Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03RANGOON53
2003-01-13 08:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

WHAT'S BEST FOR BURMA? UNCLEAR.

Tags:  PREL PHUM ECON BM ASSK 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000053 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EB/TPP
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2013
TAGS: PREL PHUM ECON BM ASSK
SUBJECT: WHAT'S BEST FOR BURMA? UNCLEAR.

REF: RANGOON 45

Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.5 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000053

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EB/TPP
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2013
TAGS: PREL PHUM ECON BM ASSK
SUBJECT: WHAT'S BEST FOR BURMA? UNCLEAR.

REF: RANGOON 45

Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.5 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary. During a conversation with David Rockefeller
at the Chief of Mission's residence on January 12th, Aung San
Suu Kyi talked about the need for a speedy transition, the
dangerous state of the nation's education system, and her
growing public support outside Rangoon. Unfortunately, ASSK
had little to say to Mr. Rockefeller's repeated question:
"what can we do to help?" However, she made it evident that
she still opposed "engagement," though additional blanket
sanctions were also not the answer. She did tout working
with the International Labor Organization (ILO) to identify
and punish export-focused factories with unacceptable working
conditions. However until there is a clear public
pronouncement from her, we see little chance that the
international community will alter its varied interpretations
of what's "best" for Burma. End summary.

Mr. Rockefeller Comes to Rangoon


2. (SBU) David Rockefeller and his traveling party came to
Burma for a 10-day tourist trip throughout the country.
While here he took the opportunity to meet with local
business leaders and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK),and plans
to meet with Secretary One, General Khin Nyunt. ASSK joined
the Rockefeller party at the Chief of Mission's residence for
an informal Sunday tea and discussion about the current
situation in Burma.

Sanctions: Psychological Not Economic Damage


3. (C) Three times David Rockefeller, and other members of
his party, pressed ASSK about "what the United States
could/should be doing" to help expedite change here. Though
ASSK was adamant that "speedy change" was essential, she did
not give specific prescriptions for how U.S. policy could
force the issue. She mentioned only that there should be
better policy coordination between nations and between
international organizations.


4. (C) On sanctions, ASSK was more specific. She insisted
that while sanctions caused minimal economic damage to the
regime, the "psychological impact" has been significant. She

pointed to the informal boycott of tourism as helping to foil
the regime's ballyhooed efforts to make Burma a major tourist
destination. Such a boycott, she said, also has an impact on
the government's pocketbook and has the residual benefit of
preventing Burma from being a country over reliant on tourism
for hard currency earnings. ASSK did admit that there was
some benefit to travelers coming to Burma if they take the
time to "learn as much as possible about the country." (Note:
despite ASSK's support of the informal boycott, she has told
us on several occasions she opposes an outright tourism ban.
We note that despite her reluctance to have Burma become
reliant on tourism, currently the industry provides one of
the very few relatively well-paying job opportunities for
English speaking young people.)


5. (C) On the question of textile sanctions, ASSK was a bit
less sanguine about their benefits. She does not support
full-scale sanctions because of the disproportionate damage
they would cause to working people. Instead, she said, more
creative solutions were needed to focus as much as possible
on helping the workers while attacking the regime. One idea,
she suggested, was to team up with the International Labor
Organization (ILO) to require inspections of all
export-producing garment factories in Burma. Only those that
the ILO certified as providing healthy working environments
would be allowed to export to the United States. She added
that exports could be banned outright from the few factories
that were controlled in whole or in part by the government.
(Note: we'd heard indirectly of this proposal before, but it
was the first time she'd mentioned to us directly. It shows
a clear position of ASSK against broad trade sanctions that
would hurt labor-intensive industries. However, as
inspections are not part of the ILO's mandate here we will
have to follow up with the local ILO representative to assess
the feasibility of this idea.)
International Community is Losing its Way

6. (C) ASSK had sharp words for countries that she saw moving
toward policies of engagement with the SPDC regime. She said
that engagement with the regime helped its efforts to justify
its own existence and policies, making it harder to convince
the SPDC to step down. She singled out Japan and Australia
for having "less than helpful" attitudes. Specifically she
criticized Japan's "reluctance to offend" and recent decision
to forgive $1.3 billion in debt (see reftel). She said this
move, along with China's offer to give $200 million in soft
loans to Burma, will give a large psychological (though not a
large economic) boost to the regime. Australia, she said,
while giving "lip service" to democracy is actually more
"ASEAN than ASEAN" in its relations with the regime and its
reluctance to rock the boat. (Note: ASSK was likely
referring to the Australians' work with the regime on a human
rights training program.)


7. (C) ASSK was less critical of ASEAN members and China.
She said that none of these countries actively supports
democracy in Burma, but at least they are "honest" about
their true positions. Twice she mentioned the PRC, saying
that while it is no friend of democracy, it is very pragmatic
and appreciates stability. She thought it would be
worthwhile to work with China to convince them to take "a
more pragmatic approach" at least to border issues (e.g.,
drug production and smuggling). It will also be important,
she said, to include China in international cooperative
efforts to make change here.


8. (C) She was slightly less charitable about Malaysian
leader Dr. Mahatir, who was not given permission to see ASSK
during his latest trip to Rangoon. She said that she was
unhappy he did not take the initiative to come and see her,
instead asking the regime for permission. In addition, it
was a "pity," she said, that following his visit Dr. Mahatir
did not come out publicly to express his disappointment about
his treatment by the regime.

Political Situation: Improving, But too Slow


9. (C) The Rockefeller group was interested generally in the
current political state of play. She said that repression of
the people has decreased since she and the SPDC began their
"exchange of views" in September 2000. She was also
encouraged by seeing on her travels the amount of grassroots
support for her and the NLD. On her recent trips to Shan and
Arakan States, she said that she was received even more
warmly than she had been during her travels in 1988-89, just
prior to the 1990 elections. Another difference from '88-'89
is the increased support she's noticed from young people and
members of various ethnic nationalities. On a negative
note, she insisted that the regime's talk of change is only
superficial, aimed cynically only at improving its
international image.


10. (C) Despite the positives, ASSK was very concerned that
change was coming far too slowly. She joked about those who
advise her to be "patient" or "go slow," saying "slow is one
thing, a snail's pace is another." The longer change takes,
she warned, the more difficult it will be to restart the
country under a new government. She said that this was a
particular problem because of the current state of the
education system. Very few young people today, except those
affiliated with the military or those who can study abroad,
are getting a quality education. There is a very real
concern that Burma will soon become a country of "uneducated
people," with terrible consequences for the nation's
political and economic future. She said that the current
regime's hostility toward education and economic reform is
the primary reason that Burma cannot develop along the lines
of other previously military-ruled Asian nations (namely
Taiwan and South Korea),where government support for
education remained strong.

Policy Changes Apparent, but Not Public


11. (C) Based on this discussion, and others we've had with
her in recent months, ASSK's position may be shifting ever so
slightly. She recognizes the increasing humanitarian
catastrophe that is occurring here because of the regime's
neglect. She is skittish of additional sanctions because of
their huge economic impact on the people, and limited
economic impact on the regime. One of ASSK's economic
advisors has told us privately that he is pushing her hard to
publicly open up for additional international assistance
(carefully monitored and disbursed so as to avoid the
government) for education and basic healthcare. ASSK did
not, however, take the opportunity of having a supportive and
sympathetic Mr. Rockefeller on hand to clearly propose any
significant new directions. We have told ASSK, and will
continue to do so, that it is essential that she speak out
directly if she wants the international community to follow
her lead in revising its collective Burma policies. End
comment.
Martinez