Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03RANGOON681
2003-06-10 11:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

RAZALI SAYS ASSK IN GOOD HEALTH, BUT WHAT ABOUT

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM BM NLD ASSK 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000681 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV
USPACOM FOR FPA
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM NLD ASSK
SUBJECT: RAZALI SAYS ASSK IN GOOD HEALTH, BUT WHAT ABOUT
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION?


Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ FOR REASON 1.5(D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000681

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV
USPACOM FOR FPA
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR TWINING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM NLD ASSK
SUBJECT: RAZALI SAYS ASSK IN GOOD HEALTH, BUT WHAT ABOUT
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION?


Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ FOR REASON 1.5(D).


1. (C) Summary: UN Special Envoy Razali had a brief meeting
with Aung San Suu Kyi this morning (June 10) and reported to
diplomats later that she was not injured and was "feisty, as
usual." While Razali was quite pleased, with good reason,
that he gained access to ASSK, he made no progress on
reversing the SPDC's recent crackdown on the opposition.
With all NLD leaders under detention, all NLD offices closed,
and arrests of members continuing, conditions are now worse
than they were in October 2000 when the SE began his mission.
Most distressing is that Razali was unable to address the
larger objective of focusing the SPDC (particularly Senior
General Than Shwe) on the urgent need to make tangible
progress on the road to national reconciliation. End Summary.

Razali Confirms ASSK Is Okay


2. (C) On June 10, SE Razali told diplomats seeing him off
at the airport that he had just met with NLD General
Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi and that she was in good

SIPDIS
condition. He said ASSK was outspoken and "feisty, as usual"
and she "did not have a scratch on her." The meeting took
place at an undisclosed location (Razali told us yesterday
that he had agreed with authorities not to disclose the
location) and Razali's three assistants, who usually
accompany him in meetings with ASSK, were not allowed to
attend. Instead, Brigadier General Than Tun, who normally
serves as military intelligence's liaison officer with ASSK,
was in the room during the meeting. As evidence of ASSK's
good health, Razali told the diplomats that she appeared to
be giving some terse instructions to BG Than Tun in Burmese
periodically during the meeting.


3. (C) Razali would not comment on what he discussed with
ASSK but in response to a direct question said he did not
raise the issue of the May 30 attack on her party as they
traveled in Sagaing Division. (Note: It seems odd that
Razali would not raise this issue, since the attack is what
precipitated ASSK's detention and international concerns that
she was injured. Hopefully, he will provide more information
on this in a more private meeting. End Note.) The COM said
she hoped Razali had conveyed to ASSK the intense
international interest and concern in her well-being. He
replied that she was aware of "all this."

No Shift Evident In SPDC Position


4. (C) The COM asked Deputy Foreign Minister Khin Maung Win,
who was presiding over the send-off, whether anyone else
would now be able to have access to ASSK. The DFM responded
that, "in all honesty, we are not thinking along those lines
for the time being." When the COM asked why ASSK continues
to be held incommunicado, the DFM said it was "for her own
safety and security."


5. (C) While it is a relief that the SE has been able to
determine that ASSK is alive and well, Razali's brief and
closely monitored meeting with her was the minimum the SPDC
could have done to address international criticism generated
by the May 30 attack on her convoy and ensuing crackdown on
the NLD. The SPDC probably calculated that they might not be
able to weather the storm of international protest (and
possibly domestic unrest) if Razali left Rangoon
empty-handed. Having made this concession to international
pressure, we expect the SPDC will now slide back into
business as usual, and continue their crackdown on the NLD.
(The DFM's remarks on her continued "protective custody" are
the handwriting on the wall.)


6. (C) The SPDC's crackdown over the past ten days has
produced conditions worse than those when Razali began his
mission in October 2000. At that time, at least some NLD
offices were still open (none are now) and ASSK was under
detention at her residence and could receive some
international visitors. Now she and NLD Vice Chairman U Tin
Oo are being held incommunicado at undisclosed locations (and
his health is still a concern),all other NLD leaders are
under house detention, and arrests of NLD members are
continuing.


7. (C) Comment: Razali was quite pleased, with good reason,
that he gained access to ASSK. In his determination to do
this, however, he failed to get any commitment from the SPDC
on next steps on reversing their crackdown on the NLD.
Razali noted (without apparent irony) that both Secretary One
Khin Nyunt and Vice Senior General Maung Aye had assured him
that they were still committed to the national reconciliation
process. Most distressing is that Razali was unable to
address the larger objective of focusing the SPDC
(particularly Senior General Than Shwe) on the urgent need to
make tangible progress on the road to national
reconciliation.
Martinez