ITALY'S EU PRESIDENCY: OCTOBER 16-17 COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 004841

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR IT NATO EUN
SUBJECT: ITALY'S EU PRESIDENCY: OCTOBER 16-17 COUNCIL
READOUT; WAY AHEAD ON ESDP, IGC

Classified By: A/DCM TOM COUNTRYMAN FOR REASONS 1.5 (B)(D)



1. (C) Summary. The Italian EU Presidency is, in general,
pleased with the results of the October 16-17 European
Council Meeting and with progress thus far on the
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). Italy remains confident
that any new EU agreements on European security architecture
will not jeopardize the transatlantic alliance. Italian
officials were sanguine that eventual structured cooperation
on defense would be compatible with NATO; Italy will insist
that its operational parameters be agreed "at 25". They
reassured us that the idea for an autonomous EU planning cell
at Tervuren is dead. While FM Frattini is optimistic that a
political agreement to close the IGC will be ready by
December, PM Berlusconi is less sure the Italian Presidency
will complete the process, and one key player at the MFA
would consider closure by December "a miracle." End Summary.


2. (SBU) On October 21 Embassy officers fanned out to pulse
officials at the Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister's
office on the October 16-17 European Council meeting and the
EU's evolving defense and security architecture. A/DCM Tom
Countryman and Polmiloff consulted Deputy Diplomatic Advisor
to PM Berlusconi Gianpaolo Scarante and Assistant Diplomatic
Advisor Francesco Talo. Poloff met with the MFA's EU
European Correspondent and ESDP coordinator Sandro De
Bernadin as well as Giuseppe Buccino-Grimaldi from the MFA's
office of EU Institutional Affairs. Two polmil officers
engaged the MFA's NATO Office Director Giovanni Brauzzi.

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EU DEFENSE IDENTITY WILL BE COMPATIBLE WITH NATO
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3. (C) A/DCM Countryman began the discussion with the PM's
diplomatic advisors by underscoring that the USG is well
aware of Italy's efforts to defend the principle that the
EU's defense identity must be fully compatible with NATO.
Nevertheless, he said, there is concern about how the EU may
operationalize it. A/DCM explained that concern about the
EU's approach is driven by several factors, including some EU
member states' apparent willingness to modify Berlin-Plus so
soon after it was agreed; the possibility that during the
course of intra-EU horsetrading on the IGC, a country or set
of countries could bend on security matters to get something
else in return; and lack of clarity about the operational
modalities of structured cooperation.


4. (C) Scarante said he was aware of the USG's general
concern, but was puzzled by the timing of the Embassy's
interest in consultations. He did not think that the dynamic
on security cooperation within the EU was one that should
particularly trouble us. Scarante claimed there is an
understanding within the EU that steps to build an EU defense
identity must be compatible with NATO. Berlusconi, he
pointed out, made a strong public statement to this effect at
the conclusion of the October 16-17 EU Council meeting.
Italy's position is that whatever the EU does on defense and
security matters must add value to the Alliance.


5. (C) De Bernadin thought that "reproducing" language
already agreed to in WEU documents could serve to defuse any
conflict with NATO article 5 commitments. He explained that
details on defense arrangements and structured cooperation
criteria would be spelled out in a protocol or annex to the
main document (as noted in Article III-213 of the current
draft treaty),which the Presidency would also write. De
Bernadin hoped to have a draft text of the protocol ready to
share with EU FMs at the November 17 GAERC.


6. (C) Brauzzi acknowledged that if the French idea for a
European Security and Defense Union had found its way into
the Convention's constitutional draft, Italy would have been
concerned -- even frightened. That eventuality could have
led toward the development of a multipolar world. Now, we
are on much firmer ground, he affirmed, adding that the
elements are in place to move forward with an EU-NATO
relationship grounded in cooperation. He rebuffed any
suggestion that the EU had not been fully transparent with
NATO in its pursuit of a more robust ESDP.


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EU FM NAPLES "CONCLAVE"
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7. (C) De Bernadin told poloff that for all the cacophony in
the press over the Council's discussion on European Security,
there was little movement on national positions and no formal
agreements on key issues such as structured cooperation and
the form that a European planning operation might assume.
What was achieved was an airing of national positions,
setting the stage for progress at the November 17-18 GAERC,
followed by a special meeting of heads of state proposed for
November 24 (location tbd),and at a November 27-28 FM
"conclave" in Naples.

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STRUCTURED COOPERATION - BUT AGREED AT 25
--------------


8. (C) De Bernadin underlined the Presidency's view that any
structured cooperation must be "inclusive and transparent"
with membership criteria and operational parameters
"established and agreed to at 25". Above all, for the
Presidency, the relationship with NATO is "essential"
insisted De Bernadin. He underlined that Article 40-2 of the
current draft treaty states that EU common security "...shall
respect the obligations of certain member states, which see
their common defense realized in NATO, under the North
Atlantic Treaty, and be compatible with the common security
and defense policy established within that framework."


9. (C) Brauzzi, from his NATO perspective, also argued
energetically--and defensively--that Article 40 of the EU's
draft constitution guarantees defense of NATO's interests;
Brauzzi did not expect the core principles contained therein
to be altered in the final document. Scarante added that
structured cooperation presupposes EU and NATO compatibility;
nothing the EU is currently considering cuts against the
interests of NATO, he asserted.

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STRUCTURED COOPERATION A PLUS FOR THE ALLIANCE
-------------- -


10. (C) Talo and Brauzzi both argued that the creation of a
core group in the EU willing to take on more military
responsibility will be to NATO's advantage, not least because
it will in all probability be composed exclusively of
Alliance members (Brauzzi could not imagine Ireland or Sweden
joining, for example). Italy, Talo reasoned, would have even
more influence in such a group than in a future EU of 25
members. The added pressure of EU military spending targets
and capabilities criteria, Brauzzi believed, would result in
a synergistic effect and contribute to transatlantic
security.

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TERVUREN (STILL) DEAD
--------------


11. (C) Talo confirmed that EU leaders meeting in Brussels
touched only lightly on the issue of where to house/how to
structure an eventual EU planning cell. He said emphatically
that Tervuren is dead. While other ideas are being studied,
including the Italian proposal to set up a virtual planning
cell (which Talo indicated was a Defense Ministry
initiative),the issue is not ripe for a full Council-level
discussion. Asked to explain Berlusconi's October 17 public
comment that the EU would need a "dedicated command", Talo
said the PM meant that to manage an autonomous operation the
EU would require some sort of planning cell. He clarified
that Berlusconi was not calling for a fixed and permanent
cell, but one that could conceivably even be created on an ad
hoc basis.


12. (C) Brauzzi, pressed on why Italy hasn't been more
forthcoming in support of the UK proposal to set up an EU
planning cell at SHAPE, said that Italy has nothing against
such a notion. "What we cannot accept," he said, "is a
prescription that mandates its establishment there."
Berlin-Plus doesn't dictate where a cell should be located,
he noted. SHAPE is an option, as is the idea to create a


virtual planning cell. Regardless of the modalities for
establishing a planning capacity, Brauzzi argued, planners
seconded to any EU cell will remain national resources and
available to NATO. He viewed the development of an
autonomous EU planning capability as adding flexibility to
the system of transatlantic security and fully in keeping
with the interests of the Alliance.

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TREATY OF ROME WON'T BE ANOTHER TREATY OF NICE
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13. (C) Buccino-Grimaldi said that the overall IGC
discussions on the Council margins were positive. He said
that FM Frattini is very optimistic that the IGC will finish
during the Italian Presidency. PM Berlusconi is also
hopeful, but "more prudent" than Frattini. Grimaldi, who's
office is responsible for drafting treaty elements dealing
with reforming the EU's institutions, told poloff that it
would be "a miracle" if there is a document ready for the
final Council meeting of the Italian Presidency on December

12. He said that the Presidency would only prepare the
overall package for heads of state to sign after the late
November FM's conclave, based on their input and ongoing
discussions. "Italy will not make the same mistake France
did with the Nice Treaty." The package, if presented, will
be "complete, tight" and not contain every amendment and
revision desired by member states, which according to
Grimaldi was the case with Nice. Italy has red lines in this
regard, one of which is to change the voting structure
enshrined in Nice so that a small minority of the 25 cannot
block decisions.


14. (C) Grimaldi said that his cynicism over completing the
treaty by December is based on the number and weight of
negotiations pending. He predicted that decision areas
subject to qualified majority voting (QMV) will remain more
or less unchanged, but only after much debate. Two areas he
sees as critical to completing the treaty on time are
agreement on numbers of commissioners and the role of and
control over the proposed EU foreign minister position.
Compromise will not be easy on either.


15. (C) Comment: Our Italian colleagues did their level best
to reassure us that modalities for implementing ESDP will be
compatible with NATO. Berlusconi's strong
pronouncements--and the unity of top government officials--
have reinforced this fundamental principle and suggest that
Italy, while likely to be less forceful than the UK, will not
go wobbly. We were struck by the apparent calm of our
interlocutors, who evidently believe that an eventual EU
Constitution will prevent some member states from straying
from their Atlanticist brethren in pursuit of a more robust
EU defense identity. We respect their view, but with the
operational details of ESDP still in flux, we will continue
to press them to ensure that it complements NATO. End
Comment.
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2003ROME04841 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL