U.S.-EU TROIKA POLITIAL DIRECTORS - PRODUCTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 003368

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR EUR/FO, EUR/WE, EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2013
TAGS: PREL EU IT EUN
SUBJECT: U.S.-EU TROIKA POLITIAL DIRECTORS - PRODUCTIVE
DISCUSSIONS ON ESDP, IRAQ, NON PROLIFERATION

Classified By: A/DCM SCOTT KILNER. REASON:1.5 (B)(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: A/S Jones had broad, frank and productive
discussions at the U.S.-EU Troika Political Directors
meeting, chaired by Italian MFA POLDIR Giancarlo Aragona in
Rome on July 18. Both sides agreed on the need for
strengthened and complementary U.S.-EU and EU-NATO security
relations under Berlin plus, and for support of the ESDP
operation in Macedonia; the US and EU remain open to an EU
command of SFOR responsibilities in Bosnia, if and when
conditions merit the transfer from NATO. Jones stressed that
Galileo will require a political-level decision, based on
technical discussions, to successfully resolve the overlay
problem. The Middle East is a priority for the Italian
Presidency and the EU praised President Bush's personal
involvement. A/S Jones noted the President wants the Quartet
to play a strong role in the MEPP. She also noted progress
on resolving remaining differences on the Container Security
Initiative and the Passenger Name Record programs. Although
little headway was made on ICC/article 98, the
non-confrontational exchange of views allowed both sides to
clarify their concerns. Both sides agreed that in Iraq, the
international community should focus on security issues,
improvement of quality of life, development of self-governing
mechanisms, and economic revitalization. The Afghanistan
government projects a budget shortfall of over 180 million
USD; the EU is on track to meet its pledge of one billion
Euros over five years. A/S Jones expressed appreciation for
the development and launch of the EU Strategy against
Proliferation of WMD; now we should focus on practical
measures in Iran and North Korea. Jones argued that the U.S.
and EU should develop a strategy to use the next IAEA report,
which will reportedly be very critical of Tehran. Aragona
said that North Korea's WMD program is a multilateral, global
problem, and needs a joint and coordinated response. He
expressed hope that China would play a helpful role. A/S
Jones urged the EU to use Moscow's desire for good relations
with the West to promote reforms in Russia, and said that the
US was open to an EU stabilization force in Moldova, under an
OSCE mandate. End Summary

--------------
Participants
--------------


2. (U) U.S.: Beth Jones, Assistant Secretary European and
Eurasian Affairs; Chuck English, Director, Office of European
Union Affairs; Scott Kilner, Econ Counselor, U.S. Embassy
Rome; Gary Robbins, POL-MIL Counselor, U.S. Embassy Rome; Lee
Litzenberger, Political Officer, U.S. Mission to the EU; Kent
Logsdon, Special Assistant to A/S Jones; Marja Verloop, EU
Desk Officer; and Jim Donegan, Political Officer, U.S.
Embassy Rome. Presidency: Giancarlo Aragona, Political
Director; Sandro De Bernardin, CFSP Coordinator and European
Correspondent; Gerolamo Schiavoni, Head, North America
Bureau; and Pierfrancesco Sacco, Deputy European
Correspondent. Council Secretariat: Robert Cooper, Director
General; Jim Cloos, Director Transatlantic Relations; and
Massimo Parnisari, European Correspondent. European
Commission: Fernando Valenzuela, Deputy Director General for
External Relations; Percy Westerlund, Director, North
America; and Peter Dun, Assistant European Correspondent.
Ireland: David Cooney, Political Director; and Kevin Conmy,
European Correspondent.

--------------
European Security Strategy (ESS)
--------------


3. (C) Aragona began by saying he was pleased that the June
U.S.-EU Summit had set the right tone for progress on the
European Security Strategy. The outline Solana presented in
Thessaloniki would serve as the foundation for further work;
the goal is to have the document ready to sign by member
state heads of government at the December EU Summit. The
Italian Presidency would do whatever was necessary to ensure
the document strengthened and complemented US-EU and EU-NATO
security relations - in other words, that it was completely
in accordance with Berlin plus. The Italian Presidency will
host a Ministerial at 25 on August 29 to discuss European
Security Strategy progress and "emerging proposals" from the
April 29 Brussels Defense Mini-Summit. Cooper added that the


European Security Strategy process was in its beginning
stages, and should include input from both the US and NATO as
it progresses. He offered to travel to Washington for
consultations, and looked forward to a period of discussion
and "workshops" during the fall before detailed drafting
begins in November. Valenzuela noted that European Security
Strategy would also encompass internal security issues, such
as energy and trade.


4. (C) A/S Jones welcomed the Solana European Security
Strategy draft, and emphasized that it mirrors closely U.S.
views on ESDP's relationship to NATO. She was pleased to
hear Aragona emphasize that the European Security Strategy
would complement and strengthen US-EU and EU-NATO security
relations, and accepted Cooper's offer to travel to
Washington for more detailed discussions - the U.S. wants to
collaborate in this process, and we look forward to seeing
the EU move concepts from paper to concrete actions.

--------------
ESDP Missions - Berlin Plus
--------------


5. (C) Aragona said that the three active ESDP missions
(Macedonia, Congo and Bosnia police) demonstrated that the EU
was committed to enhancing its security capabilities in line
with Berlin plus. Europeans do not want to be "laggards"
when it comes to its security responsibilities, particularly
when they involve the Balkans. Aragona noted that the
Copenhagen EU council expressed willingness for an EU
takeover of SFOR functions in Bosnia if and when conditions
merit a transfer from NATO command.


6. (C) Cooper said that in his view, the EU-NATO relationship
has done well and come a long way from the Berlin plus
signing last December to launching Operation Concordia just
three months later. The EU has "surprised itself" with the
rapidity with which it deployed to the Congo. The EU intends
to be "out on time" from the Congo, which will make it easier
to deploy other operations in the future, as contributing
nations will be confident they will not be engaged in drawn
out operations. Cooper emphasized that the military
deployment was but one aspect of the Congo operation. The EU
will commit resources and personnel to stabilizing all
aspects of the Congo's political and economic
infrastructures. Cooper reiterated that there was no
disagreement with the US on a possible EU takeover of SFOR
command in Bosnia - it will happen only when the U.S., EU and
NATO decide together that it is time. Cooney agreed, and
looked forward to a "real test" of Berlin plus in Bosnia. He
also expressed satisfaction with the 550 "high quality"
officers deployed by the EU for police training in Bosnia


7. (C) Cooper said that he was not satisfied with some
aspects of the Berlin plus relationship, and not entirely
enthusiastic about the "political atmosphere" between NATO
and EU. The EU and NATO had not yet developed a "habit" of
active cooperation. SHAPE does not yet function as a
platform for Berlin plus and planning for EU operations.
This may be the result of growing pains and the fact that the
three ESDP operations thus far did not depend heavily on
sharing NATO assets or planning capabilities. Aragona
averred that once ESDP and Berlin plus got up to "cruising
speed," these initial problems would evaporate.


8. (C) A/S Jones said that the USG was pleased that after
four years of negotiations between the EU and NATO, an ESDP
operation in accordance with Berlin plus was finally launched
in March to Macedonia, and she emphasizes this point with the
American public whenever possible. It was unfortunate that
headlines from elsewhere in the world in March meant
Concordia did not receive the notice it deserved - especially
as it relates to the new relationship between ESDP and NATO.
A/S Jones pledged to work with the EU and NATO so that SHAPE
does in fact begin to feel like a proper military
headquarters for the EU. Our main concern is that we avoid
duplication of capabilities and headquarters - we want to
streamline and become more efficient to more effectively
address new threats.


9. (C) A/S Jones reiterated that the U.S. remains open to an
EU takeover from SFOR in Bosnia, but not now. The security


situation at the moment and unfinished business relating to
apprehending Persons Indicted for War Crimes and terrorists
call for a continued NATO presence of 12,000 personnel at
least through the fall. In the Balkans we remain committed
to "in together - out together." A/S Jones also praised the
police training mission in Bosnia, and hoped it could serve
as a model for missions to Afghanistan and Iraq.

--------------
Galileo
--------------


10. (C) A/S Jones noted President Bush was clear that the
U.S. has strong political concerns about how Galileo's
planned overlay of the GPS M-code could adversely impact
Allied military communication. She stressed that technical
experts have demonstrated that any overlay, even partial,
will interfere with Allied military capabilities. She
reassured the EU that it is not our intention to have Galileo
be a second-class system; we believe that by separating GPS
and Galileo we could support the NATO Alliance without
degrading Galileo. A/S Jones welcomed the EU offer to stay
in contact.


11. (C) Valenzuela is hopeful that experts can find a
solution between the two extremes of satisfying security and
avoiding second-class status for Galileo. He stressed the
importance of a clear political mandate and noted that we
have everything to gain from complementary systems and
nothing to gain by impeding one another. He said that the EU
is ready to hold classified consultations regardless of
venue. Once the experts have worked out the issues, the
Commission will have to consider matters of cost, robustness,
and delays.


12. (C) Aragona stressed Italy's desire to fully safeguard
U.S. security concerns, and noted the rest of the EU Member
States felt similarly. However, he reiterated that it is
equally important Galileo be first class -- technologically
functional and credible. He was glad to see this is fully
recognized by the U.S. administration and is confident that
we are moving ahead on a sound footing. He applauded the
Commission's willingness to let the U.S. choose the venue for
the classified session, provided it is a U.S.-EU
conversation. Cooper added that it is important to keep the
prize in mind. "If the technicians can make it work, two
systems are better than one -- and our people are instructed
to find a solution."


13. (C) A/S Jones noted the question of venue will be
resolved, but stressed this situation may still require a
political-level decision, based on technical discussions, to
come to a firm conclusion. Everyone agreed the next step was
open-minded technical talks. David Cooney, Irish Political
Director, added that there is full consensus in the EU,
including non-NATO EU countries, that no one wants to
undermine the NATO alliance.

--------------
Middle East
--------------


14. (C) A/S Jones noted that intense discussions are underway
bilaterally with both Sharon and Abu Mazen, and underscored
the need to continue working with Palestinians on prisoner
releases, fence and security issues, and with the Israelis on
security on the ground. On the economic side, A/S Jones
raised need to move fast and get a direct budget for the
Palestinians in order to expand support for Abu Mazen and
enhance his ability to make agreements with Sharon for the
greater good. Intense cooperation should continue with the
Quartet; both the U.S. and the EU must push both sides at the
GAERC and meetings in Washington.


15. (C) Aragona confirmed the Middle East is a priority for
the Italian Presidency. He welcomed the U.S. efforts, and
President Bush's increased involvement. He agreed the
situation is fragile and requires commitment, which the EU is
ready to take on. He explained Sharon and Abu Mazen would
appear in succession at the GAERC, and the EU would impress
upon them the need to move ahead with roadmap implementation.
Aragona stressed the need for a credible, effective


monitoring mechanism, and highlighted the appointment of new
special envoy, Ambassador Otte. Cooney noted the EU can play
a complementary role to push the Arabs to meet their
commitments, and pointed out that the EU is not looking for
glory -- but is looking for peace. Valenzuela raised the
importance of keeping the Palestinian Authority functioning
with economic support, and the need for the population itself
to see the dividends of peace. He added that new focus on
the private sector would also have positive effects.


16. (C) A/S Jones noted the President wants the Quartet to
play a strong role to resolve the conflict, and that from the
U.S. perspective, each Quartet member should strive for equal
credibility with both parties for more effective agreements.

--------------
Counter-Terrorism
--------------


17. (C) A/S Jones described U.S.-EU CT cooperatio as very
strong, especially between EU Justice ad Home Affairs (JHA)
experts and their U.S. counterparts. This was highlighted
during the summit with the signing of the Mutual Legal
Assistance and Extradition agreements. She noted progress on
terrorism finance, but urged the EU to designate all wings of
Hamas and Hizballah, and groups that raise funds for them, as
terrorist entities. A/S Jones noted progress on resolving
remaining differences on the Container Security Initiative
and the Passenger Name Record programs, and looked forward to
closing remaining gaps. Aragona reiterated the high priority
the EU places on CT cooperation and said the EU wants to
enhance cooperation in information collection and sharing and
terrorism finance.


18. (C) Aragona said that EU Foreign Ministers will discuss
Hamas at the July 21-22 GAERC, an issue now "under constant
review." However, he noted that Hamas' respect for the
current ceasefire would need to be taken into account. Cooper
said Hamas was not a black and white issue for the EU. Its
designation raised questions -- whether the international
community would ever want to include Hamas in a political
process; and how to replace the social services Hamas
provides Palestinians. He said the EU has also talked
extensively to Abu Mazen about Hamas, and is "pulled in
different directions" regarding potential designation. A/S
Jones pressed again for EU designation of Hamas and Hizballah
as terrorist organizations.

--------------
International Criminal Court
--------------


19. (C) Aragona stated his understanding of U.S. public and
congressional pressure against ICC, but noted the equally
strong conviction in Europe in support of the ICC and the
principle of international jurisdiction. In addition, the EU
view is that the mechanisms of the ICC will protect against
the politicization of the court that the U.S. fears. He said
the U.S. and EU needed to avoid "divisive engagement" on this
issue; in spite of our differences it was in U.S.-EU
interests to manage this issue successfully. Aragona said
the EU's guiding principles on Article 98 agreements were not
a campaign against U.S. efforts to negotiate Article 98
agreements. Aragona said he hoped the ICC would establish a
track record that would persuade the U.S. to reconsider its
position.


20. (C) A/S Jones clarified that there was no disagreement
between the U.S. and the EU over the importance of
prosecuting war crimes. The disagreement was over the
failure, in drafting the Rome statute, to provide safeguard
mechanisms such as those applicable to the ICTY, making the
tribunals accountable to the international community. Just
as countries tell us that for constitutional reasons they
cannot deploy troops abroad without a UN decision, we cannot
for constitutional reasons subject U.S. citizens to a
tribunal that is not accountable to the international
community. A/S Jones noted that EU guidelines allow Member
States to negotiate Article 98 agreements. She noted that
some Member State Ambassadors, with strong personal
convictions on the issue, have been overly eager to tell
accession countries that Article 98 agreements are not


allowed, or that signing an agreement could jeopardize EU
assistance funds. We know this is not EU policy, and seek EU
help to clarify to Member State Ambassadors what is
appropriate for them to tell accession and third countries,
and what is not.


21. (C) Aragona replied that he could not exclude that some
Member State Ambassadors might have made the representations
described by A/S Jones, but the EU position on Article 98
agreements is clear, and exists in writing. The only
authorized way for the EU position to be conveyed to third
countries is via the Presidency or the EU Troika. Valenzuela
added that the notion that the EU could threaten to withhold
assistance from accession countries was remote. The
procedures involved would include a European Court of Justice
decision -- after accession of the country concerned. Cooney
noted that the U.S. and the EU had both given countries "a
pretty hard time" over Article 98 agreements, and cited U.S.
pressure, via withholding military assistance under
provisions of the American Servicemembers Protection Act
(ASPA) as an example. Although Ireland was not a recipient
of US Security assistance, the application of ASPA to
Ireland, Cooney said, would not bring Ireland any closer to
signing an Article 98 agreement. A/S Jones responded that
ASPA was the law of the land, and U.S. military assistance to
countries amounted to 1/100th of potential EU assistance to
accession states, so the two situations were not comparable.
(Comment. Although little headway was made on the substance,
the direct but non-confrontational exchange of views allowed
both sides to clarify their concerns. End comment.)

--------------
Iraq
--------------


22. (C) A/S Jones provided an update of the situation in
Iraq, focusing on five key priorities: security issues,
improvement of quality of life, assistance from the
international community, development of self-governing
mechanisms, and economic revitalization. She outlined
developments in police staffing and training, legal and
judicial reform, electricity production and supply, and the
establishment of the Iraqi Governing Council. She noted
plans to convene a donors, conference in October, adding
that the US hopes the EU will be an active participant,
perhaps taking the opportunity of the July 21 GAERC to make
this commitment.


23. (C) Aragona praised the creation of the IGC as an
important step, and agreed on the primary importance of
providing a secure environment in which Iraq,s most pressing
needs can be addressed. He said the EU would continue to
work closely with Ambassador Bremer and his team. While it
may be premature to get into specifics about the October
donors, conference, the US should be assured that the EU
will play a very supportive role on financial assistance and
reconstruction. Aragona stressed the importance of Iraqis
&owning8 this process.


24. (C) Aragona requested US views about an eventual UN role
in Iraq. A/S Jones replied that UNSCR 1483 addresses
existing responsibilities. The Allied Coalition understands
and accepts its responsibilities, and will focus on the five
priorities outlined earlier. Any discussion of transfer of
authority would, at this point, be premature.

--------------
Afghanistan
--------------


25. (C) A/S Jones noted that the Afghanistan government
projects a budget shortfall of over 180 million USD. The EU
has already committed 50 million USD; we hope it will give
another 20 million. Additionally, Afghan elections are
expected to cost about 100 million USD; we trust that the EU
will also be supportive of that process. A/S Jones briefed
on the Provincial Reconstruction Team program and urged EU
participation. She also expressed appreciation for the
willingness of the EC,s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) to
permit personnel of the Coalition Joint Civil-Military
Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) to use UN Humanitarian Air
Service flights for crucial transport, and urged ECHO to


extend such usage beyond August 1.


26. (C) Cooney expressed concern that constitutional
consultations were taking place without circulation of draft
texts, saying this was giving rise to suspicions that the
process was not really inclusive. Cooney also expressed
concern about possible delays in the electoral process.
Cooper added that there is a growing perception among many
Afghans that a &fix8 is in which will simply ratify
existing powers.


27. (C) Valenzuela said the EU is on track to meet its pledge
of one billion Euros over five years, with outlays during the
current year totaling over 200 million. He recognized the
need for electoral funding, but was noncommittal, noting that
the EC budget is already stretched. Valenzuela also echoed
Cooper,s concerns that the electoral process not be
perceived as favoring status quo warlord power. In that
regard, he expressed general support for extending Kabul,s
power and influence into the provinces, but said present
plans do not envision EU participation in the PRT,s.

--------------
Nonproliferation
--------------


28. (C) Aragona said that the conceptual framework for NP
coordination is contained in the EU Strategy Against
Proliferation of WMD; now we should focus on practical
measures in Iran and North Korea. A/S Jones expressed
appreciation for the development and launch of the
nonproliferation initiative. While we recognize that there
are some differences of perception, we agree that there are
ample opportunities for cooperative action. A/S Jones
expressed US concerns about proceeding with an initiative in
the UNGA, but said the US is willing to discuss this
possibility with EU experts.


29. (C) Cooper said the Commission has developed four main
areas of emphasis. First, the IAEA has proven very useful,
most recently with Iran. Second, the EU will, in
consultation with the U.S., review all of its treaty
relationships with a view to adopting language requiring
nonproliferation cooperation. Third, the Commission wishes
to review (at 25) the best practices of various
nonproliferation regimes. Finally, Cooper lauded the
Proliferation Security Initiative, but noted that not all EU
member states were asked to participate in PSI, and asked
whether such EU participation might be possible. A/S Jones
said the US would welcome broader participation that expands
the effectiveness of the PSI. Aragona said that, as one of
the original PSI participants and EU Presidency country,
Italy might be well placed to explore the idea of greater
inclusiveness.

--------------
Iran
--------------


30. (C) Aragona noted that Italian FM Frattini recently told
his Iranian counterpart that prompt and unconditional
agreement to the Additional Protocol sought by the IAEA is
essential. He said that political dialogue and economic
cooperation must be linked, and we should balance our
approaches and avoid steps that might prove
counterproductive. A/S Jones said the U.S. and EU should
develop a strategy to use the next IAEA report, which will
reportedly be very critical of Tehran. The U.S. recognizes
that Iran is divided; the key question is how to influence
internal dynamics to achieve the changes in Iranian policy
that we seek.
--------------
North Korea
--------------


31. (C) Aragona said that North Korea's WMD program is a
multilateral, global problem, and needs a joint and
coordinated response. He expressed hope that China might be
able to foster a renewal of dialogue with the DPRK. A/S
Jones welcomed Aragona,s recognition that North Korean
proliferation is a global issue. The criminality of the


regime is also a factor. Valenzuela lauded the intensity of
U.S. dialogue with China and Japan on North Korea, but
expressed concern that discussions with other KEDO members
outside the framework of KEDO might affect that body, and
asked that we keep the EU in the loop on all KEDO-related
matters.

--------------
Russia
--------------


32. (C) Aragona said the EU is making progress with Russia on
border/immigration issues, combating organized crime and drug
trafficking. The EU raises Chechnya and human rights issues,
but has not had much success. The EU assessment is the
Russians are content with their role within the Quartet. On
Moldova, Aragona said that Russian FM Ivanov is extremely
uncomfortable with any "outside" role in a settlement. On
nonproliferation, Aragona said the Russians may be moving in

the right direction, but this was an Italian national
assessment.


33. (C) A/S Jones urged the EU to use Russia's desire for
good relations with the West to promote reforms. On
Chechnya, despite Russian extreme sensitivities, the U.S.
raises it at all levels, including at summit meetings,
pointing out that there must be a political solution that
also addresses underlying causes. On human rights/media
freedom and economic reform, much still needs to be done.
The U.S. is concerned about Putin's recent closure of TV
stations.

--------------
Moldova/Frozen Conflicts
--------------


34. (C) A/S Jones outlined U.S. frustration with the Russian
MFA "stone wall" that blocks any effort to move ahead on
Moldova or any of the frozen conflicts. The U.S. strategy,
which is still being developed, is to say to Moscow that if
it wants good relations with the U.S. and the West (e.g. visa
free travel with the EU) then it can't say the EU has no
voice in a Moldova settlement. A/S Jones outlined upcoming
U.S.-Russian meetings that can be used to raise these issues
above the level of the MFA, and said the U.S. would welcome a
similar EU effort. Russia cannot be allowed to take "Cold
War" positions on Moldova and Georgia.


35. (C) Cooney agreed there was a big gap between Russian
rhetoric and action, and outlined three reasons why the EU
sought a role in a Moldova settlement. First, the EU wants
conflict resolved on what will be its borders. Second,
Moldova is an economic basket case -- per capita GDP is two
percent of the EU average and it is a source of organized
crime and trafficking in persons. Third, the EU wants a
resolution in Moldova before enlargement encompasses Romania
in order to avoid further tension along that border. Cooney
noted that public discussion of a potential EU peacekeeping
force in Moldova was not helpful in reaching a political
settlement -- it would just upset the Russians. Aragona
added that no decisions have been taken; when the day comes
that the OSCE does reach a decision, and if the OSCE asks the
EU to take this role, the EU will have to take the Russian
connection to Moldova into account. A/S Jones said that the
U.S. was open to an EU stabilization force in Moldova, under
an OSCE mandate, and would want such a mission to draw on
NATO planning. It should follow the Macedonia, not Congo,
model since it would be in the European theatre.

36 (U) A/S Jones has cleared this cable.
Sembler
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2003ROME03368 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL