INTERIOR MINISTER ALIMI ON AL-MOAYED, TRAINING AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 001971

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2013
TAGS: PTER PREL ASEC YM COUNTER TERRORISM TERFIN
SUBJECT: INTERIOR MINISTER ALIMI ON AL-MOAYED, TRAINING AND
COLE ESCAPEES


Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull, Reasons 1.5 (b & d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Interior Minister Alimi again pressed
Ambassador August 5 for US agreement to return Sheikh
al-Moayed to Yemen for trial, in response to FBI invitation
for Yemeni officials to visit New York and review evidence
following al-Moayed's extradition. Ambassador and
Legatt-Designate reiterated firm USG intent to extradite and
urged Yemeni government to cooperate in al-Moayed case and
urge al-Moayed himself to cooperate. Current training of
Interior forces was assessed favorably by both sides and
future training discussed generally. Legatt-Designate
proposed formation of a joint task force to pursue Cole
escapees. Alimi was cool to the idea, but agreed to study
it. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Ambassador, Legatt-Designate Gaudin, Special Agent
Fernandez and RSO Laas met Interior Minister Alimi for nearly
two hours August 5, to follow up previous discussion with
President Saleh and invitation for Yemeni officials to come
to New York to meet with American prosecutors and review the
al-Moayed case subsequent to his extradition.


3. (C) To start, Ambassador praised Alimi on excellent crime
scene exercise which he had attended that morning on the
outskirts of Sanaa. Ambassador praised Yemeni participants
for their enthusiasm and qualifications. He also praised FBI
trainers for their expertise. Ambassador noted that this
training had direct relevance to our counter terrorism
efforts and was funded by the Diplomatic Security Bureau of
the State Department. Alimi welcomed the training and said
it would serve as one of the bases for the new CT capability
that he was forming within the Ministry of Interior.


4. (C) Discussion turned to extradition of al-Moayed.
Minister Alimi said he, PSO Chief Qamish and President Saleh
had all considered the letter of the Legatt-designate (Para
8) which contained particulars of the US case and an
invitation for Yemeni officials to come to New York City to
review all evidence and cooperate with US prosecutors. Alimi
said the facts in the letter broke little new ground. The
Yemenis continue to consider al-Moayed a relatively
unimportant player and one best handled in the Yemeni courts.
He reiterated previous Yemeni offers to work with US
authorities in bringing al-Moayed to justice in Yemen. In
response, Ambassador and Legatt-designate reiterated US
determination to extradite al-Moayed and cautioned the
Minister that previously seemingly unimportant terrorists
subsequently played important roles in facilitating attacks.
Extensive discussion ensued and Alimi indicated that it is
unlikely Yemeni authorities will accept the invitation.
Ambassador stressed that cooperation on al-Moayed's part and
between the US and Yemen offered the best opportunity to deal
with the political fallout of the al-Moayed case.


5. (C) Discussion eventually turned to future training of
Interior Ministry CT Unit. Legatt-Designate sketched
training programs that have been successfully done in
Indonesia and Pakistan. In so doing, he noted that such
training falls within the purview of the State Department ATA
Program, but he would recommend that the FBI support such
training if agreed. RSO noted funding for such training would
have to be obtained. Ambassador said that US would explore
the possibility based on the Minister's interest.
Legatt-designate then noted that the FBI hopes to have slots
for one or two Yemenis at the FBI Academy and suggested that
the Yemeni facilitator in the current training program, Major
Qatan, would be an excellent candidate.


6. (C) Legatt-Designate then noted Ambassador's previous
demarche to President Saleh on urgency to recapture escaped
Cole suspects as well as BG Robeson's similar Demarche to
Alimi August 4. Legatt-Designate proposed that a joint task
force be formed with the sole purpose of recapturing
prominent Cole escapees. FBI participants would bring their
expertise and capabilities to the effort. Such a step would
signal from the Yemeni side complete determination to bring
these wanted individuals to justice. In response, Alimi
expressed Yemeni determination to recapture the escapees. He
noted the significant changes that have occurred in Yemeni
security services in the wake of the escape. The issue
currently was to develop leads, follow-up and re-arrest.
Ambassador pointed out that development of leads was exactly
where the FBI could help and extraordinary efforts are now
required in this regard. Alimi said he would study the
proposal.


7. (C) COMMENT: Minister Alimi was obviously conflicted in
this meeting. The al-Moayed case presents significant
political costs here, and the Minister is accurately
reflecting President Saleh's strong personal preference that
al-Moayed be returned to Yemen. The Minister is also
responsible for security of Americans in Yemen and will have
to manage any threats that result from an extremely unpopular
handover. That said, Minister Alimi appreciates acutely the
benefits Yemen accrues from CT cooperation with the US and
will work to keep that cooperation on track despite
inevitable political and security fallout from al-Moayed's
extradition.


8. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF FBI LETTER TO MINISTER ALIMI:

His Excellency
Dr. Rashad al-Alimi
Minister of Interior
Sana'a
Excellency:

It is our pleasure to invite three members of your government
to visit the Federal Bureau of Investigation's New York City
Office. The purpose of the invitation is to discuss the
pending United States criminal case against two Yemeni
citizens, Mohamed al-Moayad and Mohamed Zayed. We would like
to extend this offer for your visit upon completion of all
extradition proceedings involving al-Moayad and Zayed. It is
believed that this visit will further the spirit of
cooperation between our two agencies in combating the global
war against terrorism. This request for you to visit the
United States is at the expense of our government. A more
complete and full disclosure of the facts involved in the
case will be made available to you upon your arrival in New
York City.

A summary of the case is outlined below:

It initially was reported to the FBI that al-Moayad was
involved in supplying money, arms and recruits to mujahideen
fighters, i.e., men fighting for extremist Muslim groups such
as al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and the separatists in Chechnya
and Kashmir. Al-Moayad also stated, in substance, that he
has supplied al-Qaeda with arms and communication equipment
in the past.

Al-Moayad identified five individuals in New York who were
sending money from the United States to al-Moayad. Al-Moayad
provided contact telephone numbers for these individuals.
Al-Moayad indicated that he received money for the jihad that
was collected at a mosque in Brooklyn, NY.

Al-Moayad suggested meeting in Frankfurt, Germany because he
and the secretary who was to accompany him could easily get
visas to Germany. Al-Moayad also explained that he
(al-Moayad) had business to conduct in Germany. Al-Moayad
specifically referenced plans to purchase
counter-surveillance equipment from a German company, known
as PK Electronic International GmbH and Co KG, located in
Hamburg, Germany. Al-Moayad showed a typewritten invoice
from PK International reflecting al-Moayad's proposed
purchase of equipment. The buyer was listed as Ali Ibrahim
Elhayek, whom al-Moayad identified as the individual making
the purchases on al-Moayad's behalf. Al-Moayad claimed that
he wanted the equipment to enable him to conduct
counter-surveillance against Yemeni internal security
authorities, whom al-Moayad believed might be monitoring him.
The invoice reflects the purchase of, among other things, a
"Mini Transmitter Detector," a "Wrist Watch Transmitter," a
"Wrist Watch Camera Set," "Audio Surveillance Device,"
"Quartz Controlled Ball Point Pen," "Photographic
Surveillance System with Camera and Adapter" and a "Universal
Tapping Detector."

The names of people living in the United States were then
investigated by the FBI. It was determined that the persons
in the U.S. were involved in helping al-Moayad.

On January 7, 2003, Mohamed Zayed and Mohammed al-Moayad
arrived in Frankfurt, Germany. On the previous day, an FBI
source had a telephone conversation, which was not recorded,
with Mohamed Zayed, in which he told the source that
al-Moayad and Zayed almost cancelled their trip because of an
incident that had occurred in Frankfurt on January 5, 2003,
during which the pilot of a small airplane threatened to fly
into a building, but that al-Moayad thought the meeting in
Frankfurt was too important.

On January 7, 2003, al-Moayad and Mohamed Zayed met a second
FBI source and the four men went to dinner. At the direction
of the FBI agents, source one and two did not discuss the
purpose of their trip and the meeting in Frankfurt at the
dinner.

On January 8, 2003 Mohamed Zayed, al-Moayad, source one and
source two, had breakfast together and then met in source
two's hotel room to discuss business. During a two-hour
meeting, which was recorded, source two advised al-Moayad
that source two was interested in providing money to support
the jihad against America and Zionist governments. Al-Moayad
told source two, in part and substance, that al-Moayad had
met with Usama bin Laden and discussed matters with bin Laden
and that bin Laden says that al-Moayad is his "sheikh" or
spiritual leader. Al-Moayad also said that jihad" was
al-Moayad's field and that he is connected to terrorist
organizations and has prior knowledge of terrorist
activities. In response to a question by source two,
al-Moayad said he would make inquiries as to whether source
two's men could train with terrorist fighters. Towards the
end of the meeting, al-Moayad said he would provide source
two with names of people in the United States who could
transfer money from source two to al-Moayad. The meeting
concluded with the four men agreeing to meet again to
continue their discussions.

During the January 8, 2003 meeting, source two and al-Moayad
were the primary speakers, with source one serving as a
translator. Mohamed Zayed was present for the entire meeting
and occasionally interjected in the conversation by prompting
al-Moayad's responses to questions from source two. For
example, at one point, when al-Moayad was having difficulty
remembering the name of one of his terrorist contacts, Zayed
supplied the name. Zayed also nodded his head in apparent
agreement to certain statements made during the meeting. At
the outset of the meeting, Zayed questioned the presence of
source two's pager on the coffee table, appearing to express
concern about the possibility of cameras and recording
equipment in the room. At one point during the meeting,
al-Moayad said they should swear on the Quran that they will
trust each other with respect to the matter of the money and
keep it secret, remembering that Allah is watching. In
response, all four men, including Mohamed Zayed, stood up and
placed their hands on the Quran. At another point during the
meeting, al-Moayad pointed to Zayed and told source two that
money could be sent through "Mohammed."

In the evening of January 8, 2003, source two met with
al-Moayad and Mohamed Zayed in a hotel room. During that
meeting, which was recorded, the three men discussed the use
of codes when speaking with each other on the telephone.

On January 9, 2003, Mohamed Zayed and al-Moayad again met
with both sources. During this conversation, which was
recorded, source two asked al-Moayad to identify the group or
groups to which source two's money would go, specifically
whether source two's money would go to al-Qaeda, or other
groups. Al-Moayad responded that the money would be used to
support the mujahideen fighters of both al-Qaeda and other
groups. Source two asked what the defendant Mohamed Zayed's
role was and whether he was someone source two could deal
with directly if something happened to al-Moayad. Al-Moayad
responded that Zayed was someone he trusted. Source two
asked Zayed directly if source two gave Zayed his (source
two's) money, would Zayed give it to the people to whom
source two wanted it to go. Zayed swore to Allah that he
would. Later in the meeting, Zayed suggested that possibly
arrangements could be made with members of terrorist groups
to allow source two to send money directly to a terrorist
group.

Over the course of the meetings in Germany, al-Moayad
reiterated to source one that individuals in Brooklyn, New
York could be used to facilitate the transfer of money to
al-Moayad.

It is believed that the opportunity to review the evidence of
the case in its entirety will assist you in fighting the
threat imposed by al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.
Additionally, it is hoped that at the completion of the
review, both your agency and ours, can continue to work
together to locate evidence against al-Moayad and other like
minded persons in the U.S., Yemen, and abroad.


Sincerely,

Stephen Gaudin
Legal Attache (Designate)
END TEXT.

HULL