Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03RANGOON646
2003-06-03 10:57:00
SECRET
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

INSIDERS' VIEWS ON HOW TO INFLUENCE BURMA'S RULING

Tags:  PREL KDEM PGOV ETRD BM 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000646 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EB
NSC FOR KAREN BROOKS
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2013
TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV ETRD BM
SUBJECT: INSIDERS' VIEWS ON HOW TO INFLUENCE BURMA'S RULING
GENERALS


Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (B,D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000646

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EB
NSC FOR KAREN BROOKS
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2013
TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV ETRD BM
SUBJECT: INSIDERS' VIEWS ON HOW TO INFLUENCE BURMA'S RULING
GENERALS


Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (B,D)


1. (S) Summary: Burma's businessmen have been telling us in
no uncertain terms that neither economic sanctions nor
constructive engagement will expedite political reform under
the current circumstances. With surprising unanimity, these
insiders have asserted that "coercive persuasion" is the only
possible solution. End summary.

An Informal Poll of Movers and Shakers


2. (S) In light of the increasing intransigence of the regime
in general, we've been listening closely to our most reliable
private sector contacts who work closely with the regime, on
how to influence the political process. We pass on these
views not as a policy prescription, but to add to the ongoing
debate, sparked by UN Envoy Razali during the February
Informal Consultative Group (ICG) meetings in Tokyo, over how
to better advance the process of transition in Burma.


3. (S) Some of our sources are former military officers, both
recently retired and of the Ne Win era, now using their close
contacts still in service and in the government to advance
their economic careers. Others are long-standing private
businessmen, both Burmese and foreign, who, manipulating
close ties with ministers, military intelligence, and others
in power, have learned the ropes and are now living high on
the hog. Despite their success, some of the sources are
growing disenchanted with the regime's mismanagement of the
economy and the country. Others view each GOB economic
misstep as something on which to capitalize for increased
profits. None expressed any particular love for ASSK or the
NLD leadership, often citing their advancing age and
inability to express a clear policy vision. However, most
agreed that there was currently not any other option.


4. (S) The results of our soundings were surprisingly
unanimous: to expedite political change, economic sanctions
don't work, but neither would pure constructive engagement.
The results of sanctions -- as measured by changes in the
regime's behavior and achievement of U.S. policy aims -- have

been quite limited. According to the observers, the failure
is due the sanctions' inability to hit the ruling generals
"where they live," that is by threatening directly their hold
on power.

Economic Sanctions: Laughed Off


5. (S) Our contacts told us that economic sanctions have
missed their target for three main reasons. First and
foremost, unilateral sanctions cannot succeed. U.S.
sanctions have failed because of the inability to win
multilateral cooperation, particularly from regional states.
In the past several years, the Burmese government has worked
hard and successfully to spin a cocoon of economic protection
by strengthening trade, investment, and other ties with its
neighbors. The net result is that Burma now has friendly
relations with all its neighbors. This includes even
democracies like India, Thailand, and Bangladesh, which
continue to support, at least verbally, political transition
in Burma. For all of these neighbors, Burma simply holds too
many of the keys to regional security and development to be
sanctioned, embargoed, or isolated. Even such anti-regime
stalwarts such as the UK and the Nordic countries have
started expanding their aid programs in Burma, though for
reasons entirely different than those of the regional states.
While regional states are all focused on their basic
political and economic interests in Burma, for the Europeans
the growing humanitarian crisis has become an issue that
parallels their interest in political transition.
Businessmen are confident that should the United States
impose a trade ban, the regime would shrug it off, benefiting
as they do, both legally and illegally, far more from massive
border trade with Thailand and China than from the minuscule
amounts shaved off exports of garments and seafood to the
United States.


6. (S) A second factor is that sanctions have been
politically useful to the regime, providing cover for its
economic failures. The regime is certainly vexed by
reductions in foreign exchange earnings, whatever the cause,
however the GOB's own policies are more to blame for these
problems than any economic measures taken by foreign states.
Evidence of this is the mass divestments of companies from
all over the world, regardless of their home government's
Burma policy.


7. (S) Third, all of our contacts pointed out that, as they
saw it, the government has nothing to win and everything to
lose by making major concessions in the current environment.
With this view of life or death, it's no surprise that the
regime is able to easily weather the slight discomfort caused
by unilateral U.S. sanctions.

Constructive Engagement?


8. (S) So what will work? Most agreed that the regime might
respond to carrots for non-political reforms. However, the
carrot would have to be sizable and clearly stated -- such as
a large aid package or agreement to support an international
financial institution effort to fund economic reforms -- and
tied to specific reforms. The consensus was clear that the
regime would not be willing to take carrots, no matter the
size, in exchange for major political reforms. Even with the
promise of money the rulers of Burma had little to gain, and
much to lose, by agreeing to changes in the power structure.

Coercive Persuasion


9. (S) Our discussions always turned to the projection of
force. Contacts of various political stripes concurred that
the only way to convince the senior generals to cede power
was through "coercive persuasion," that is wielding a large
stick aimed directly at the heart of the leadership. Time
and again, we heard the assertion that this regime
understands only the language of force, and would be
influenced only if it is convinced it has more to lose
personally from holding out than from coming to the table.
The most important point, though, is that any coercive
persuasion would need to be explicit and serious, and come
with a firm timetable and deadline. The regime, with its
large cushion of regional relations and its experience facing
down external pressure, would not respond to bluffs and vague
gestures.


10. (S) Despite our contacts' strong views, none could give a
clear example of how this kind of pressure has been
successfully applied to the top leadership. They explained
their conviction in the Burmese cultural context, where even
powerful men grudgingly do what they're told because someone
more powerful extends an unrefusable offer. No one would be
specific on what the most useful stick for the current junta
should be. However, through a mix of allegories, metaphors,
and obfuscation each implied that the only solution would be
a direct challenge to the junta, possibly including force, if
it did not agree to negotiate. There was consensus that the
regime would respond better to this stick if it were mixed
with tangible carrots (help to relocate, guarantees of
protection from revenge or prosecution, economic assistance,
etc.)

The Silent, Quaking Majority


11. (S) Another common theme we've heard is the existence,
but inaccessibility, of a silent majority of high ranking
military officers and civilian administrators who are unhappy
with the current regime. During the February ICG meetings, a
hypothetical approach to reform minded "Officer(s) X" was
debated as a possible alternative policy direction. One of
our contacts, who was a decorated army officer, said that
many of the active duty officers from his "batch" (now
colonels and brigadiers) and high-ranking civil government
employees (including some Ministers) with whom he socializes,
have expressed quiet but serious discontent with the regime.
This sentiment stems largely from the SPDC's heavy handed
management style, and the insecurity in which the ruling
class must live its life. Also, we've heard from former and
serving military contacts alike that officers feel that the
regime is not taking adequate care of the troops, but instead
spending vast sums on literal and figurative white elephants.
The ruling junta's evident recent decision to reduce
expected salary raises to military officers and enlisted men
only adds to this discontent.

12. (S) The contact opined, though, that this discontented
group is likely unreachable because while it dislikes aspects
of the current system, it is enslaved to it. First, though
disenchanted, this group is unwilling to make sacrifices for
the good of the country. These officials owe their power and
wealth to the current rulers, and thus are unwilling to take
any anti-regime initiative that could lead to disaster for
them and their families. The second reason, according to our
source, is that none of these officers and civilian officials
has reached their positions of power and influence without
accumulating some skeletons in their closets. Thus, they,
like the top leadership, are fearful that working for a
change to the system (no matter how despised) could lead to
prosecution or revenge on them or their families from any new
civilian government.

Comment

13. (S) There are a few important caveats to note when
considering the conclusions of these observers. First,
despite our contacts' clear hinting that a military solution
would be the most effective, such an adventure would be of
questionable interest to the USG. For obvious reasons, the
risks of a military expedition on the borders of China, and
at the juncture of two nuclear-armed states (China and India)
would probably outweigh possible rewards. Second, many
educated Burmese these days are grasping at the idea of U.S.
military action as a tidy solution to intractable and complex
political problems. However, our sources assert that they
supported direct action long before the U.S. campaign in
Iraq. Third, it is difficult to completely write off the
potential for other policies working to effect change here.
While neither sanctions nor constructive engagement has been
totally successful, neither has ever really been tried in a
coordinated fashion by the entire international community.
Martinez