni investigation that cracked it, and
follow-up questions from GEN Abizaid and the Ambassador
elicited little additional detail. Saleh said the Political
Security Organization would pass a copy of the written report
to the Embassy via intel channels soon.

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Saudi-Yemeni CT Cooperation
--------------

6. (C) In response to questioning by GEN Abizaid, Saleh said
CT cooperation with Saudi Arabia was going well. Information
is being exchanged, and both sides have rendered terrorist
suspects to the other. He pointed to the previous week's
Yemeni handover of al-Ghamdi as a recent case in point, and
said Yemen was waiting for the Saudis to turn over eight
suspects. Nevertheless, said Saleh, money from Saudi Arabia
and elsewhere in the Gulf continues to flow to extremist
elements inside Yemen. He added that Saudi Arabia provided
insufficient financial help to Yemen, and that by comparison
the United States does better.

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Iraq
--------------


7. (S/NF) Saleh expressed considerable interest in the
progress of coalition operations in Iraq, and asked if the
overall situation was improving. He commented that President
Bush was making good use of the tools of state, including
military, economic and diplomatic power. The CDR responded
that the situation is improving, with the central region --
including Baghdad, Rumadi and Tikrit -- remaining dangerous
while the north and south are calm. Saleh joked that the
British remained in Basra because the UK's colonial
experience in Iraq told them it would be less dangerous.


8. (S/NF) GEN Abizaid replied that the UK soldiers were very
good, and reviewed positive developments in the country,
including the ongoing training of new military and police
units, reopening of schools and universities and general rise
of economic activity. He added that the overall challenge
was more political and economic than military -- mainly
because Saddam had left the country in poor condition -- and
cited the need for greater participation by the Sunni
community. People in the north and south are already better
off than under the old regime, and those in the middle must
also join the rebuilding effort and be part of the solution.
Above all, stressed the CDR, the old regime was gone for
good. Forty-three of 55 former regime officials were
accounted for, although it remained important to find Saddam
Hussein. Saleh expressed the view that arresting or killing
Saddam would not end resistance, and GEN Abizaid agreed. He
said the resistance came mainly from terrorists and Islamic
zealots rather than Baathi loyalists.


9. (S/NF) Saleh asked about the number of foreign terrorists
active in Iraq, noting that he was aware of 6,000 Saudi
terrorists who had fled police pressure in the KSA. The CDR
estimated that perhaps 1,000 foreign fighters were in Iraq,
and about 10 Saudis were in custody. Saleh expressed
surprise that a larger percentage of the fugitive Saudis had
not turned up in Iraq. GEN Abuzaid said some Yemenis had
also been apprehended in Iraq, although Syrian fighters were
the most numerous national group. Saleh responded that he
knew of Yemeni students in Iraq, but not terrorists. The
Ambassador pointed out that recent intel showed the beginning
of networks to recruit Yemenis for combat in Iraq. Regarding
the Syrians, Saleh posited that they were "individuals," as
it was not SARG policy to send them to Iraq.


10. (S/NF) GEN Abizaid reviewed the range of challenges
facing coalition forces in Iraq, including Baathi loyalists,
Islamic extremists and foreign fighters. Saleh observed that
much of the resistance came from the four million or so who
had benefited from the regime of Saddam Hussein. GEN Abizaid
pointed out that the number of resistance fighters was far
lower.


11. (S/NF) Saleh ventured to put himself in the place of U.S.
planners and offered his counsel on Iraq. First, he urged
coalition action to close Iraq's borders to stem the inflow
of foreign fighters, noting that the coalition was "legally
responsible" for border security. He cited the decision to
dissolve Iraq's military and security structure as a mistake,
and the cause of much of the current disorder. Finally, he
advised against placing too much faith in former exiles like
Ahmed Chalabi and warned of the danger of erecting political
institutions based on ethnic and religious affiliation.
Focusing on separate Kurdish, Shia and Sunni identities
creates division and impedes progress. Saleh called for an
inclusive political solution and reconciliation with all
Iraqis, including those connected with the former regime. He
stressed that he did not want see Americans continue to be
targeted in Iraq nor to see the United States face long-term
enmity either in Iraq or in the region. It is thus necessary
to move quickly toward the model democracy in Iraq that
President Bush has spoken of, declared Saleh.


12. (S/NF) The CDR said AMB Bremer understands the complex
challenge of doing just that and is managing it well.
Moreover, a huge majority of Iraqis support the
reconstruction effort, although, again, the Sunni community
needs to engage more actively. Saleh acknowledged that most
Iraqis were supportive, but observed that if even 10 percent
remained non-supportive it would cause problems. He
expressed worry that all the terrorists in the world will now
get together in Iraq, as they used to do in Afghanistan. He
immediately concurred with GEN Abizaid's assertion that the
terrorists would fail, but worried aloud at the tension and
damage they could create in the near term.

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Other Issues
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13. (C) Saleh reiterated the value of training and continuing
information exchange. He added that U.S. assistance to the
Yemeni Coast Guard had been extremely valuable. The
continuing influx of illegal immigrants from Somalia was a
huge problem for Yemen. A recent fatwa by Afghan clerics had
legitimated the export of drugs to finance weapons purchases,
and this was creating new concerns for Yemen. He also
welcomed U.S. assistance on economic development issues,
adding that he and the Ambassador spoke often on this.


14. (U) Following the meeting President Saleh hosted a lunch
iho GEN Abizaid that was attended by more than 100 senior
government and military officials. As in the past, Yemeni
media provided ample coverage of GEN Abizaid's visit and
reaffirmed robust Yemeni-U.S. security cooperation.


15. (U) This cable was cleared by USCENTCOM.


16. (S/NF) Comment: We will be analyzing information to be
provided through intel channels on the disrupted al-Qaida
cell, but caution against premature conclusions based on
Saleh's sketchy account.
HULL