MAKING THE MONEY WORK IN YEMEN; ON-GOING SUPPORT

S E C R E T SANAA 002335

SIPDIS

FOR PM A/S BLOOMFIELD FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2013
TAGS: PINR POLM YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: MAKING THE MONEY WORK IN YEMEN; ON-GOING SUPPORT
FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION

Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for reasons 1.5 (b and d).


1. (u) This is an action request. See paragraph 6.


2. (s/nf) Summary/comment: We need to stay engaged with the
Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) to ensure that Yemen
continues to support U.S. counter-terrorism efforts. In
order to be successful, we must both continue current levels
of assistance -- both for security and for economic
development -- and find ways to sustain and expand the
programs we have created. In 2003, the ROYG publicly
designated their Ministry of Interior's Central Security
Force (CSF),the National Counter-terrorist (CT) Force of
Yemen. This was due in large part to the specialized
training the unit received from U.S. and U.K. military
personnel. In the short while since the unit's designation
as Yemen's National CT Force, they have conducted several
successful CT operations. However, sources of funding for
this unit are severely limited. We need to stay engaged with
the ROYG, and the CSF in particular, to ensure that Yemen
continues to take aggressive action against terrorism and
does not revert to being a haven for extremists or
terrorists. If the U.S. expects the ROYG to be a useful
partner in CT matters, a solution for sustainable funding
will have to be found. End summary/comment.


3. (s/nf) Training and materiel support for the Central
Security Force
(CSF) is the cornerstone of our CT engagement in Yemen. The
CSF's
participation and outstanding performance in a July 2003
operation in Abyan to defeat terrorists who had attacked a
ROYG medical convoy the previous month is an obvious example
of the benefits of providing this training. Elements of the
Ministry of Defense along with Ministry of Interior
U.S.-trained CSF soldiers killed or arrested the terrorists,
who were holed up in caves. In April 2003, this 50-member
unit also captured Hamza Majali and Fawaz Al-Rabii AKA
Furqan. Furqan was a designated USCENTCOM High Value Target
(HVT). The CSF are training hard and operating aggressively
against terrorism in Yemen. They represent our most notable
success in getting the ROYG to take action and we currently
do not have a reliable, long-term solution for funding
engagement with this unit.


4. (s/nf) Military offices at Post have utilized a variety of
sources to fund training the CSF to date. The training
conducted in FY 2003 was funded using Title 10, Commander's
Initiative Funds (CIF). These funds were authorized by the
Joint Staff but are not allowed to be used on the same
project two years in a row. Fortunately, USCENTCOM recently
received some FY 2003 CT Supplemental funds and has agreed to
cover the costs of training the CSF throughout FY 2004 using
these funds. However, CIF and CT Supplemental funds are
neither reliable nor sufficient to maintain long-term,
productive engagement with the CSF.


5. (s/nf) Foreign Military Funding (FMF) and/or International
Military Education and Training (IMET) monies would appear to
be possible long-term solutions, but there are legislative
constraints against using FMF or IMET funds for training
outside the control of a country's Ministry of Defense. This
issue was brought to the attention of Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence (SSCI) Staffer Randy Bookout and General
Counsel Richard Douglas when they visited Sana'a in August.
Bookout and Douglas suggested the possibility of a
legislative fix to expand the scope of permissible uses for
FMF funding and promised their support for a solution in
Washington.


6. (s/nf) Action request: I would like to request your
assistance resolving this issue and identifying an on-going
source of funding for sustaining U.S.-Yemen military
cooperation with the CSF.
HULL