Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03RANGOON769
2003-06-26 11:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

LOCAL REACTION MIXED ON NEW BURMA SANCTIONS

Tags:  ETRD EFIN ECON BM 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000769 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EB/ESC, EB/TPP
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2013
TAGS: ETRD EFIN ECON BM
SUBJECT: LOCAL REACTION MIXED ON NEW BURMA SANCTIONS

REF: RANGOON 4

Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.5 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000769

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EB/ESC, EB/TPP
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2013
TAGS: ETRD EFIN ECON BM
SUBJECT: LOCAL REACTION MIXED ON NEW BURMA SANCTIONS

REF: RANGOON 4

Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.5 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: The Embassy has received much solicited and
unsolicited reaction to the impending U.S. sanctions. We've
heard from foreign diplomats, businessmen, resident U.S.
citizens, some NLD members, and GOB economic officials.
Generally people understand our motives, but are very
skeptical that our choice of action will prove effective.
Even the bureaucrats seem resigned to the inevitable
punishment. The NLD members with whom we spoke support the
U.S. efforts, though they agree that sanctions imposed
without the support of ASEAN or China would not be enough to
force this regime to change its mind on political reforms.
As for American citizens, the two most specific concerns come
from long-term residents, concerned about their ability to
continue living and working here, and from U.S. exporters
with containers on the docks who are unsure whether they
should give the order to load. End summary.

The Diplomats


2. (SBU) Both the Korean and French commercial attaches
requested meetings to discuss pending U.S. trade sanctions.
The Korean attache raised his concerns about the likely fate
of around 40 Korean investors who are running garment
factories. Garments make up a very large portion of Burmese
exports to the United States. He told us that most of these
investors would have to pack up and try to move on should the
U.S. market become inaccessible to them. He said, though,
that the larger Korean investors (such as Daewoo, which has a
joint venture garment factory with the Union of Myanmar
Economic Holdings, Ltd.) would likely remain in Burma,
attempting to sell more to the European market.


3. (SBU) The French attache was not critical of the new
possible sanctions, admitting that his government too was
considering (in the EU context) additional measures. Both he
and his Korean colleague understood the reasons the United
States wanted to take action. However, they both questioned
whether the import ban could damage the government when the
vast majority of garment sector factories and output is in

private sector hands. (This is a fact, reported in reftel,
we've noticed various editorials and NGO press statements
seem to misunderstand.) Both pointed out that the import ban
would lead to factory closures and unemployment at a time of
pre-existing economic hardship.

The Businesspeople


4. (SBU) Garment factory owners are understandably frightened
by the likely import ban. They repeated their oft-heard
refrain that the garment industry contributes very little to
government coffers, employs about 100,000 workers (mostly
women),and is nearly 100 percent private sector. However,
they understand that the root of their problems was not U.S.
sanctions, but inept GOB economic policies. Other exporters
of products to the United States (a fishery owner and a
timber merchant) said they are not really concerned about the
ban, as their major markets are elsewhere, but scoffed at the
notion that the new sanctions would have even a psychological
effect on the country's policymakers.

The US Citizens


5. (SBU) The economic and consular sections have been getting
a steady stream of calls from U.S. citizens concerned about
the impact of the pending import ban, and the possibility of
a travel ban. In both sections these inquiries have followed
a familiar thread: What are the details of the new sanctions?
Will it hurt my business/ability to travel to, or live in,
Burma? As these measures will have no impact on the regime,
why is the U.S. government imposing them?


6. (SBU) The two most specific concerns come from long-term
American residents in Burma, concerned about their ability to
continue living and working here, and from U.S. exporters
with containers on the docks who are unsure whether they
should give the order to load. This latter group fears that
the sanctions will come into effect while their shipment is
en route, and Customs in the United States won't accept any
grandfathering. When more details are available on these two
topics, we plan to put out a bulletin to U.S. citizens in
Burma and hold a town meeting to try and address their
concerns.

The Opposition


7. (C) We had a chance to brief a few of the remaining free
mid-level NLD officials on the proposed U.S. sanctions.
Those with whom we spoke have little economic background, but
understand sanctions and their use as a policy tool. They
were quite supportive of sanctions as a gesture of U.S.
displeasure with the SPDC and its recent actions. The
officials opined that the psychological impact on the regime
would outweigh the comparatively minor economic damage and
unemployment (100,000 workers out of a workforce of roughly
10-20 million) that would be caused by the new sanctions.
The NLD members support the U.S. efforts, though they agreed
that sanctions imposed without the support of ASEAN or China
would not be enough to force this regime to change its mind
on political reforms.

The Government


8. (C) We also discussed impending sanctions with officials
of one of the state-owned trade banks, and of the
GOB-affiliated Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of
Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI). The UMFCCI official,
representing Burmese private sector interests, told us he and
most of the UMFCCI membership understood the motivation for
sanctions, and who was really to blame for Burma's dismal
business climate. He quizzed us carefully on what, if
anything, could stop the rush toward an import ban. We told
him that at this point, nothing short of a significant and
irreversible step toward political transition (i.e., more
than just the release of ASSK) would change the direction of
U.S. policy. We advised him to use UMFCCI's limited, but
existent, lobbying power with the SPDC to try and convince
the regime to take these steps if it wanted a chance to stave
off the new sanctions.


9. (C) The banker asked for an explanation of all of the
pending sanctions, but did not seem surprised at our actions.
He asked us to keep him apprised of the changing situation,
particularly as regards the asset freeze, as the two
state-owned foreign trade banks (Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank
and Myanmar Investment and Commercial Bank) both have some
assets remaining in accounts at their U.S. correspondent
banks. He said that the bank had not noticed any slowdown in
the number of Letters of Credit requests at the bank, but
that he'd heard several bank customers complaining of
canceled export orders from the United States and Europe.
Martinez