COM PRESSES HOME MINISTER TO RELEASE DETAINEES AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 000696

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV
USPACOM FOR FPA
USMISSION NEW YORK FOR AMBASSADOR TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2012
TAGS: PGOV PHUM BM
SUBJECT: COM PRESSES HOME MINISTER TO RELEASE DETAINEES AND
MOVE FORWARD ON RECONCILIATION

REF: RANGOON 665

Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ FOR REASON 1.5(D).


1. (C) Summary: On June 11, COM had a frank meeting with
Minister of Home Affairs Colonel Tin Hlaing to discuss the
recent crackdown on the NLD and to deliver an advance copy
of this year's Trafficking In Persons report. On recent NLD
detentions, Tin Hlaing denied press reports that the
government told Special Envoy Razali that Aung San Suu Kyi
would be released in immediately or in two weeks, saying
there was no timetable for her release. He assured the COM,
however, that the International Committee of the Red Cross
would have access to recent detainees once a police
investigation of the incident on May 30 is completed
(although this contradicts what ICRC has been told, see
septel). The Minister provided a detailed account of SPDC
internal security concerns prior to May 30, and a description
of what occurred the night of the clash. The COM said that
allowing Embassy officers to visit the site of the clash was
a positive approach. COM then described some of the
information Emboffs collected which indicated a premeditated
attack by trained individuals (some disguised as monks) and
did not support the government's version of events. She
stressed the extreme importance the USG placed on a credible
investigation of the attack and full accounting for the
people who have been missing or were detained since then.
She reiterated that the U.S. saw no justification for the
continued detention of ASSK and other NLD members and called
for their immediate release. She urged the Minister to take
actions to undo the harsh measures taken over the past 12
days and to use his influence to get the national
reconciliation process back on track. She also provided the
Minister a copy of the Trafficking in Persons report, noting
that the government's failure to make progress on forced
labor was the primary reason Burma was still on Tier 3. The
Minister said his government "takes U.S. views very much to
heart," and asked the COM to keep in close communication with
him. End Summary.

NLD Crackdown


2. (C) In a June 11 meeting with Home Minister Tin Hlaing
(accompanied by the Deputy Home Minister and an interpreter)
the COM asked for clarification of news reports that Special
Envoy Razali had said Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) might be
released immediately or within two weeks. The Minister said
there must have been some mistake because there was no
timetable set for her release. He said that her protective
custody is a temporary situation but there has been no
decision when she might be released. The Minister said a
formal police investigation of the incident that occurred on
May 30 is underway, intimating that the results of the
investigation will have a bearing on ASSK's release.


3. (C) The COM expressed the USG's concern regarding those
missing after the May 30 clash and urged the Minister to
provide an accurate account of what transpired that night and
to account for those that are missing, injured, or dead. She
asked if any charges had been fixed against those jailed
after the attack and why 19 of the NLD leaders from the
convoy were reportedly in protective custody and still
incommunicado. The Minister said no charges had been made
against anyone yet, that 25 of the people detained that night
were released yesterday, and that others were being held as
part of the investigation. He said the 19 NLD leaders were
still in protective custody because, "The situation is
confusing, not stable, and not to our liking. We want the
dust to settle, then diplomats will be able to visit these
individuals."

The SPDC's Version of Events


4. (C) He elaborated that the SPDC had evidence and
intelligence that the incident was pre-planned (he did not
elaborate by whom). He shared the following information,
which he deemed "very confidential," regarding events leading
up to the incident:

-- Earlier this year, ASSK and Senior General Than Shwe had
dinner together and agreed on steps to national
reconciliation and democratic reform. Part of the agreement
was that ASSK could rally her supporters in NLD offices but
not elsewhere, and she could travel to any part of the
country. (Note: This is the first official confirmation of
this meeting. ASSK has always avoided any direct discussion
or even acknowledgment of meetings with Than Shwe or Khin
Nyunt when we have met with her. End Note.)

-- Up until January or February, everything went according to
plan and there was no tension. Then, the SPDC received
information that the NLD was planning a political change in
June and ASSK started to break the rules established for her
travels (see reftel, para. 3; this parallels what S-1 said to
Razali.) She began to hold roadside meetings and speak to
crowds gathered to see her at monasteries. She started
traveling without keeping military intelligence advised of
her plans, sometimes traveling through the night. This
caused problems for them because they could not provide her
adequate security. Military intelligence warned her
repeatedly to keep them advised of her travel plans, but she
did not.

-- In Kachin State, the SPDC found that a lot of people did
not like ASSK and this became a big concern for the
government. ASSK continued to cause problems which
aggravated the people such as not paying tolls at bridge
crossings, causing traffic jams with her motorcade, and using
monks as a means of taking advantage of uneducated poor
people.

-- At the same time, insurgent groups along the Thai border
began rallying support for ASSK, producing pamphlets, and
planting explosive devices. These activities seemed to be
"in synch" with her activities.

-- Secretary One Khin Nyunt had planned to meet with ASSK in
May but at the last minute she said she would be traveling,
and she designated NLD Secretary U Lwin to meet with
Secretary One.

SIPDIS


5. (C) Note: It is very unlikely that these "confidential"
tidbits are original thoughts from the Minister; they are
most likely the party line on why ASSK's activities could not
be allowed to continue (the points about people not liking
her because she did not pay bridge tolls, disrupted traffic,
etc., have been leveled before and are becoming tiresome).
The failure to coordinate her travel with authorities, fears
of links to subversive groups, and the affront to Khin Nyunt
for proposing a substitute to represent her at a requested
meeting with him, combined with concerns about her growing
popularity and independence, sound closer to the mark as to
why the SPDC was unhappy. End Note.


6. (C) The Minister then segued into the events of May 30,
saying that it was very confusing because it was dark that
night but, so far, the following information was available.
ASSK was supposed stay in Mon Ywa that night but instead
chose to travel toward Depeyin. At a certain place in the
road, there were 2,000 (down from the governments previous
claim of 5,000) people "who were against her" who had blocked
the road. Her motorcycle escort turned back when it saw
these people but her car (with lights switched off) forced
its way straight through the crowd, fortunately not injuring
anyone. The second car, carrying NLD Vice Chairman U Tin Oo,
also attempted to force its way through the crowd but it hit
some people and came to an abrupt halt. A trailing
motorcycle ran into it and crashed. The third car ran over
the motorcyclist, killing him, and the whole convoy came to a
halt. Violence then broke out until security police reached
the scene, restored order, and took the injured to the
hospital. U Tin Oo got out of his car and walked to Depeyin
where he was put in protective custody; he was uninjured.
After ASSK made it through the crowd, she also met the police
and was taken into protective custody.

U.S. Concerns

7. (C) The COM said the information was appreciated and that
the lack of interference with the Embassy officers who
visited the site of the clash on June 4-5 was a positive
step. She said that the information the Emboffs gathered
from many people in the area, and the items they found at the
scene, did not support the Minister's account of the
incident. She provided a synopsis of the attack as related
to Emboffs by many sources, which indicated that the convoy
was blocked by trucks and attacked by an organized and
trained group of armed individuals who wore white armbands to
identify themselves. She said the idea that 2,000 local
people would congregate in a field at night to attack ASSK
was not a credible story and she hoped the government
investigation would provide a more credible account. The COM
also reiterated the USG's deep concern for the people missing
and possibly injured or dead as a result of the attack. She
urged the Minister to ensure a full accounting, including
names of the dead, as soon as possible.

ICRC Access


8. (C) The COM noted that the ICRC has a standing agreement
with the government to be notified of new political arrests
and to have access to these detainees as quickly as possible,
and asked if ICRC had been given access to those detained on
May 30 or to other NLD members detained since that night.
The Minister responded that the ICRC did not have access to
these detainees yet but that it would be granted access as
soon as possible. He said that normally ICRC is not granted
access to detainees while an investigation is underway. The
COM emphasized the importance of granting ICRC access to
these detainees as quickly as possible. The Minister
responded that he was the focal point for the ICRC, he knew
the importance of their work, and he would make sure they got
access. (Note: According to the head of ICRC in Rangoon,
Secretary One Khin Nyunt told him on June 10 that ICRC would

SIPDIS
not get access to detainees taken in at the May 30 incident
or since. The Home Minister was present at that meeting but
perhaps he still hopes to gain access for ICRC. End Note.)

National Reconciliation Is Top Priority


9. (C) The COM said that the USG and the world is watching
and the SPDC needs to not only restore the political climate
that existed prior to the May 30 clash, but go beyond that in
order to demonstrate that it is still committed to national
reconciliation. She urged the Minister to do everything he
could to quickly move the process forward and reminded him
that he once told her "I do not like to keep Burmese people
in jail". (Note: While we do not have any illusions that
the Minister has the authority to act alone on this, he is
one of the more approachable Ministers and he has good access
to Secretary One. Certainly the COM's comments will be
reported to at least that level, and hopefully higher. End
Note.)

Trafficking in Persons


10. (C) The COM provided the Minister with a copy of this
year's Trafficking In Persons report and Poloff provided an
overview of the Burma section of the report. TIP falls under
the Minister's purview and Poloff was able to report on
several areas in which the Ministry and its partners had made
progress on TIP during the year. Poloff noted, however, that
Burma remained a Tier 3 country on the TIP ranking in large
part due to its failure to make adequate progress on forced
labor, which is included in the U.S. definition of TIP. The
Minister appeared to appreciate receiving the report and
feedback on his Ministry's actions (he does not have
authority on forced issues).


11. (C) Comment: Despite the frank and candid nature of the
COM's message in this one-hour meeting, the Minister was very
cordial and stated in his closing remarks that he "takes U.S.
views very much to heart," and asked that the Embassy
continue to provide him with news releases and information on
this matter and other issues as it becomes available. As
with a handful of other Ministers, we have the impression
that the Home Minister recognizes the serious problems in his
government. End Comment.
Martinez