Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03RANGOON890
2003-07-25 05:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

MANDALAY OUTREACH CENTER: NOW MORE THAN EVER

Tags:  KPAO PREL ABLD ASEC BM 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 RANGOON 000890 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2013
TAGS: KPAO PREL ABLD ASEC BM
SUBJECT: MANDALAY OUTREACH CENTER: NOW MORE THAN EVER

REF: A) RANGOON 00183 B) 02 RANGOON 1493 C) 02

RANGOON 1624 D) WEGMANN-GLAZEROFF E-MAIL
2/12/03

Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ FOR REASON 1.5 (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 RANGOON 000890

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2013
TAGS: KPAO PREL ABLD ASEC BM
SUBJECT: MANDALAY OUTREACH CENTER: NOW MORE THAN EVER

REF: A) RANGOON 00183 B) 02 RANGOON 1493 C) 02

RANGOON 1624 D) WEGMANN-GLAZEROFF E-MAIL
2/12/03

Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ FOR REASON 1.5 (D)


1. (U) This is an action request. See para 2.


2. (SBU) Summary: In order to expand its democracy training
and outreach, Embassy proposes to establish an American
Center Teaching Annex in Mandalay (see reftels),Burma's
second largest city and its geographic and cultural center.
The American Center Teaching Annex would enable post to
include significantly larger numbers of those supporting
political change in these regions in public diplomacy
outreach programs fostering democracy and civil society, a
core MPP goal. The most recent GOB crackdown on opposition
parties throws into stark relief the need and utility of
another outreach channel to those organizations and
individuals.

An OIG team visiting post in February applauded post,s plans
to expand outreach beyond the capital. Among its draft key
judgments: "The (Public Diplomacy) section continues to make
significant strides in its outreach efforts and conducts a
highly successful educational program in Rangoon." The OIG
recommended that Post provide for the Department an analysis
of alternatives for establishing an outreach center in
Mandalay.

Post herein offers an assessment of three possible options
for the establishment of the Mandalay outreach center:

A) Opening an American Center Teaching Annex in USG-owned
property: Utilize former Mandalay Consulate property for the
Center and begin the program with four FSNs and two AmCit
grantees;

B) Leasing the USG property to an Educational NGO to perform
outreach programs under a grant agreement: Have an American
educational NGO provide program activities similar to Public
Diplomacy programs at the USG-owned property; and

C) Opening an American Center Teaching Annex as a Tenant in
Commercial Space: Rent commercial space in Mandalay, sell the
USG-owned property, and begin the program with four FSNs and
two AmCit grantees.

Funding would need to come from a variety of sources, but
could include ESF from the "Burma Earmark" for democracy

programs. In making this assessment, site visits to Mandalay
were conducted by the COM, DCM, PAO, GSO, and RSO, as well as
by two DS Regional Security Engineers, an OBO architect, and
the OIG team.

ACTION REQUEST: that the Department review the options and
select which, if any, it deems most appropriate and name a
point of contact to work with Post to implement the proposal.
End Summary.

THE NEED FOR AN AMERICAN CENTER TEACHING ANNEX, MANDALAY


3. (SBU) Even before the May 30 ambush on Aung San Suu Kyi's
motorcade and the subsequent arrests of hundreds of democracy
supporters, Burma was a country subject to Orwellian
censorship and control by the military dictatorship. There
is no free press, free speech, or right of assembly. The
universities, historically a source of political activism,
have been virtually dismantled by the regime. Graduating
high school students must wait more than a year before space
opens for them in a university "distance learning" program.
Thus, at precisely the time they are making life decisions
and are perhaps most open to influence, thousands of young
adults are turning to the American Center in Rangoon each
month to use the Library/Information Resource Center (IRC),
attend films or lectures, or join English language classes.
These English language classes have a high content of civil
society training, such as critical thinking, expressing
opinions and persuading others, mediating disputes and
conflicts, etc. A number of the students in the English
language classes are former political prisoners, or
representatives of opposition political parties or minority
ethnic groups, who have been granted tuition waivers for the
classes.


4. (C) For the past year, through an ESF Burma Earmark grant,
post has been providing governance training and English
classes (eight hours a week) for seven to twelve opposition
leaders. The program was begun at the request of opposition
leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the participants are her
hand-picked representatives -- predominantly MP's elected in
1990, but never seated -- her shadow Ministers and successors
to the aging party leadership. Because of the importance of
this program to ASSK, she asked that the training be
continued for a second year. During the first year of the
program, ASSK also sought to include party leaders and MP's
from other provinces. A group of three Mandalay MP's moved
to Rangoon for two six week sessions, but were unable to keep
up with the main cohort because they could not be away for
long from party responsibilities in Mandalay. Another group
including a Shan, a Mon, and a Karen party member were able
to come for just one session. A clear benefit to
establishing a public diplomacy facility in Mandalay would be
to extend activities like this high priority (but stealth)
training program to NLD leadership in Mandalay and
neighboring states and divisions. This is one reason ASSK
herself has endorsed establishing an American Center Teaching
Annex in Mandalay.


5. (C) The enthusiastic reception ASSK received in Mandalay
and neighboring divisions, which led directly to the SPDC's
dastardly May 30 ambush and crackdown on the National League
for Democracy party leadership, demonstrates that there is a
groundswell of popular support for political change in these
regions. All offices of the NLD (the only place party
members can legally assemble) have been closed. If the GOB
experimentation with a longer leash for the opposition
parties is indeed over, and the NLD's freedom of activity is
curtailed, their ability to operate in the Mandalay region
and beyond will be severely restrained. Post can best aid
democratization efforts, and our core MPP goal of a return to
democracy, by increasing the capacity (widening the pipeline)
to deliver training and information about the outside world
to these supporters of political change.


6. (SBU) The American Center Teaching Annex in Mandalay need
not be an open-ended commitment. In the period before
democracy returns to Burma, and in the transition period, it
would be in a unique position to provide valuable training
for civil society organizations, particularly the democratic
opposition. Once democracy returns, the USG could
investigate deeding the facility and its apparatus to a local
institution as a democracy think tank or an American Studies
Institute, as was done with many USIS libraries during the
1990's.

OPTION A OPENING AN AMERICAN CENTER ANNEX IN USG-OWNED
PROPERTY (FORMER MANDALAY CONSULATE)


7. (SBU) Reftel A provided post,s rationale for opening an
American Center Annex at the former consulate building
Mandalay. Reftels B and C, reported on the RSO,s security
survey of the site and on probable costs associated with
opening an American Center Annex there.


8. (SBU) To recap, under Option A, the Teaching Annex would
be staffed by a combination of LES (4) in the
Library/Information Resource Center, and English
teachers/trainers (2) hired through a grant agreement, with
supervision from the PAO in Rangoon. The former Consulate
building offers approximately 3700 square feet well
configured to function as a small American Center. It could
include two teaching classrooms and a language/computer lab
in the upstairs rooms, and a Library reading room, reference
section, and office space in the downstairs rooms. An OBO
architect, concluding a site visit in May, reported: "The
property is in excellent condition and would be well-suited
for use as an American Center," citing the building's
excellent location, accessibility, and setback.

SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

9. (SBU) The RSO determined (see Ref B) that the building is
&in good to excellent condition8 has &excellent setback
and reasonably effective safe area/office complex.8 &Basic
structures are fundamentally sound and could be made
operational with appropriate upgrades and DS exceptions to
specific standards.8


10. (SBU) According to 12 FAH-6, H-020, Definition of Terms
the Annex would be a Public Office Facility. ("Facility,
which exists for public use or functions, such as libraries
and cultural centers. It is located in a commercial or
residential building not collocated with the chancery or
consulate. No classified material is maintained. U.S.
Government may or may not be sole occupant.") Thus it would
be governed by the physical security standards for "Public
Office Facilities" as provided by regulation 12 FAH-6,
H-111.8, Physical Security (Public Office Facilities - Such
as Libraries and Commercial Offices).


11. (SBU) The current property was acquired prior to 1991 and
therefore falls in the category of an Existing Office
Building, 12 FAH-5, H-111, Differentiation Between Existing
and New Buildings; 12FAH-5, H-112, Existing Office Building
(EOB). Thus, no waiver for collocation or setback is
required, according to SECCA, 1999, A.1, 00 State 82682. ("A
quick reference checklist for waiver requirements involving
building collocation and setback follows: A. No waiver
required: 1) Existing U.S. diplomatic facilities as of 29
November 1999....")


12. (SBU) If this option is chosen, RSO is ready to prepare a
formal Site Survey and Security Upgrade Plan for the facility
utilizing 12 FAH-5 and 12 FAH-6 as specific guidelines.
These reports would provide DS the exact site layout,
recommended security upgrades, and define those physical
security standards that are not feasible as defined per
regulation. This would satisfy the requirement of 12 FAH-5,
H-121.2, Exceptions to Standards, and serve as the
documentation to support a funding request for security
upgrades, 12 FAH-5, H-121.1, Applicability.

FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS

13. (SBU) Reftel C discussed post,s estimates of funding
needs for this option. Post estimated approximately $200,000
in non-recurring expenses and about $95,000 in recurring
costs, including salaries for locally engaged staff. English
teachers/trainers would be recruited through a grant to an
educational NGO, at additional cost. (A similar grant
arrangement using Burma Earmark ESF is under consideration
this fiscal year to assist the Rangoon American Center's
English Teaching Program.)

14. (SBU) In Ref D, AID indicated to State Desk Officer its
estimation, after consultation with its Legal office, that of
the $295,000 post estimated would be needed for year one,
most could be covered by ESF. (This may include costs for
furnishings, computers and telecommunications, generator,
electrical upgrade and maintenance costs, program materials,
books, janitorial, grounds keeping, utilities, and fuel.)


15. (SBU) AID advised that non-project costs, such as raising
the perimeter fence and providing security guards, could not
be allocated to ESF. Funds for this, which post estimated at
$45,000, will need to be found elsewhere. Some recurring
costs such as LES salaries ($37,000) should come from PD
allotment. PAO would request an increase in PD allotment
from EAP/PD to meet this new cost.

OPTION B: LEASING THE USG PROPERTY TO AN EDUCATIONAL NGO TO
PERFORM OUTREACH PROGRAMS UNDER A GRANT AGREEMENT


16. (SBU) The USG property (former Consulate Building) could
be leased to an international NGO active in Education
programs to run programs similar to Public Diplomacy
programs, but not under the direction of the country PAO.
Funds from the Burma earmark, with appropriate notification
to Congress, could be used in a multiyear grant to pay for
most startup and recurring costs associated with the project.
Security upgrades would not be required by law.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POST AND GRANTEE

17. (SBU) The grantee NGO would administer a program with
aims similar to the country public diplomacy program, but
would not be under the supervision of the country PAO. In
accordance with grants policy, the PAO could function as a
program officer to the grant, ensuring that the program is
being run in good faith, but could not provide day-to-day
direction. PAS Rangoon could cooperate on programs and could
provide some materials and assistance to the grantee, as it
does to other local organizations


18. (SBU) As part of the grant agreement, the USG could lease
the former consulate building to the NGO for a nominal fee of
$1 per year. The facility would not be a diplomatic
installation, but may have a status equivalent to the British
Council, which has quietly operated a small reading room in
Mandalay for two years. Post hopes that the grantee would
enjoy protection from GOB harassment because of its
affiliation with a diplomatic entity. The NGO would have to
register with the Government of Burma.


19. (SBU) The grantee could recruit and provide
teacher/trainers for the English language programs, and could
locally recruit a reference librarian and other clerical
support staff. The grantee,s program could host speaker and
cultural presentations from PAS Rangoon on a quarterly basis.
The grantee could network with other civil society
organizations in Mandalay and help the PAO to identify
exchange participants from Mandalay and northern Burma. The
grantee,s library staff could help disseminate PAS
Rangoon,s publications and products.

20. (SBU) The grantee could not be expected to perform the
policy advocacy role of a State Department public diplomacy
program.


21. (C) In addition, without the diplomatic cover of the USG,
it is unclear whether the grantee could effectively run the
stealth governance program described in paragraph 4 above.

SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

22. (SBU) By leasing the property to the NGO, the USG is no
longer obligated by regulation to bring the property up to
security standards mandated for USG diplomatic installations.
However, because the site has strong association with the
United States, and because American citizens may be among the
grantee,s staff, the place may run some risks of being a
target of terrorism, as do many American NGO's around the
world. The Department will have to decide whether it has a
perceived obligation to provide the same security upgrades it
would to an American Center.
FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS

23. (SBU) By AID,s estimation, in consultation with its
Legal office, costs for furnishings, computers and
telecommunications, generator, electrical upgrade and
maintenance costs, program materials, books, annual staffing
costs, janitorial, grounds keeping, utilities, and fuel could
be covered by ESF. Although most of the above will be
provided by the grantee, it might be expedient for post
(still using ESF) to provide procurement and importation of
furniture, computers, and other aspects of the facilities
upgrade.


24. (SBU) AID advises that non-project costs, such as raising
the perimeter fence and providing security guards, could not
be allocated to ESF. If these are deemed necessary, funds
will need to be found.
FINDING THE RIGHT GRANTEE

25. (SBU) In preliminary discussions, post has not found a
grantee willing to take on such a novel arrangement. The
representative of one large Educational NGO with extensive
worldwide experience, already in grant relationships with
both AID and State, has told PAO they would be willing to
provide English teachers to a USG operated facility in
Mandalay (as per Option A or C). But the representative said
they would not be interested in taking on a challenge like
Option B &on our own.8 The well-known difficulties of
establishing a relationship with the GOB, together with the
controversy inherent in teaching English with a democracy
bent, apparently makes the risks outweigh the benefits for
this organization. While there may be more zealous or less
experienced organizations willing to take up the challenge,
post would need to weigh the judiciousness of entering into a
close programming association with them.

OPTION C OPENING AN AMERICAN CENTER ANNEX AS A TENANT IN
COMMERCIAL SPACE


26. (SBU) In May, GSO, PAO, and RSO, accompanied by regional
Security Engineers, visited several commercial properties
available for rent in Mandalay. GSO and PAO identified two
as best meeting requirements for the proposed program in
acceptable downtown mixed retail/residential areas.
Available commercial space affords no setback from road or
neighbors, and is often adjacent to open sewers or other
eyesores. While rents are not high, there would be costs
associated with security upgrades and other modifications.


27. (SBU) Property One is a new, four-story, reinforced
concrete structure, currently configured as living space,
sharing one half of the ground floor with a fast food retail
shop. The ground floor hall has ample room to install a PAC.
With some modifications, the upper three floors could be
configured to serve as classrooms, office space, library
reading room, and event space. Rent was quoted at
$1,000/month for 5880 square feet.


28. (SBU) Property Two is a three-story space in a row of
similar shops in a new, reinforced concrete structure. Most
are not yet occupied but are designed for street-level
retail, and mixed retail/residential above. The first floor
could accommodate a PAC and office space, and the upper two
floors could accommodate a 1500 square foot library reading
room and two English teaching classrooms. Rent was quoted at
$2000/month for 4536 square feet. There are many similar
rental spaces available in this newly redeveloped quarter of
Mandalay, which is a joint venture of the local government
and some (Chinese) businessmen.


29. (SBU) In the interests of thoroughness, GSO and PAO also
investigated commercial space in Mandalay,s centrally
located hotels, but found nothing appropriate. The Sedona
Hotel offered space configured as serviced apartments and
space designed for their own administrative offices
accessible only through a service stairway. Access and space
configurations were problematic in both. The Mandalay Swan
Hotel offered four adjoining shops spaces adjacent to the
hotel with a very pleasant entrance off quiet 68 th street.
The total space, under 1500 square feet, could accommodate
the teaching classrooms but the associated
library/information resource center program.

SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

30. (SBU) As with every commercial property examined, there
is no setback from the street, or from neighboring buildings,
which are as near as six inches away. Because of the high
price of land in central Mandalay, new structures are built
on their entire allowable footprint (and possibly beyond it).
The facility would be governed by the physical security
standards of 12 FAH-6, H-111.7 - Physical Security Tenant of
Commercial Office Space. Collocation and setback waivers
would have to be sought.

FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS

31. (SBU) Startup and recurring costs and possible sources of
funding would be similar to Option A, with the addition of
annual rent of $12,000 to $24,000. Also, security upgrades
will be at least as expensive as for Option A, and possibly
higher.
THREE OPTIONS: PRO'S AND CON'S WEIGHED


32. (SBU) Option A Pro,s and Con,s:
Pro,s:

-- The attractive USG-owned facility is in good to excellent
repair, requiring little upgrading (other than security) and
reconfiguration.

-- On a large parcel of land, it has excellent setback and
could be brought up to security standards with some outlay.

-- USG-owned means no delay or harassment from local
authorities, also no additional recurring costs from rent
($12,000 ) $24,000/year).

-- American Center Teaching Annex (vs. grant agreement with
NGO) means mission has control over all program content.

-- Prime location for reaching target groups

Con,s:

-- Post will have large initial outlays for start-up and
security upgrade (but not necessarily larger than with other
options).


33. (SBU) Option B Pro,s and Con,s
Pro's:

-- No legal requirement for security upgrade.

-- NGO programming would share most Country PD goals.

-- More recurring costs, such as salaries, could be covered
by ESF through the grant agreement.

Con's:

-- Mission would not have supervisory role or control over
all program content.

-- NGO could not play Policy Advocate role of PD.

-- Without diplomatic or USG employee status, NGO, program,
and participants may be subject to more harassment by GOB and
local authorities.


34. (SBU) Option C Pro,s and Con,s
Pro,s:

-- The commercial space identified, though in some ways
inferior to the USG owned property in Mandalay, could be made
as serviceable.

-- Locations are as good as the USG owned property.

Con,s:

-- Being a "tenant in commercial space" is meant to lower
the facility's desirability as a terrorism target because it
would entail too much collateral damage to other tenants.
But crowded urban locations afford more chances for
terrorists to hide. With no setback from neighbors or the
street, these locations may be less secure than the USG owned
property set apart on a large parcel of land.

-- Post will have to spend the same amount of dollars, if
not more, for necessary security upgrades on the rental
properties as on USG-owned property.

-- Post will have to secure a setback waiver and other
waivers for the rental properties.

-- With a rental property, post gives GOB and local
authorities an entry point for harassment. The authorities
may use threats or pressure on the landlord to cause delays
or interference with services to the PD program. The
landlord of the current American Center in Rangoon was jailed
before the Center opened in 1991. And Mandalay authorities
used threats to hotel employees to disrupt a PD cultural
program in January 2003 (Rangoon 00134). Post may even spend
funds on security upgrades only to find the landlord renege
on the contract because of pressure from authorities.

-- Implicit in this option is post's disposal of the USG
property, i.e., sell it back to the despotic Burmese regime
for what was paid for it (now worth $75),leading to a huge
windfall for the Generals, and a public affairs embarrassment
for the Department.


35. (U) Post POC for this project is PAO Mary Ellen
Countryman, countrymanme@state.gov.
Martinez