Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ROME3214
2003-07-14 17:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

MID-EAST PEACE PROCESS: WHAT TO EXPECT OF ITALY AS

Tags:  EU IS IT KPAL PREL EUN 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 003214 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2013
TAGS: EU IS IT KPAL PREL EUN
SUBJECT: MID-EAST PEACE PROCESS: WHAT TO EXPECT OF ITALY AS
PRESIDENT OF THE EU ON THE MEPP

REF: A. ROME 2766


B. ROME 2646

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR THOMAS COUNTRYMAN FOR REASO
NS 1.5 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 003214

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2013
TAGS: EU IS IT KPAL PREL EUN
SUBJECT: MID-EAST PEACE PROCESS: WHAT TO EXPECT OF ITALY AS
PRESIDENT OF THE EU ON THE MEPP

REF: A. ROME 2766


B. ROME 2646

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR THOMAS COUNTRYMAN FOR REASO
NS 1.5 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: Italy has identified the MidEast Peace
Process as among its top foreign policy priorities during its
EU Presidency (July-December 2003). PM Berlusconi has
consciously upgraded Italy's relations with Israel to balance
its traditional close ties to the Palestinians and make the
GOI better able to collaborate closely with the USG within
the Quartet. At the same time, it is conscious that EU
decision-making process, and continued Israeli distrust of
the EU, will limit its ability to innovate -- we should not
expect the Italians to single-handedly reverse the feeble EU
record in the peace process. Italian hopes of replacing
Moratinos with an Italian candidate appear to be fading. PM
Berlusconi and FM Frattini would like Italy to host the first
of two international peace conferences called for by the
roadmap in Sicily in Fall 2003 (Refs A-B). Israeli,
Palestinian and Egyptian representatives in Rome share our
view that Italy's balanced ties at least give a basis for
hope that the Italian Presidency has an opportunity to make
the EU contribution to the peace process more visible and
productive. End summary.

BALANCING TIES WITH ISRAEL AND PALESTINE
--------------


2. (C) Since taking office two years ago, Berlusconi has
consciously sought to improve Italy's ties with Israel.
Besides hosting PM Sharon early in their respective tenures,
Berlusconi has gone out of his way to keep in phone touch
with the Israeli leader. Of greater substance, a succession
of Italian technical ministers (communications, industry,
transportation, science) have visited Israel or hosted their
Israeli counterparts and signed substantive cooperation
agreements. This has been accompanied by a conscious shift
away from the traditional GOI support for Arafat, who
Berlusconi once courted with money from his own pocket.
Primarily at the request of President Bush, Berlusconi has
avoided direct contact with Arafat for over a year, and he
told visiting Israeli President Katsav last year that he

would "never" again see Arafat. (This private comment was
immediately given to the press by the Israeli Embassy). The
GOI has in turn balanced the shunning of Arafat with the
continuation of the annual subsidy that keeps afloat the
Palestinian "embassy" in Rome and -- more theoretically --
with Berlusconi's proposal of a "Marshall Plan" for
Palestinian economic development. This re-balancing is
consistent with Berlusconi's personal politics and with his
desire to align his foreign policy as close as possible to
President Bush's. Italian diplomats have made clear that
they hope it has the added benefit of more Italian
credibility with the US - and a higher EU profile - within
the Quartet.

--------------
WITHIN THE QUARTET, AND WITHIN THE EU
--------------

3. (C) The Italians are conscious -- as we should be -- that
their ability to make the EU a more effective player will be
limited by the EU's own history (which has led to Israel's
distrust of the EU) and tortured decision process. For
example, Berlusconi was eager to make his recent visit to
Israel before assuming the EU Presidency, knowing that it
would be harder to keep his promise (made personally to
President Bush) not to see Arafat once he wore the EU
President's hat. His haste to make the visit probably
contributed to the less-than-subtle way that he avoided an
Arafat meeting, which generated in turn criticism from the
French and other EU ministers that his snubbing was
inconsistent with agreed EU policy. Though Berlusconi shot
back with a tried-and-true one-liner (De Villepin "missed a
great opportunity to keep quiet"),the fact remains that the
Italians start in a hole in terms of bringing the EU policy
around to a similar re-balancing. FM Frattini has stated
publicly Italy's desire to have the EU gain a "higher
profile" within the Quartet. If this is supported by the US
(Berlusconi may raise it in his July 20 call on the
President),it would vindicate Berlusconi's re-balancing
approach.


4. (C) We expect the GOI will be closer to the USG, within
the Quartet, than recent EU presidencies. In the Italian


view, the most positive factor in the current process is the
personal commitment of President Bush. Berlusconi believes
that he can take advantage of a close personal relationship
with the President to support and share that commitment. It
will do so by seeking to establish EU positions that will be
more consistent with the US view, and by coordinating closely
with the US on any diplomatic mission to the region. It
should also be more willing than recent EU Presidents to -
rapidly - add the weight of the EU Presidency to any pressing
of either the Palestinians or Israel that the US finds
necessary. The GOI will run the risk of being yanked back by
EU colleagues if it pushes too far (e.g., if Berlusconi were
again to snub Arafat). They are realistic, knowing that the
real role of the Italian Presidency is limited, all the more
so as Solana appears determined to keep a tighter rein on the
process by naming as Moratinos' successor someone more
dynamic and closer to Solana himself. But this limitation
will not prevent the Italian representatives
(Director-General for Middle East Ricardo Sessa or Eastern
Med office director Luca Ferrari) at any Quartet meeting from
speaking out strongly. Both have strong experience with the
region, the full confidence of the Berlusconi government, and
(especially Ferrari, the main architect of the GOI's
rebalancing) a pre-disposition to agree with the USG.


5. (C) More publicly, the GOI would like to make four
distinctly Italian contributions to the peace process, most
of them long shots:
-- The candidacy of Ambassador to Damascus Laura Mirachian to
replace Moratinos as special EU envoy, once hopeful, now
appears all but finished. At best, the GOI looks forward to
working with a replacement who will be "more competent and
less jaded" than Moratinos.

-- Second, they will continue to push the idea of a concerted
EU economic program for Palestinian development, particularly
if there is significant progress in Phase one of the roadmap.
MFA officials concede it has little chance of EU approval,
partly because of its close association with Berlusconi
himself, and partly because this is one area of foreign
assistance where EU states prefer to get the credit (and
leverage) for individual contributions, rather than through
the EU.

-- Third, PM Berlusconi has restated his desire to host (in
Erice, Sicily) the international peace conference called for
in the second phase of the roadmap. In his June meeting with
Berlusconi, Sharon did not object to the idea as long as the
situation on the ground corresponded to what it should be at
the end of phase I of the roadmap (Ref A). Luca Fratini,
Ferrari's deputy, recently outlined what the MFA saw as key
to reaching that goal: that the US encourage Israel to
continue the settlement freeze; that the US discourage Israel
from building a security fence; and the adequate functioning
of a multinational implementation monitoring mechanism. (FM
Frattini, in a June 11 speech at the Center for Defense
Studies in Rome praised the President's decision to send the
first group of American observers to the region, saying that
the roadmap cannot be carried out unless there was a
monitoring mechanism on the ground. He added that Italy,
with a demonstrated expertise in monitoring work, stands
ready to assist if called upon by the US (ref B).

-- Fourth, Berlusconi has invited Abu Mazen to Rome, ideally
in July (at this moment, it seems unlikely that this will
occur before September). At this point, the GOI has no
concrete objective for that meeting, but we are confident it
will consult closely with the USG as soon as the meeting is
scheduled.

--------------
ISRAELI, PALESTINIAN AND EGYPTIAN VIEWPOINTS
--------------


6. (C) Israel is optimistic about the Italian Presidency
because it will be a "balanced Presidency," said Ofer Bavly,
the spokesman of the Embassy of Israel in Rome. Israel
considers Berlusconi to be more balanced on the
Israeli/Palestinian issue than previous Italian governments
and EU presidencies. Given Italy's excellent relations with
Israel and with the Arab world, Bavly expected Italy to play
a positive mediation role that other EU countries cannot.
Israel will always look to the US for the leading mediation
role in the MEPP, but does not mind a greater EU role in the
MEPP as long as the EU views are balanced and the EU plays a
complementary role to that of the US, said Bavly.



7. (C) As far as tangible steps Italy could play during its
Presidency, Bavly suggested that the EU ought to apply
pressure on the PA, Syria, and other countries in the region
that get economic aid from the EU to commit seriously to
fighting terrorism. He did not expect Italy to put any "real
pressure" on Israel during its Presidency because the
Berlusconi government has a "far greater understanding" of
Israel's security needs than did previous Italian governments
and EU Presidencies. Bavly expected any concrete
achievements during the Italian Presidency to come through
the Quartet. Israel expects Italy to coordinate well and not
to compete with the US in the Quartet. Israel wants to see
the US and the EU work well together within the Quartet, not
the US supporting Israel and the EU supporting the Arabs,
said Bavly.


8. (C) Nemer Hamad, the senior PA representative in Rome,
expected Italy to coordinate equally within the 15 EU members
and the USG on the MEPP during its Presidency. It will not
be Italy as an individual country that is calling the shots,
predicted Hamad, but as the EU President within the Quartet
and in full coordination with the US. Full unrestricted
acceptance of the roadmap by both parties is an indispensable
starting point for any serious progress in the region.
Without that, even the best intentions of the Quartet will be
of little help, insisted Hamad.


9. (C) As long as the EU does not have a common foreign
policy, it will not be able to exert useful pressure on
either side, said Hamad. In order for the EU to serve as a
mediator in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, it must be
accepted by both parties. In that sense, Italy, with its
excellent ties to both the Arab world and Israel, could play
a key coordination role within the Quartet, between the EU
and the US, having the trust of both Israelis and
Palestinians. Italy's success during the Presidency will
depend primarily on Sharon's continued willingness to
implement the roadmap --the only possible road to an eventual
peace-- and the US' willingness to pressure Sharon to do
that, said Hamad.


10. (C) The real test for Italy and the international
community is the implementation of the roadmap, said Ahmed
Adel, NEA Watcher at the Embassy of Egypt in Rome. The MEPP
will give Italy an opportunity to reunite the EU politically
after its political division over Iraq and will give
Berlusconi the opportunity to play an important and visible
leadership role at the international level. Italy should use
its positive relations with Iran and Syria to convey actively
the US message that Iran and Syria should not disrupt the
progress of the MEPP. Italy and the EU could and should play
a positive role in the monitoring mechanism because they
understand well the reality of the situation on the ground
both for Palestinians and for Israelis. When implementation
of the roadmap proves difficult, Italy should play a balanced
role, acknowledging the reality and challenges faced by both
sides, said Adel.
Sembler
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2003ROME03214 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL