Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ROME5003
2003-11-04 14:16:00
SECRET
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

ITALY: MFA ON TROOPS AND PRT IN AFGHANISTAN,

Tags:  MOPS MASS PREL EAID AF IT EUN AFGHANISTAN 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 005003 

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR EUR, EUR/WE, EUR/RPM, SA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2013
TAGS: MOPS MASS PREL EAID AF IT EUN AFGHANISTAN
SUBJECT: ITALY: MFA ON TROOPS AND PRT IN AFGHANISTAN,
ACCELERATED DISBURSEMENTS, AND EU TROIKA VISIT

REF: A. ROME 4933


B. STATE 303817

C. ROME 4427

D. STATE 305542

E. 10/31 COUNTRYMAN-BURKHEAD E-MAIL

F. USNATO 1111

CLASSIFIED BY: POL MINCOUNS THOMAS COUNTRYMAN, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 005003

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR EUR, EUR/WE, EUR/RPM, SA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2013
TAGS: MOPS MASS PREL EAID AF IT EUN AFGHANISTAN
SUBJECT: ITALY: MFA ON TROOPS AND PRT IN AFGHANISTAN,
ACCELERATED DISBURSEMENTS, AND EU TROIKA VISIT

REF: A. ROME 4933


B. STATE 303817

C. ROME 4427

D. STATE 305542

E. 10/31 COUNTRYMAN-BURKHEAD E-MAIL

F. USNATO 1111

CLASSIFIED BY: POL MINCOUNS THOMAS COUNTRYMAN, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).


1. (S) SUMMARY: KEY MFA INTERLOCUTORS SIGNAL THAT ITALY'S
ASSESSMENT OF SENDING A PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT)
TO GHAZNI IS MOVING FORWARD. THEY DOUBT THAT ITALY WOULD BE
ABLE TO SEND 1,000 OEF TROOPS TO KHOWST TO REPLACE U.S.
MARINES THERE (SEE ALSO SEPTEL). THEY ALSO REPORTED BRIEFLY
ON THE PRESIDENT'S PHONE CALL TO PM BERLUSCONI, URGING
ACCELERATED DISBURSEMENT OF ITALY'S AFGHAN ASSISTANCE, AND ON
THE RECENT EU TROIKA VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN. END SUMMARY.


2. (S) ON NOVEMBER 3, A/POLMINCOUNS, ACCOMPANIED BY POLOFF,
MET TOGETHER (AT THEIR SUGGESTION) WITH MFA SPECIAL
COORDINATOR FOR AFGHANISTAN ENRICO DI MAIO AND NATO OFFICE
DIRECTOR GIOVANNI BRAUZZI. DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON REF B
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL ITALIAN MILITARY SUPPORT IN
AFGHANISTAN, FOLLOWING UP ON OUR APPROACHES TO DEFENSE
MINISTER MARTINO (REF A) AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE
(SEPTEL). (NOTE: DI MAIO AND BRAUZZI WERE ALSO AWARE OF,
BUT DID NOT DISCUSS, OUR REF B REQUEST FOR ITALIAN FORCES TO
REMAIN IN IRAQ "WELL INTO 2004." BRAUZZI HAD INDICATED IN AN
EARLIER CONVERSATION THAT HE FORESEES "FEW PROBLEMS" IN
RENEWING ITALY'S DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES IN IRAQ. END NOTE.)
A/POLMINCOUNS OUTLINED THE REQUEST FOR A RETURN OF
APPROXIMATELY 1,000 ITALIAN TROOPS TO AFGHANISTAN TO REPLACE
U.S. MARINES IN KHOWST AND THE PROPOSAL THAT ITALY PROVIDE A
PRT IN GHAZNI FROM JANUARY 2004 FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR. BOTH
DI MAIO AND BRAUZZI HAD BEEN BRIEFED ON OUR REQUESTS
PREVIOUSLY.


3. (S) BRAUZZI LED OFF BY REFERRING BRIEFLY TO THE REQUEST
FOR A RETURN OF TROOPS TO KHOWST IN MARCH 2004, SAYING THAT
IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR ITALY TO SEND ANOTHER LARGE
DEPLOYMENT TO AFGHANISTAN AT THAT TIME BECAUSE ITS FORCES ARE

ALREADY STRETCHED THIN WITH EXISTING DEPLOYMENTS (IRAQ,
BALKANS). A/POLMINCOUNS NOTED THAT DEFMIN MARTINO HAD SEEMED
MORE FORTHCOMING, INDICATING THERE MIGHT BE SOME QUESTION
ABOUT TIMING AND THAT HE NEEDED RECOMMENDATIONS FROM HIS
MILITARY STAFF, BUT NOT SUGGESTING THAT THE REQUEST WOULD BE
REJECTED (REF A). BRAUZZI CONFIRMED THAT THE MOD IS STILL
ASSESSING THE REQUEST, AND SAID A REPLY WOULD NOT BE READY
BEFORE THE WEEK OF NOVEMBER 10.


4. (C) BOTH BRAUZZI AND DI MAIO WERE QUITE FORTHCOMING IN
THE ENSUING DISCUSSION ON A POSSIBLE ITALIAN PRT, HINTING
THAT ITALIAN AUTHORITIES ARE LOOKING FAVORABLY AT AGREEING TO
THIS REQUEST. THEY UNDERSCORED THE IMPORTANCE ITALY WILL
PLACE ON PRT LINES OF AUTHORITY. BRAUZZI SAID ITALY WOULD
WANT ITS PRT (AND, EVENTUALLY, ALL PRTS) TO BE UNDER THE
AUTHORITY OF NATO VIA ISAF, NOT AUTONOMOUS OR "A PART OF
PHASE IV OEF OPERATIONS". WHILE ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL
DETAILS WOULD BE WELCOME THROUGH CENTCOM OR THE EMBASSY,
ITALY WOULD EXPECT TO MAKE ITS PRT CONTRIBUTION THROUGH ISAF.
(COMMENT: WHEN WE PRESSED THEM ABOUT THE OPERATIONAL
CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT, BRAUZZI AND DI MAIO
CLEARLY WANTED TO HAVE IT BOTH WAYS: WHILE THEY WANT ANY
ITALIAN PRT TO OPERATE "UNDER NATO AUSPICES", THEY ARE
EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT PRT SECURITY VULNERABILITIES AND
WANT OEF (READ AMERICAN) FORCES ON TAP TO INTERVENE IF
NECESSARY. END COMMENT.)


5. (C) THE TWO DISCUSSED THE IMPORTANCE OF PRTS FOR
EXTENDING SECURITY AND STRENGTHENING PRESIDENT KARZAI'S
POSITION IN THE RUN-UP TO ELECTIONS, BUT ALSO SAW PRTS AS A
WAY TO EXTEND ISAF-BASED SECURITY BEYOND KABUL. BRAUZZI SAID
ITALY WAS LOOKING AT THE PRTS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ITS
BALKAN EXPERIENCE. CIVILIAN PRT PERSONNEL MIGHT FALL UNDER
THE AUTHORITY OF THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN KABUL, WHILE THE
MILITARY COMMANDER WOULD REPORT TO THE NATO-ISAF COMMANDER.
BOTH EXPRESSED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN WASHINGTON'S VIEWS ON
THE LATTER ARRANGEMENT.


6. (C) DI MAIO AND BRAUZZI CITED THE ITALIAN MILITARY'S

ROME 00005003 002 OF 002

IN THEIR JUST-CONCLUDED
SERVICE IN KHOWST AND IN ONGOING WORK IN THE BALKANS. DI
MAIO SAID POLICE TRAINING, COUNTER NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT, AND
JUDICIAL REFORM COULD BE EXPANDED BY INCORPORATING TRAINERS
AND JUDGES INTO PRTS. HE ENCOURAGED THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY TO CHANGE ITS PERSPECTIVE ON AFGHANISTAN -- TO SEE
SECURITY AS THE MEANS TO DEVELOPMENT, AND THUS TO KARZAI'S
RE-ELECTION, NOT ONLY AS A SUBSET OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM.


7. (C) WHEN WE CITED OUR EARLIER DISCUSSION WITH MOD
MARTINO ABOUT PRT SIZE, BRAUZZI SAID THE MILITARY WOULD HAVE
TO MAKE THE FINAL DETERMINATION ON THAT ISSUE (AGAIN HINTING
THAT THE DECISIONS WERE IN THE DETAILS, NOT IN WHETHER OR NOT
TO AGREE). HE SUSPECTED ITALY WOULD GO WITH A LARGER, RATHER
THAN A SMALLER, PRT IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE RISK. WE POINTED
OUT THAT A LARGER PRT COULD ACTUALLY INCREASE VULNERABILITIES
BECAUSE OF ITS LARGER FOOTPRINT. AS FOR TIMING, BRAUZZI SAID
A JANUARY 2004 START WOULD BE "TOUGH", BUT THE MILITARY WOULD
HAVE TO PROVIDE THE FINAL ASSESSMENT AND REPLY ON THE
DETAILS. BOTH MEN ADDED THAT ITALY WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE
PRIORITIES AND NEEDS IN AFGHANISTAN. "WE PUT OURSELVES UNDER
A TIGHT TIMELINE IN BONN," DI MAIO SAID RUEFULLY TO
A/POLMINCOUNS, BOTH OF WHOM PARTICIPATED IN THE BONN
NEGOTIATIONS.


8. (C) DI MAIO NOTED THAT ITALY HAS A LONG-STANDING
RELATIONSHIP IN GHAZNI, THROUGH AN ITALIAN NGO, THE
"INSTITUTE FOR AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA." THIS
ENTITY HAS BEEN WORKING WITH AFGHANS IN GHAZNI TO PROTECT
CULTURAL HERITAGE AND TREASURES THERE FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS,
SENDING MISSIONS APPROXIMATELY TWICE A YEAR. DI MAIO SAID HE
IS ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT THE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
PROJECT TO HEAR THEIR IMPRESSIONS OF GHAZNI, INCLUDING THE
SECURITY SITUATION THERE.


9. (C) ON OTHER TOPICS, DI MAIO REPORTED ON THE PRESIDENT'S
OCTOBER 31 TELEPHONE CALL TO PRIME MINISTER BERLUSCONI,
REQUESTING ITALY TO ACCELERATE DISBURSEMENT OF ITS PLEDGED
ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN (REFS D, E). ITALY HAS ALREADY
DISBURSED ALMOST 90 PERCENT OF ITS PLEDGE, HE BELIEVED, SO
ACCELERATED DISBURSEMENT MIGHT NOT BE ALL THAT MEANINGFUL.
(MFA OFFICE DIRECTOR FOR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO ASIA,
AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA, ALESSANDRO GAUDIANO, TOLD ECONOFF
ESSENTIALLY THE SAME THING, SAYING ITALY HAS ACCELERATED
DISBURSEMENTS OVER THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS.) HOWEVER, ITALY
WOULD LIKE TO FIND STILL MORE FUNDS TO ASSIST IN THE UPCOMING
ELECTIONS. THIS WOULD BE COMPLICATED, DI MAIO WARNED,
BECAUSE THE MONEY WOULD NOT COME FROM WITHIN THE MFA, BUT
ITALY WAS INTENT ON FINDING ADDITIONAL RESOURCES. ON
ELECTIONS, DI MAIO ASKED IF THE U.S. HAD TAKEN A POSITION ON
WHETHER PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS SHOULD BE HELD PRIOR TO
GENERAL ELECTIONS, AS A WAY TO STRENGTHEN PRESIDENT KARZAI'S
POSITION VIS-A-VIS "THE PANJSHIRIS." FINALLY, DI MAIO SAID
THE EU TROIKA, LED BY ITALIAN MFA U/S FOR ASIA AND HUMAN
RIGHTS MARGHERITA BONIVER TO KABUL OCTOBER 18-21, EXTRACTED A
COMMITMENT FROM KARZAI THAT THE NEW CONSTITUTION WOULD
PROVIDE THAT ELECTIONS WOULD "ABIDE BY" INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS. THE TROIKA WAS DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE INFLUENCE
OF THE NARCOTICS TRADE IN AFGHANISTAN. DI MAIO WORRIED ABOUT
THE NEGATIVE INFLUENCE NARCOTRAFFICKERS COULD PLAY ON THE
UPCOMING ELECTIONS.


10. (C) COMMENT: DI MAIO TOLD US ITALY WOULD WELCOME ANY
ADDITIONAL INPUT THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN FORMULATING ITS
ASSESSMENT OF OUR REQUESTS, BUT SUCH INPUT SHOULD PREFERABLY
ARRIVE PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 10. WE NOTE FROM REF F THAT THE
CONCEPT OF PRTS UNDER NATO-ISAF LEADERSHIP SEEMS TO BE
WINNING ACCEPTANCE, BUT WOULD BE HAPPY TO FORWARD WASHINGTON
VIEWS ON THIS, OR ANY OTHER ASPECT, TO OUR ITALIAN
INTERLOCUTORS.


11. (U) KABUL MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
SEMBLER

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2003ROME05003 - Classification: SECRET