PM'S DIP ADVISORS ON REQUEST FOR TROOPS IN IRAQ

S E C R E T ROME 005008

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2013
TAGS: PREL IT EUN ESDP NATO AFGHANISTAN IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: PM'S DIP ADVISORS ON REQUEST FOR TROOPS IN IRAQ
AND AFGHANISTAN; CONFUSING SIGNALS ON STRUCTURED COOPERATION

REF: A) STATE 303817 B) ROME 4907 C) ROME 4974 D)
ROME 4957 E) ROME 4933

Classified By: POL MINISTER COUNSELOR TOM COUNTRYMAN. REASON: 1.5 (B)(
D)


1. (S) SUMMARY. On October 31, Deputy Diplomatic Advisors to
the PM, Paolo Dionisi and Francesco Talo, confirmed that
Italy will likely approve our request for an extension of its
deployment in Iraq. They asked that the Italian role in Iraq
security and stabilization be given more public and official
US acknowledgment, that Italy be given a senior role on Amb.
Bremer,s team, and that Italian firms be given more
opportunities to compete for contracts in Iraq. They said it
would be difficult for Italy to agree to the US request to
provide a task force of 1000 troops to Khowst, noting that
the significant Italian troop presence in Iraq and ongoing
stabilization operations in the Balkans were stretching
resources. They were more optimistic about the possibility
of Italy deploying a Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) to
Ghazni, and asked for more specifics on scope and number of
personnel required. In an apparent contradiction of ref. b
readout, the PM's advisors assured us that structured
cooperation as it relates to European security currently
under discussion in the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC)
would not delegate operational decisions to a core group.
They insisted any use of force would require consensus at 25.
END SUMMARY.

FORCES IN IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN
--------------


2. (S) In discussing the US request for Italian forces in
Iraq, Talo and Dionisi confirmed that Italy will probably
agree to the request for continued deployment of personnel in
Iraq well into 2004. They stressed, however, that Italy,s
strong support should not be a "secret"; indeed, it would
help them to push our requests with parliament and the public
for additional resources if there were more public
acknowledgment of Italy's role in Iraq. They noted that
while Italy is the third largest contributor to stabilization
efforts in Iraq, Poland's effort, which is largely funded
through NATO, gets far more mention in the US press and
official statements. It would also help if Italy could be
assigned one of the deputy positions in the CPA, and if
Italian private industry had a larger role in infrastructure
reconstruction. That said, they predicted that the
US/British request to extend troop deployment in Iraq would
be considered favorably.


3. (S) POL-Mil Counselor acknowledged the need for more
recognition and publicity. He promised to pass Italy's
concerns to Washington, and suggested that President Ciampi's
upcoming visit to the US would be an opportunity to
acknowledge, at the very highest levels, Italy's outstanding
contribution to stability and reconstruction in Iraq.


4. (S) Our request that Italy provide a task force of 1000
troops to Khowst in March 2004 would prove more problematic,
Talo and Dionisi said. When the US first asked Italy for a
significant troop deployment to Afghanistan, the Iraq
conflict had not taken place. Italy now had a significant
troop presence in Iraq. This, coupled with the ongoing
stabilization operations in the Balkans, was stretching
Italian military resources. They confirmed that the MOD is
examining the request, but were pessimistic that it would be
approved. (Comment: This negative signal on OEF deployment
accords with others we have received in recent days from MFA
NATO Director Brauzzi, CHOD Mosca Moschini, and Vice CHOD
Camporini. End comment.)


5. (S) Talo and Dionisi were more optimistic about the
possibility of Italy deploying a PRT to Ghazni. The issue
was more about resources rather than concept; they asked for
specifics on scope and number of personnel required.
Pol-Military Counselor stressed that we find 60-90 PRT
personnel to be sufficient, and said there was no need to
follow the more numerous German model. We promised to follow


up and noted that additional operational details would be
available through Italy's liaison officers at CENTCOM.
(Septel reports PRT discussion with MFA experts.)

IGC/STRUCTURED COOPERATION
--------------


6. (C) Dionisi and Talo said that the US should not be
concerned over recent developments regarding European
security and Structured Cooperation. The initiatives under
discussion in the IGC process are designed to close
capabilities and operations gaps. Additionally, underlined
Talo, the participation of like-minded nations, such as
Italy, the UK and Spain, in any defense core group will
ensure that US interests and Berlin-plus are protected.


7. (C) Talo and Dionisi stressed that structured cooperation
parameters within which the core group could operate would be
decided at 25. They also said that any decision to go
operational (use of force) would require a consensus
decision. Embassy note: this contradicts ref. b readout in
which Senate President Pera told us that he had been briefed
by FM Frattini on the latest thinking on structured
cooperation. Pera said Frattini had discussed with his
German, French and British counterparts a structured
cooperation proposal which would include allowing the core
group authority to make operational decisions. End note.


8. (S) Comment. While no formal reply is in, it is becoming
clear that our three-pronged request will yield a mixed,
albeit generally positive, response. Iraq extension looks
increasingly likely. An Italian PRT in Ghazni (septel) now
looks more likely, although details of command and control
and lines of authority will have to be ironed out. A renewed
deployment of Italian troops to Khowst, however, remains
uncertain, primarily because Italian forces are already
stretched thin on other overseas missions (Iraq, Balkans).
We will continue to press on all three fronts.


9. (S) Comment continued. PM Berlusconi has loyally
supported US policy in Iraq despite deep reservations in
Italian public opinion, so the requests of his diplomatic
advisors for more official recognition, and more policy and
commercial participation in Iraq,s reconstruction, make
sense. We recommend that Washington and the CPA explore
opportunities to address these concerns, and will work
closely with them in this process.
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2003ROME05008 - Classification: SECRET