FRATTINI-STRAW MEETING READOUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 004022

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR IT UK EUN ESDP
SUBJECT: FRATTINI-STRAW MEETING READOUT


Classified By: DCM EMIL SKODON. REASON: 1.5 (B)(D)


1. (C) Summary: During an August 29 meeting in Rome, FM
Frattini and UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw agreed on the
necessity of a quick finish for the Intergovernmental
Conference on the EU constitution, but Straw cautioned that
some items in the current draft would need clarification
before it would be acceptable to UK lawmakers. They agreed
that the discussion of EU security structures should be
brought back to the EU at 15 (25). Straw welcomed Frattini's
proposal for a MEPP Quartet meeting on the margins of the
UNGA, and both thought it unlikely that France would agree to
list Hamas on a terrorist "black list". Straw registered
Frattini's concern that the arms sanctions against Libya were
impeding Tripoli's ability to deal with illegal immigration,
but underlined that Qadhafi had a long list of conditions to
satisfy before sanctions could be lifted. Straw agreed to
take under consideration Frattini's concerns on the UK
proposal for UNSC reform. End Summary.

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Constitution/IGC
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2. (C) On September 3, MFA Western Europe Office Director Pio
Mariani briefed poloff on FM Frattini's August 29 meeting
with UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. They spent a
significant portion of the meeting discussing the draft EU
constitution and Intergovernmental Conference, scheduled to
begin on October 4 in Rome. Frattini stressed the GOI's
preference to finish the IGC by the end of the Italian
Presidency, in order to complete the three-month translation
process into all EU
languages prior to the spring European Parliamentary
elections and formal accession of new members. Therefore,
emphasized Frattini, the IGC could not reopen large areas of
the current draft for extended debate; its role will be to
fine tune and perhaps give a bit more detail and precision to
the existing language.


3. (C) Straw agreed in principle that a December finish to
the IGC would be optimal, but had reservations about
Frattini's minimalist view of the role of the IGC. He said
that the document would need consensus not just among the
framers, but among all citizens of EU member states - most or
all would be voting for or against the document in referenda.
In the UK, for instance, there was substantial concern among
MPs and ordinary citizens over defense/security issues, the
authority of the new "Minister of Foreign Affairs for Europe"
and his/her role in international organizations and the
question of whether unanimity would be retained for decisions
dealing with EU finances and Common Foreign and Security
Policy. These are red lines for the British, and Straw
thought it was possible that the UK would have some
"alternate wording" for the draft constitution ready to
present at the September 5-6 informal EU FMs' meeting
(Gymnich) at Riva del Garda.

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Gang of Four
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4. (C) Straw and Frattini agreed that the German, French,
Belgian, Luxembourger proposal to establish a separate ESDP
planning operation at Terverun was not acceptable. Straw
said that if the EU started now down the road towards
dismantling the Berlin-plus agreement, within ten years there
would be little left of the transatlantic alliance. Straw
and Frattini agreed that one goal of the IGC should be to
bring debate on security and foreign policy back to 15 (25).

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MEPP
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5. (C) Frattini underlined the need for a regional "Marshall
Plan" to improve the economic status of individuals on all
sides of the conflict. Straw agreed to Frattini's proposal
for a Quartet meeting on the margins of UNGA on September 22.
Hamas is on the agenda for the Gymnich, but Frattini and
Straw concurred that French agreement to add Hamas to the
terrorist "black list" was unlikely.

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Iran
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6. (C) Straw raised the case of former Iranian Ambassador to
Argentina Hadi Soleimanpour, arrested and ordered held in
London on August 21 for alleged complicity in the 1994
bombing of a Jewish center in Buenos Aires. He asked
Frattini for continued Italian support in explaining to the
Government of Iran that there was little HMG could do to get
the courts to drop the case. Mariani said that Italy had in
fact already made a number of demarches in Tehran, urging the
Iranians not to blow the case out of proportion, and
stressing that Iran "needs all the friends it can get".
Threatening to lower diplomatic relations with the UK, and by
extension the EU, would not elevate Iran's standing in the
eyes of the international community.

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Libya
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7. (C) Frattini said that he hoped the French would soon
reach a satisfactory agreement with Libya, as the UK had,
over the Lockerbie bombing. The government of Italy wants to
start discussions, first in Brussels then, after a common EU
position is forged, at the UN on lifting, at least partially,
arms sales sanctions against Libya. Frattini told Straw that
Libya does not have the tools to control its own borders and
the increasing flow of illegal aliens into Italy and other EU
countries. Straw did not discount the possibility of
eventual discussions on sanctions, but noted that an
agreement with France is just one in a series of conditions
that Libya must satisfy before the UN sanctions are lifted.

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Security Council Reform
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8. (C) Frattini told Straw that the British initiative on UN
Security Council reform had "created problems" for Italy.
Simply enlarging the number of Permanent Members (which would
exclude Italy) seemed unfair to Frattini and would create
problems with other large excluded countries in South America
and Asia. A more equitable plan, pushed by Italy, would
expand the number of non-permanent members on a more frequent
rotation based on "benchmarks". Straw promised only to take
Frattini's concerns under consideration. Mariani noted that
under the British plan, France, UK, and Germany would have
permanent seats in the Security Council, effectively killing
any debate on the possibility of moving to a single EU seat.
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2003ROME04022 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL