DEMARCHE ON SALE OF FAST BOATS TO IRAN

S E C R E T ROME 005552

SIPDIS


NOFORN

STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/PRA, NP/ECNP, INR/SPM, NEA;NGA,
PM/RSAT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2013
TAGS: PARM ETTC PREL EIND IR IT EXPORT CONTROLS
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON SALE OF FAST BOATS TO IRAN

REF: A. STATE 338477

B. ROME 5202 AND PREVIOUS

CLASSIFIED BY: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION EMIL SKODON FOR REASONS 1.5(A)(B
) AND 1.6X6


1. (S) FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF REF A INSTRUCTIONS, EMBASSY
RAISED URGENT USG CONCERNS WITH THE FOLLOWING GOI OFFICIALS:

-- FM FRATTINI: AT A PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED DECEMBER 10
DINNER AT THE RESIDENCE IN HONOR OF FM FRATTINI, AMB. SEMBLER
PULLED ASIDE THE MINISTER TO OUTLINE THE PROBLEM AND THE NEED
FOR GOI ACTION. FRATTINI AGREED TO LOOK INTO THE ISSUE.

-- PRIME MINISTRY UNDER SECRETARY LETTA (PM BERLUSCONI'S
CLOSEST ADVISOR): AT THE SAME DINNER, SENIOR EMBOFFS ALSO
RAISED THE DEMARCHE WITH LETTA, WHO SAID HE WOULD CHECK ON
THE MATTER THE NEXT DAY AND TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION.

-- FRATTINI CHIEF OF STAFF CESARE RAGAGLINI: ON DECEMBER 11,
DCM CONTACTED RAGAGLINI TO ENSURE THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THE
AMBASSADOR'S EXCHANGE WITH FRATTINI THE PREVIOUS EVENING, AND
TO UNDERSCORE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE DEMARCHE. THEY AGREED
THAT ECMIN WOULD FOLLOW UP WITH THE MFA ECONOMIC DIRECTORATE.


2. (S) ACTING DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR ECONOMICS MASSIMO LEGGERI:
ON DECEMBER 11, ECMIN MET FOR 30 MINUTES WITH LEGGERI TO
HAND OVER RELEASABLE REFTEL POINTS AND TO REVIEW THE
SITUATION IN DETAIL. ECMIN ALSO GAVE LEGGERI A COPY OF
SECRETARY POWELL'S FEBRUARY 20, 2003 LETTER TO FRATTINI ON

SIPDIS
FAST BOATS, AS WELL PRINTOUTS THAT EMBASSY HAD DOWNLOADED
DIRECTLY OFF THE FB DESIGN WEBSITE, WWW.FBDESIGN.IT. (THIS
INFORMATION, INTER ALIA, PROMOTES THE FB MIL 55 AS "SUITABLE
FOR MISSIONS SUCH AS HIT AND RUN, COMMANDO OPERATIONS, (AND)
OFFSHORE INTERCEPTION.")


3. (S) IN PRESENTING THE DEMARCHE, ECMIN STRESSED THAT WE
HAD TWO LEVELS OF CONCERN. THE FIRST WAS THE NEED FOR
IMMEDIATE GOI INTERVENTION AT ITALIAN PORTS AND WITH FB
DESIGN, TO STOP DELIVERY OF WHICHEVER FAST BOATS HAD NOT YET
LEFT ITALIAN TERRITORY. THE SECOND WAS THE NEED FOR A
SYSTEMIC FIX TO THE NOW PROVEN INADEQUACY OF EXISTING ITALIAN
EXPORT CONTROLS ON SUCH BOATS. THE "INFORMAL PRESSURE" WHICH
THE GOI HAD RELIED UPON CLEARLY HAD NOT WORKED; DEPENDABLE
LEGAL MECHANISMS NEEDED WERE NEEDED URGENTLY.


4. (S) LEGGERI LISTENED CAREFULLY AND ASSURED ECMIN THAT THE
MATTER WOULD BE INVESTIGATED IMMEDIATELY. HE CONFIRMED OUR
EARLIER INDICATIONS (SEE REF B) THAT A GOI INTERAGENCY EFFORT
WAS ALREADY UNDERWAY TO FIND A MORE PERMANENT SOLUTION TO THE
FAST BOATS PROBLEM. LEGGERI SOUGHT CONFIRMATION THAT THE
U.S. HAD MADE SIMILAR APPROACHES TO OTHER COUNTRIES WHOSE
COMPANIES COULD SUPPLY SUCH BOATS TO IRAN. ECMIN REITERATED
(AS WE HAVE MANY TIMES IN THE PAST) THAT THIS WAS
EMPHATICALLY THE CASE, ADDING THAT ITALY WAS INCREASINGLY
PERCEIVED AS ONE OF THE REMAINING WEAK POINTS IN THE CONTROL
EFFORT. LEGGERI INDICATED HE WOULD WELCOME ANY INFORMATION
WE COULD PROVIDE REGARDING WHAT LEGAL MECHANISMS OTHER
COUNTRIES HAD USED TO BLOCK FAST BOAT EXPORTS. IN
CONCLUDING, LEGGERI REPEATED THAT HE WOULD FOLLOW UP WITH
OTHER GOI AUTHORITIES RIGHT AWAY, AND KEEP US INFORMED OF
DEVELOPMENTS.


5. (S) IN ADDITION THE ABOVE, ORCA IS RAISING THE FAST BOAT
SITUATION WITH ITS ITALIAN COUNTERPARTS.
SEMBLER

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2003ROME05552 - Classification: SECRET