JAPAN'S NEW BURMA POLICY: FULL ENGAGEMENT WITH NO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000543

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EAP/J
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2013
TAGS: PREL ECON EAID KDEM BM
SUBJECT: JAPAN'S NEW BURMA POLICY: FULL ENGAGEMENT WITH NO
STRINGS ATTACHED

REF: A. GLAZEROFF-MCMULLEN 5/1 EMAIL


B. RANGOON 445

C. TOKYO 1194

D. 02 RANGOON 1447

E. 02 RANGOON 1366

Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.5 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: The new Japanese "Three Pillars" strategy of
humanitarian aid, economic reform, and democracy was
officially unveiled on April 29. The Japanese ambassador in
Rangoon explained the details and origin of this policy to
the Chief of Mission (COM) during a lunch on May 5. Though
he did not expect U.S. support, the ambassador asked for U.S.
understanding and pointed out how the U.S. and Japan
strategies might be complementary in achieving democratic
reform. End summary.

The Three Pillars Strategy


2. (C) During a lunch at his residence on May 5, Ambassador
Miyamoto gave a readout to the COM, DCM, and Economic Officer
(notetaker) on the recent visit to Rangoon of former Prime
Minister Yoshio Mori. Mori visited April 29-May 2 on behalf
of two private Japanese foundations. The ambassador stressed
that Mori was not an envoy of the Japanese government.


3. (C) The former prime minister met with the SPDC leader,
Senior General Than Shwe, and delivered to him a letter from
current Japanese PM Junichiro Koizumi explaining the new
Japanese "Three Pillars" strategy for relations with Burma.
This policy, which the Japanese government described in
detail at the February Informal Consultative Group on Burma
meeting (Ref C) is founded on the concept of "total
engagement" with the Burmese regime; engaging on humanitarian
aid, economic reform, and progress toward democracy.


4. (C) The ambassador clarified the reasoning behind this
definitive Japanese policy shift. He characterized Japan's
recent Burma policy as fickle and rootless, changing with the
political winds. These vagaries had eroded the traditional
trust and influence that Japan felt it had with the regime
and the Burmese people, adding that the Burmese people had a
"warm place in their heart for the Japanese." The ambassador
said that upon arriving in the summer of 2002, he began to
examine the situation on the ground to see how the Japanese
might reassert themselves. His conclusion was that the
Japanese government should rebuild its foundation of trust
with the Burmese regime through 360-degree engagement. He
contrasted this with the Chinese and ASEAN engagement
policies that provide assistance without pushing for
political or economic reforms, and with the U.S. and European
policies that rely on sanctions and pressure for reform with
no assistance.


5. (C) The new policy is ambitious and, the ambassador
admitted, quite risky. However, the ambassador opined that
something new was needed to break the current impasse, and
thus it was worth a try. He was unable to respond, though,
to the COM's questions regarding the specific measurements
of, or a timetable for, the policy's success or failure. He
would only say that success would be measured in
(unspecified) political reform. Later in the meeting, the
ambassador, who clearly has a large personal stake in the
policy's success, indicated that a personal goal for him
would be substantial progress within a five-year time frame,
though again it was unclear what exactly the endgame was.
The new Japanese policy will have no conditionality, nor will
it receive a large budget for implementation. Instead,
proposed projects would be approved for funding by Tokyo on a
case by case basis.

Trust But Verify


6. (C) Miyamoto stressed that at this point the strategy is
focused only on rebuilding trust and relations with SPDC
decisionmakers. He pointed out his aim to gain easier access
to SPDC Secretary One, General Khin Nyunt, and the frank
exchange of views between ex-PM Mori and Senior General Than
Shwe. When the COM asked how the Japanese would ensure that
messages about political and economic reform would get
through to the top, the ambassador quickly replied that if
this problem arose PM Mori (or another senior envoy) could
return to deliver the message personally. According to
Ambassador Miyamoto, PM Mori had invited Senior General Than
Shwe to spend two or three days in Tokyo as "his guest"
following Japan-ASEAN meetings coming up in December.


7. (C) The ambassador claimed that if he had closer ties with
Burmese leaders he would be able to read their intentions,
and that their close ties would keep the SPDC honest. He
said that the Burmese government would respond better to
earnest requests for necessary changes from a government with
whom it has good personal ties, than to demands and pressure
from hostile governments. The COM was skeptical of the
Japanese reliance on trust and goodwill as the basis for the
policy's success.


8. (C) If the relationships are established, the Japanese
will push forward with their specific objectives. The UN's
overdue humanitarian assessment was mentioned as a possible
benchmark for basic human needs assistance, while the
long-awaited Japan-Burma economic structural adjustment
review would be the economic starting point. It was less
clear what the Japanese had in mind for an opening gambit on
the political side. However, the Ambassador said he would
use his hoped-for new relationships to push the SPDC to give
increased importance to the visits of UN Envoys Razali and
Pinheiro.

Don't Stand in the Way


9. (C) The overall message, diplomatically conveyed, was that
the Japanese were going to try a bold new policy, and while
they didn't expect U.S. support, they hoped that the United
States would not object. Ambassador Miyamoto told the COM at
least twice that he thought the United States and Japan could
work together with complementary policies aimed at the same
objective -- democracy in Burma. We are not yet 100 percent
convinced that Japan's intention is as wholeheartedly
democratic as the ambassador claimed. Although it could be
helpful to have a close ally, who at least professes to be in
favor of democratic reform, with good access to Senior
General Than Shwe, we remain skeptical that the regime
understands that the goal of the Japanese policy is political
reform and transition to democracy.
Martinez