Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03SANAA2125
2003-08-24 07:05:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

SANAA EAC MEETING - AUGUST 20, 2003

Tags:  ASEC AMGT PREL PTER EAC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SANAA 002125 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS,
DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2013
TAGS: ASEC AMGT PREL PTER EAC
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - AUGUST 20, 2003

Classified By: CHARGE ALAN G. MISENHEIMER, for reasons
1.5 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SANAA 002125

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS,
DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2013
TAGS: ASEC AMGT PREL PTER EAC
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - AUGUST 20, 2003

Classified By: CHARGE ALAN G. MISENHEIMER, for reasons
1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Begin Summary: The Charge convened an EAC
meeting on August 20 to assess the recent bombings in Baghdad
and Jerusalem and how this could affect security for official
and unofficial Amcits in Yemen. Also discussed was a recent
internet news item concerning terrorism and security in
Yemen. Key offices and personnel represented at the meeting
included: POL/ECON, CONS, ADMIN, PD, RSO, ORCA, DAO, OMC,
AND SOC YEMEN. End summary.


2. (C) The Charge briefed the EAC on the August 19, 2003
bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem, and discussed with
attendees any implications for the security situation in
Yemen. The EAC decided that there were no immediate or
obvious connections to be drawn between the bombings and an
increased threat in Yemen. EAC attendees collectively had no
specific indications or warnings of an immediate threat to
Amcits or American installations in Yemen.


3. (C) The Assistant Regional Security Officer (ARSO)
briefed that he had discussed the attacks with the Local
Guard Force (LGF) supervisor and had directed an increase in
vigilance among LGF staff. The ARSO also discussed the issue
with counterparts in the Central Security Organization and
the Political Security Organization. Both organizations had
been directed earlier in the day by their higher command to
increase Yemeni guard vigilance around the American Embassy
and housing installations.


4. (C) The EAC decided that a warden message to the U.S.
community was not warranted. While a warden message and/or
other responsive measures might become necessary, there was
as yet no specific indications of a heightened threat to
Amcits or U.S. interests.


5. (S/NF) In a separate issue, the Charge passed out copies
and discussed a August 16, 2003 internet news item from the
DEBKAfile.com site. The story was passed to him by the
director of the local United Nations (UN) office. The story
indicated that Yemen, as well as Kenya and Saudi Arabia, had
been targeted during the week of August 10 for devastating
mega-terror offensives. ORCA reported no information to
substantiate such lurid predictions. OMC indicated that he
knew of the site and that it was consistently sensationalist.
While the UN director told the Charge that he would keep an
eye on the site and forward any other information of
interest, the EAC agreed that the Embassy would continue to
rely on its own sources of information regarding security
issues.
MISENHEIMER