Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ROME3047
2003-07-03 15:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

BERLUSCONI'S MOUTH MAKES SECOND ROME TREATY FAR

Tags:  PGOV PREL IT ITALIAN POLITICS 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 003047 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL IT ITALIAN POLITICS
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI'S MOUTH MAKES SECOND ROME TREATY FAR
LESS LIKELY -- AND IT COULD HAPPEN AGAIN

REF: ROME 3029
Classified By: POL MINCOUNS THOMAS COUNTRYMAN, REASONS 1.5 (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 003047

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL IT ITALIAN POLITICS
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI'S MOUTH MAKES SECOND ROME TREATY FAR
LESS LIKELY -- AND IT COULD HAPPEN AGAIN

REF: ROME 3029
Classified By: POL MINCOUNS THOMAS COUNTRYMAN, REASONS 1.5 (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Berlusconi's tasteless insult to German
MEP Martin Schulz reduces the likelihood of a second Treaty
of Rome and exacerbates the difficulties the Prime Minister
will have serving in the role of "honest broker" as European
Council President-in-Office. The vast majority,
non-headline-grabbing work of the Presidency will not be
affected; Italy's MFA has laid the ground well to make
progress on GOI priorities. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Berlusconi's offensive rejoinder to Schulz's attacks
is not unexpected, although it came earlier in the Italian
Presidency than most would have predicted. Berlusconi must
be extremely frustrated with the unfairness of the criticism
directed against him, questioning his (and by extension,
Italy's) fitness to lead Europe. This criticism, in the eyes
of many Italians, comes from those who already enjoy the
immunity the Prime Minister was awarded by the Italian
Parliament; who have never accepted Berlusconi and his
non-traditional, self-made roots; and who insist on
besmirching an Italy that in 2003 bears little resemblance to
the stereotypes perpetrated in much of the commentary across
Europe.


3. (C) Berlusconi has used the same tactics in his domestic
political battles, to great effect. When the center-left
opposition attacks, he turns the attack back on them,
ratcheting the volume and intensity up by degrees. It has
worked, and he remains popular among his electorate. His
stupid rise to Schulz's bait, however, will not win him the
respect of Italy's centrist or undecided voters, and
certainly is not in keeping with Italian devotion to avoiding
the "brutta figura." Berlusconi's reaction was predictable,
too, in that Schulz's criticism was part of a coordinated
campaign among European socialists, as the PM later claimed.
(NOTE: We agree it is likely that the Italian opposition
provided the ammunition for Schulz's fusillade.) In
responding to Schulz, Berlusconi was responding to his own
opposition, employing tried and true tactics. Berlusconi is,
as well, convinced of overarching collusion on the left,
whether between Italy's left-wing parties and its judiciary

(reftel explains why we don't think he's completely off base
with this one); Italy's left and its European counterparts;
or the left and the media (including both state-owned RAI and
his own TV networks; certainly neither spares Berlusconi from
criticism).


4. (C) Explaining his reaction does not make it any less
stupid. EC President Prodi's recommendation was right. When
asked how the EU could avoid "personalizing" the EU
Presidency for the next six months, he replied "by not
answering your question." We are hard-pressed to predict
whether Berlusconi's staff and close associates can
successfully train their shoot-from-the-hip, self-confident,
at times arrogant, self-made tycoon-turned-Prime Minister to
follow Prodi's sage advice in the case of future
provocations, which will come any time he sets foot in the
European Parliament. History does not suggest Silvio
Berlusconi can restrain himself. His exchange with Schulz is
emblematic of why Berlusconi has been a successful
businessman and winner in Italy's political trench warfare,
but it also shows why he may not be cut out for the role of
the EU's back-room broker. Before giving up all hope,
however, we note that many political and business deals are
also made in back rooms, where Berlusconi's skills at
persuasion, if not compromise, have been proven.


5. (C) The vast majority of work under the Italian
Presidency will not be affected by the outburst. Berlusconi's
prepared remarks to the European Parliament, which few will
now bother to read, actually outlined a forward-looking
agenda that should enjoy consensus support. The Italian MFA
is well-prepared and the machinery is in place for a
successful Presidency. Most GOI priorities for its semester,
such as promoting further Balkans stability, closer EU-Russia
relations, and EU-wide immigration reform, will continue
unimpeded. Decisions that can be reached at the working
level will be made. Those that must be resolved by heads of
state -- and we cannot predict which those will be -- will be
harder. There will be, we are certain, plenty of cases where
political compromise will be in the self-interest of all, and
will be reached. There may be others where this incident,
and more importantly Berlusconi's personality traits which


underpin it, may impede progress.


6. (C) His imprudence may eventually be held against him
when he attempts to bring the Convention/Constitution
document back to Rome after the Intergovernmental Conference
(IGC) process is completed, most likely during the Irish
Presidency. We suspect that lingering bad feeling and
distaste may make many EU member states reluctant to allow
Berlusconi to preside over the highly symbolic treaty signing
ceremony, and risk another of his tirades which could mar
Europe's big day. His chances may depend in part on whether
and how well he apologizes to German Chancellor Schroeder in
a telephone call later today.
Sembler
NNNN
2003ROME03047 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL