Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03RANGOON647
2003-06-03 12:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

MFA BRIEFING ON NLD/GOVERNMENT CLASHES

Tags:  PGOV PINS PREL BM ASSK NLD 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000647 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV
CDR USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2013
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL BM ASSK NLD
SUBJECT: MFA BRIEFING ON NLD/GOVERNMENT CLASHES

REF: A. RANGOON 640

B. RANGOON 639

C. RANGOON 636

D. RANGOON 635

E. RANGOON 634

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000647

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV
CDR USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2013
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL BM ASSK NLD
SUBJECT: MFA BRIEFING ON NLD/GOVERNMENT CLASHES

REF: A. RANGOON 640

B. RANGOON 639

C. RANGOON 636

D. RANGOON 635

E. RANGOON 634

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Deputy Foreign Minister Khin Maung Win's
briefing for diplomats on the recent deadly clash between NLD
and government supporters in Depeyin satisfied no one. While
he provided a faithful rehash of government press reporting
on the incident, he would not say where Aung San Suu Kyi or
other members of the NLD leadership are being held or why NLD
offices in Rangoon had been closed. He could only assure
diplomats that both measures were "temporary" and that
neither Aung San Suu Kyi or any of the members of the NLD
leadership had been charged with any crime. On Razali, he
said it was up to the Special Envoy to decide whether he came
to Burma June 6 as planned, but noted that he could not
guarantee that Razali would see Aung San Suu Kyi, if he came.
Razali may be willing to continue his mission on those
terms, but we don't see the point. So long as she remains in
detention and the NLD offices remain closed, Razali should
stay away. In the meanwhile, we plan to send officers to
Depeyin to see what we can determine regarding events there.
It may be impossible to re-assemble any clear picture of
events on May 31, but we believe it is essential to show our
interest and concern. End Summary.

The Government's Briefing


2. (U) At a briefing for diplomats on June 3, Deputy Foreign
Minister Khin Maung Win provided a rehash of the government's
side of the story regarding the recent riot in Depeyin.
According to the Minister, the events in Depeyin were
provoked by the youth wing of the NLD and militant Buddhist
monks who had affiliated themselves with the NLD. He said
that there had been a variety of incidents leading up to the
riot on May 31. He asserted that a 21-year old girl had been
run down in Shwebo and, in Indaw on May 26, NLD supporters
had attacked villagers with "sticks, iron pipes and bicycle
chains." In Depeyin on May 31, the NLD convoy, consisting of

nine cars and about 40 motorcycles, were stopped by a crowd
of 5,000 local people about 2 miles outside the town, he
said. As the NLD tried to push its way through the crowd,
fights broke which eventually left four dead and fifty
hospitalized. Initially, there were "no Burmese police or
military forces" on the spot, according to the DepFonMin.
Security forces from Mon Ywa only arrived about two hours
after the altercation started. They secured the situation,
took Aung San Suu Kyi and her party into "protective
custody", and took count of the casualties. The government
still has not identified all the dead, missing, or injured,
but says categorically that neither Aung San Suu Kyi nor NLD
Vice Chairman U Tin Oo were injured. The DepFonMin also
denied that gunshots were fired during the course of the
incident.


3. (U) On Aung San Suu Kyi, the Minister said that the
government had been obliged to provide "temporary
protection" for her and her party. Similarly, the NLD had
been asked to "temporarily" close their offices throughout
the country. The DepFonMin asserted that the government had
"no animosity or hostility" towards Aung San Suu Kyi, and
maintained that, for the government, the "greatest nightmare"
is that some harm might come to her. However, some of the
NLD youth had acted "very rashly," and there was "growing
resentment" against the NLD in Burma. He also assured
diplomats that the process of national reconciliation would
continue and hoped "that the international community will
understand the situation and not complicate it."

Diplomats Reaction


4. (U) Diplomats reacted to brief with incredulity and tough
questions that focused on Aung San Suu Kyi's health and
circumstances, the situation of the NLD's Central Committee
members, and the government's reasons for closing NLD offices
throughout Burma. The DepFonMin would not say where Aung San
Suu Kyi was being held, though he did say she was not in the
notorious Insein prison. He also said that neither she nor
any of the other leaders of the NLD would be charged with any
crime. When pressed regarding access to ASSK and the other
NLD detainees by the COM, the British Charge, and the French,
German and Norwegian Ambassadors, however, he stated flatly
that "for security reasons," it would not be possible for any
diplomats to have access to either Aung San Suu Kyi or any of
the other members of the NLD's leadership and gave no time
frame for the "temporary" detention. His answer regarding
the NLD's offices was much the same; the offices had been
closed down as a "temporary measure for security reasons."
On SE Razali's upcoming visit, the DepFonMin said that he had
been in touch with the Special Envoy on both June 2 and June
3 but it was entirely up to Razali as to whether he came or
not. However, he emphasized that at "his level" (the
DepFonMin's) he could not assure Razali that he could meet
with Aung San Suu Kyi.


5. (U) The DepFonMin also ruled out any international
investigation of the incident. Burma, he said, was "very
conscious of its independence" and would never allow
foreigners to dictate to it. When the COM informed the
DepFonMin that officers form the Embassy were traveling to
Depeyin on June 4, he was taken off guard, but did not
indicate that the area would be off limits to travel.


6. (U) The DepFonMin's answers satisfied no one. The COM was
emphatic in stating that the GOB's credibility on this matter
was gone, and that the diplomatic community could not be sure
whether Aung San Suu Kyi and the other NLD members were alive
or dead. Without access, no one could verify any part of the
government's story. She also questioned the credibility of
the government's account of the events in Depeyin and
insisted that names of the dead should be released. The
British noted that, in large measure, the GOB's own
credibility and reputation was at stake - if we could not
verify the government's statements, others would undoubtedly
question them. The Italian Ambassador similarly expressed
his concern and that of the EU regarding the situation and
read a statement from the EU.

Comment


7. (C) This was a deservedly brutal session for Khin Maung
Win. His account convinced no one. In fact, his
presentation left behind the impression that the government
have stage-managed recent events in order to end the latest
tentative political liberalization episode in Burma, and to
scuttle the UN-sponsored dialogue process. It is hard
otherwise to understand how Aung San Suu Kyi's party could
have run into a mob of 5,000 anti-NLD agitators at night on a
country road without any government security present. The
government's actions since then in closing all NLD offices
and holding all senior NLD leadership incommunicado also
suggest that the government has a broader agenda than simply
assuring internal security. Burmese government spokesmen
will deny this, as the DepFonMin did in the briefing today,
but the government's seeming indifference to the strong
international reaction to the latest events, and to Razali's
mission, suggests that neither political transition nor
international opinion carries any weight with them at the
moment. Internal security and keeping the junta's power
intact comes first, even if that means political repression
and international condemnation.


8. (C) COMMENT: For the United States and other countries
which have focused their policy on the goal of a transition
to democracy and increased respect for human rights and the
rule of law, these latest developments are powerfully
negative. The GOB may restore ASSK's liberty and may allow
the NLD to re-open its offices, but there is little doubt
that it will do so only on terms that make explicit that
political liberty will always be subordinate to the internal
security concerns of the regime in Burma. Razali may be
willing to continue his mission on those terms, but we don't
see the point, unless there is some clarification of the
government's intention regarding the teatment and liberties
of the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi. So long as she remains in
detention and the NLD offices remain closed, Razali should
stay away. End Comment.

9. (U) We are sending two officers and an FSN employee to
Depeyin to see what we can determine on the ground regarding
events there. It may be impossible to re-assemble any clear
picture of events on May 31, but we believe it is essential
to show our interest and concern.
Martinez