Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ROME4187
2003-09-12 17:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

BERLUSCONI AND PUTIN DISCUSS IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Tags:  PREL IT IR RS EUN IAEA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 004187 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2013
TAGS: PREL IT IR RS EUN IAEA
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI AND PUTIN DISCUSS IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

CLASSIFIED BY: A/DCM SCOTT KILNER. REASON: 1.5 (B)(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 004187

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2013
TAGS: PREL IT IR RS EUN IAEA
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI AND PUTIN DISCUSS IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

CLASSIFIED BY: A/DCM SCOTT KILNER. REASON: 1.5 (B)(D)


1. (U) GUIDANCE REQUEST. SEE PARA 7.


2. (C) SUMMARY: DURING THEIR AUGUST 29-31 MEETING IN
SARDINIA, RUSSIAN PRESIDENT PUTIN TOLD PM BERLUSCONI THAT
RUSSIA IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT IRAN'S NUCLEAR
PROGRAM. ACCORDING TO BERLUSCONI'S SENIOR DIPLOMATIC
ADVISOR, PUTIN SAID THAT HE WAS DETERMINED TO MAKE IRAN SHIP
SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL BACK TO RUSSIA. BERLUSCONI WILL WRITE TO
PRESIDENT KHATAMI URGING IRANIAN COMPLIANCE WITH IAEA
GUIDELINES. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) THE PM'S SENIOR DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR, GIOVANNI
CASTELLANETA, TOLD DCM AND POLOFF ON SEPTEMBER 11 THAT PUTIN
HAD CONFIDED TO BERLUSCONI THAT HE HAD MUCH GREATER CONCERNS
THAN WHEN THEY LAST MET (IN JULY) OVER IRAN'S INTENTIONS FOR
ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM. HE WAS THEREFORE DETERMINED TO PUT IN
PLACE MEASURES TO KEEP THE PROGRAM CIVILIAN, AND TO MONITOR
WHAT HAPPENS TO THE NUCLEAR FUEL RUSSIA IS SELLING TO IRAN.
PUTIN PLANS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS BY DEMANDING THAT IRAN SHIP
THE SPENT FUEL BACK TO RUSSIA. PUTIN IS NOT JUST THINKING
ABOUT IT, SAID CASTELLANETA, HE IS GOING TO DO IT.
CASTELLANETA THOUGHT, AND PUTIN'S OWN DIPLOMATIC ADVISORS
CONFIRMED, THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE BEGINNING TO REALIZE THAT
AN IRAN WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD REPRESENT A THREAT NOT
ONLY TO THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT ALSO TO MANY OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND TO RUSSIA ITSELF.


4. (C) IN A WRITTEN RESPONSE TO A LETTER FROM IRANIAN
PRESIDENT KHATAMI OUTLINING IRAN'S PROMISES THAT ITS NUCLEAR
PROGRAM WOULD REMAIN CIVILIAN AND IRAN WOULD SIGN THE IAEA
PROTOCOL, BERLUSCONI WILL URGE IRAN TO MATCH ITS WORDS WITH
ACTIONS. HE WILL EMPHASIZED TO KHATAMI THAT IRANIAN
BEHAVIOR, SYMBOLIZED BY THE DISCOVERY OF TRACES OF PLUTONIUM
IN TEHRAN, WAS NOT IN LINE WITH ITS COMMITMENTS TO THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. NOTE: THE PM'S OFFICE WILL PROVIDE
EMBASSY WITH A COPY OF THE LETTER AS SOON AS IT IS SIGNED.
END NOTE.


5. (C) DCM AGREED WITH CASTELLANETA'S ASSESSMENT THAT THE US
AND EU MUST KEEP THE POLITICAL PRESSURE ON IRAN TO COMPLY
WITH IAEA REGULATIONS, BUT THAT THE SITUATION WAS DELICATE.
FOR ITALY, A MILITARY SOLUTION AT THIS TIME WOULD NOT BE
ACCEPTABLE. THE "COUNTDOWN HAS STARTED" TO THE END OF THE
FRAGILE REGIME IN TEHRAN THROUGH INTERNAL PRESSURES. WE MUST
BE CAREFUL, CAUTIONED CASTELLANETA, THAT TOO HARD A LINE AND
TOO MUCH PRESSURE FROM THE OUTSIDE COULD CAUSE THE
CONFLICTING FACTIONS WITHIN IRAN TO UNITE AGAINST A COMMON
ENEMY.


6. (C) ACCORDING TO CASTELLANETA, THE ATMOSPHERICS DURING
PUTIN'S VISIT TO BERLUSCONI'S SUMMER HOME ON THE ISLAND OF
SARDINIA WERE EXCELLENT. PUTIN'S PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH
BERLUSCONI HAS GROWN VERY STRONG, AND HE SEEMED TO BE VERY
"PRO-WESTERN" IN HIS POLITICAL VIEWS, AS EVINCED BY PUTIN'S
CONSIDERATION OF SENDING RUSSIAN TROOPS TO IRAQ UNDER US
COMMAND. IN RESPONSE TO THE DCM'S OBSERVATION THAT PUTIN'S
RELATIONSHIP WITH PRESIDENT BUSH WAS ALSO DEVELOPING
POSITIVELY, CASTELLANETA NOTED THAT PUTIN SAID HE WAS LOOKING
FORWARD TO HIS UPCOMING TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
UNGA AND MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BUSH. PUTIN PROMISED TO
RAISE WITH THE PRESIDENT MANY OF THE SAME ISSUES OF STRATEGIC
IMPORTANCE HE AND BERLUSCONI COVERED IN SARDINIA.


7. (SBU) CASTELLANETA WILL ACCOMPANY BERLUSCONI ON HIS TRIP
TO THE US SEPTEMBER 21-24. HE HAS OFFERED TO REMAIN BEYOND
THAT TIME IF THE US WANTS TO SCHEDULE A MEETING, WITH NSA
RICE FOR INSTANCE, AFTER THE CRUSH OF UNGA RELATED
ACTIVITIES. DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE IS REQUESTED ON HOW WE
SHOULD RESPOND TO CASTELLANETA'S OFFER.
SEMBLER

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2003ROME04187 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL