Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03SANAA1373
2003-06-16 05:11:00
SECRET
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON'S VISIT TO

Tags:  PARM PREL OTRA OVIP YM COUNTER TERRORISM 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001373 

SIPDIS

RIYADH PLEASE PASS U/S BOLTON PARTY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2013
TAGS: PARM PREL OTRA OVIP YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON'S VISIT TO
YEMEN


Classified By: CHARGE ALAN G. MISENHEIMER FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001373

SIPDIS

RIYADH PLEASE PASS U/S BOLTON PARTY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2013
TAGS: PARM PREL OTRA OVIP YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON'S VISIT TO
YEMEN


Classified By: CHARGE ALAN G. MISENHEIMER FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) You are the most senior State Department official to
visit Yemen since Secretary Baker came in late 1990. The
ROYG thus recognizes your visit as an important opportunity
to continue building the positive bilateral relations that
have evolved in the aftermath of the Cole and 9/11 attacks,
so your brief stay in Yemen should be productive. Our
post-9/11 CT cooperation with Yemen has achieved important
successes, and President Saleh has shown resolve; but your
visit forces the Yemenis to focus on areas of the
relationship that are difficult for them, particularly SCUDs
and cooperation with North Korea. Your discussions with
Defense Minister Aliwa and, especially, FM Qirbi will advance
the U.S. agenda on those issues, and on Article 98. This
cable follows up your discussion with AMB Hull in Washington
early this month.

--------------
Yemen and North Korea
--------------


2. (C) The Yemenis have no ideological affinity for the DPRK,
but like to buy cheap. Of course the question of why a
country like Yemen -- among the world's 25 poorest, with
annual per capita income around $400 -- would buy a useless
weapons system like the SCUD (or Russian MIGs for that
matter) at any price is often posed by international donors,
and Yemen has no convincing answer. The 11/02 interdiction
of the So San with its cargo of SCUD-Bs underscored such
questions and prompted several donors (particularly the
Japanese) to suspend aid until the ROYG offered assurance
that those SCUDs would be the last.


3. (C) Those assurances, conveyed in similar terms to both
Japan and the USG, fall short of the simple and categoric
language we sought to elicit. The most recent Yemeni
statement on this -- a 3/5/03 letter from Aliwa -- stated
that existing contracts with the DPRK for spares/
maintenance, as well as construction of a naval port near
Hodeidah, would be implemented. We have seen no recent
indication of movement on either, and have strongly urged the
Yemenis to refrain from both.



4. (C) The ROYG has invited the USG to propose an affordable
alternative to the DPRK. We have urged the Rumanians (the
best established of the East Europeans in Yemen) to use their
extensive port-building experience to undercut the DPRK.
They are interested, but have bad memories of unpaid bills
for construction here in the early 90's. AMB Hull has
discussed with you the possibility of dangling expected
supplemental FMF as assistance toward responsible military
procurement.

--------------
Article 98
--------------


5. (C) U.S. military assistance is vital for Yemen, so our
leverage on the ICC/Article 98 issue is considerable. The
fact that other Arab states have taken the plunge on Article
98 is also an important consideration for the Yemenis, who
are hesitant to step ahead of their Gulf neighbors on any
potentially sensitive issue. The ROYG has signed, but not
ratified, the Rome Statute; and we have ensured that the
Yemeni leadership is aware that ratification without an
Article 98 agreement in place would precipitate a cut-off of
FMF.


6. (C) The ROYG put off consideration of an Article 98
agreement for many months in the run-up to the April 27
parliamentary elections. Since then we have worked the issue
hard with the MFA, which has been responsive. FM Qirbi is
interested in pursuing an exchange of diplomatic notes based
on the Egyptian precedent, and we have encouraged this.
President Saleh's approval is required, and we believe Qirbi
is hoping for presidential authorization to proceed in time
for your visit.

--------------
Humanitarian Demining
--------------


7. (C) You will pay a brief visit to Yemen,s National Mine
Action Committee. With U.S. guidance, the ROYG began a
humanitarian demining program in 1998. Sixty percent of all
marked areas have been cleared of mines and UXO, including 10
out of 14 "high impact" areas. Despite Yemen's poverty, the
program is widely recognized as one of the best managed and
most successful in the world.


8. (C) There is an issue here. The USG has been the largest
contributor to the program, but FY03 NADR funds -- $750,000
-- have not yet been released as the June 30 deadline looms.
The program provides humanitarian benefit to the rural poor,
and has helped anchor bilateral CT cooperation.

--------------
Security of Radioactive Materials
--------------


9. (C) Yemen's National Atomic Energy Commission -- led by
U.S.-educated Moustafa Bahran -- is surprisingly active and
supportive of U.S. positions in international fora. Bahran's
main initiative is a proposal to enhance the physical
security of radiological materials. The Republic of Yemen,
in cooperation with the United States and the EU, co-drafted
and co-sponsored the final resolution in the 2002 IAEA
conference on preventing the use of radioactive materials for
terror. Bahran looks forward to meeting you.

--------------

10. (C) Foreign Minister Qirbi
--------------

In his second term as Foreign Minister, Dr. Abu Bakr al-Qirbi
(a physician by background) has worked to advance Yemen's
return to a responsible foreign policy, although he is not
inclined to take bold steps that might alienate Arab or
Muslim opinion. Both he and Saleh were cautious in public
expressions of opposition to Operation Iraqi Freedom, and
Qirbi privately told us many times he welcomed the removal of
Saddam Hussein. Qirbi has strongly endorsed the
Israeli-Palestinian Road Map and publicly praised President
Bush for launching the initiative. He is UK-educated and
speaks fluent English.

--------------

11. (C) Defense Minister Aliwa
--------------

Major General Abdullah Ali Aliwa has served both as a soldier
and as the civilian governor of a poor province. He is
anxious to strengthen military cooperation with the U.S. He
does not take the lead on international policy issues,
however, and will defer to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on
Article 98 and, to a lesser degree, cooperation with North
Korea. He may raise the ROYG's program to buy back MANPADS
as in indicator of Yemen's CT commitment. He speaks limited
English and will prefer to converse in Arabic.
MISENHEIMER