RAZALI: NO ACCESS TO ASSK AS YET, MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000665

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2012
TAGS: PREL PHUM BM ASSK
SUBJECT: RAZALI: NO ACCESS TO ASSK AS YET, MEETING WITH
MAUNG AYE ON JUNE 9

REF: RANGOON 664

Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ FOR REASON 1.5(D).


1. (C) Summary: Late on June 7, Special Envoy Razali
briefed COM Martinez on his meeting earlier in the day with
SPDC Secretary One Khin Nyunt. Khin Nyunt told Razali that
the crackdown on the NLD was in response to actions by ASSK
that constituted an unacceptable threat to the SPDC. He
assured Razali that ASSK was in good health and provided two
photos dated May 31 to prove it. Razali said he did not
contest Khin Nyunt's justification for the crackdown,
choosing instead to make the case that it was absolutely
essential that he gain access to her on this visit. Khin
Nyunt said this was not his decision to make and asked for
Razali to make the case for access to ASSK directly to Vice
Senior General Maung Aye in a meeting early Monday. The SE
is well aware that this may just be a ploy to wear out his
patience so he will leave and the SPDC can claim that he
"quit." Razali is determined to go the last mile and see
Maung Aye, although he did not seem hopeful of the outcome.
End Summary.


2. (C) Special Envoy Razali and his team (Hitoki Den, Damon
Bristow, and Leon DeReidmatten) met with COM Martinez on June
7 to provide a read-out of his meeting earlier in the day
with SPDC Secretary One General Khin Nyunt. In what he
termed "a long session" with Khin Nyunt, Razali said he made
a strong case for access to Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK),saying,
among other things, that it would be an embarrassment to
ASEAN to not allow the Special Envoy access. Razali said
Khin Nyunt responded with a long explanation of the SPDC's
perception that ASSK posed an unacceptable threat to the
state based on her recent actions. Khin Nyunt provided
photos of crowds that have gathered to hear ASSK at various
stops and said she had begun to deviate from the agreement
she had with the SPDC on the parameters of her travel. Khin
Nyunt said that in addition to the agreed to visits to NLD
offices, ASSK had begun impromptu visits to monasteries and
delivering roadside talks, often taking the opportunity to
criticize the government and the performance of civil
servants. Khin Nyunt stated that the regime had evidence
that ASSK had also been meeting with other political parties,
some of whom had ties to groups responsible for recent
bombings in Burma.


3. (C) In a strange twist, Razali said Khin Nyunt posited
that ASSK's more threatening stance began after a January
2003 meeting she had with ex-Charge d'Affaires to Rangoon
Priscilla Clapp (Note: Clapp made a personal visit to Rangoon
in January. If she met with ASSK, it was with no Embassy
involvement. End Note.) COM asked Razali to clarify if Khin
Nyunt indicated that the regime believed that Clapp was in
Rangoon on instructions from Washington or if they understood
that she was on a personal visit. Razali said this was not
clear from what Khin Nyunt said but the regime clearly linked
the change in ASSK's strategy to the Clapp visit. (Comment:
This is in all likelihood a red herring thrown out by Khin
Nyunt in order to build on the theme that ASSK is a pawn of
foreign governments. We do not know, however, how much the
regime may believe its own propaganda. End Comment.) Khin
Nyunt said that the regime had evidence that the NLD had
recently been working with other political parties to "bring
things to a boil" before Razali's visit and that there was a
plan to proclaim democracy on June 17, ASSK's birthday and to
demand a transfer of power by September.


4. (C) Razali said he was dumbfounded by the logic behind
Khin Nyunt's presentation. "What do they expect, the people
love her, of course they are going to turn out." And he was
very concerned with the regime's response to this perceived
threat; "If they think the crowds that came out to see her
were bad, wait until they see what will happen if they
continue to hold her." He deemed it totally illogical to
respond to this perceived threat with a harsh crackdown.
Razali said he did not want to take on the substance of Khin
Nyunt's presentation at that point and, instead, he told Khin
Nyunt there would be time to hash through all of these issues
later but the immediate priority was to get access to ASSK.
Khin Nyunt responded by showing Razali two photographs dated
May 31 showing ASSK sitting on a four-poster bed in nice
surroundings with a few females, possibly her assistants.
Razali said ASSK looked fine, "not a scratch," in the photos,
but he told Khin Nyunt that this was no substitute for
meeting with her. At this point, Khin Nyunt told Razali, "I
can't do it, it's not my decision, it is a group decision."
Razali implored Khin Nyunt to take the issue to the others
necessary to make the decision and make the case, reiterating
that it was of utmost importance.


5. (C) Khin Nyunt finally responded by asking if Razali
would meet with Vice Senior General Maung Aye on Monday, June
9 in the morning to make the case for access to ASSK directly
to him. Razali told COM that this would be the first
substantive meeting he would have ever had with Maung Aye.
Razali speculated whether Khin Nyunt needed Maung Aye's
support in order to take the issue to Senior General Than
Shwe or if perhaps Maung Aye is behind the recent hard-liner
retrenchment and crackdown. Razali said Maung Aye has gone
to lengths to avoid any substantive discussion with him, so
Razali looks forward to hopefully gaining an insight into the
decision making process of the junta's top three, in addition
to obtaining access to ASSK. He said he was not very
confident that they would allow him access to her but there
was at least a small chance. At any rate, he felt that he
would probably know after the Maung Aye meeting whether or
not he would gain access to ASSK. If not, he said he would
probably leave on the noon flight to Kuala Lumpur.


6. (C) Discussing the intense press interest in his visit,
Razali said he would just say at this point "he continues to
work hard to obtain access to ASSK." After discussing
various scenarios for a departure statement with the COM, he
felt it probably best to provide a short statement in Rangoon
before departing for KL where he will provide a full briefing
to the international press.


7. (C) Comment: The SE is well aware that the SPDC is
probably trying to wear out his patience hoping he will leave
so they can claim that the SE "gave up." Razali is
determined, however, to go the last mile and see Maung Aye on
June 9. At this point though the SE did not seem hopeful of
getting access to ASSK. This is particularly worrisome as we
and others in the diplomatic community are receiving more
frequent reports that ASSK may have received serious injuries
in the May 30 attack. End Comment.
Martinez