EAP DAS DALEY MEETS WITH AUNG SAN SUU KYI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000517

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID KDEM BM NLD ASSK
SUBJECT: EAP DAS DALEY MEETS WITH AUNG SAN SUU KYI

Classified By: CDA, A.I. RON MCMULLEN, REASONS 1.5(B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: EAP DAS Matt Daley, COM, and note taker
spent over an hour and a half with Aung San Suu Kyi at her
residence April 27 discussing a host of political issues. UN
Special Envoy Razali's influenced was undermined, in the NLD
leader's view, when Malaysian PM Mahathir bowed to the
regime's insistence that he not meet with her during his
August visit. The regime's harassment of ASSK and
intimidation of NLD members mounted after her travel to
ethnic states showed her strong backing there, she continued.
On national reconciliation, ASSK said the NLD is willing to
cooperate but not submit, adding, "cooperation can be carried
just so far, if one side is not interested." At the close of
the long and productive meeting she said, "I rely on you to
take a firm stand--they only respond to pressure." End
Summary.


2. (C) RAZALI PROCESS: When COM asked if Mahathir's upcoming
retirement had weakened Razali's standing with the SPDC, Aung
San Suu Kyi agreed that much of Razali's influence is derived
from his close relationship with Mahathir. ASSK added that
when Mahathir "kowtowed" to Than Shwe during the August visit
and agreed to cancel a planned meeting with her, "that hurt
Raz and us. It was after that that their attitude toward us
began to harden." She explained the SPDC thinking as, "If
Mahathir can be faced down, why bother with Razali?"
Regarding Razali's proposal that ASSK make suggestions to the
SPDC on humanitarian assistance projects, she added, somewhat
dismissively, "I've provided suggestions."


3. (C) HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION: ASSK said harassment
began when her trip to Shan State in November showed she had
widespread support among Burma's ethnic minorities. She said
the regime let her travel to Shan State because it gauged she
had little support there, having only sampled opinion in a
provincial capital populated by cautious civil servants.
Outside the provincial capital the crowds were large and
enthusiastic. Harassment was bad in Arakan, she said, adding
that the SPDC orchestrated "systematic harassment to ensure
my trip would not receive popular support." It did
nevertheless. Intimidation continued in Chin State, although
the harassment lessened somewhat when the NLD directly called
the regime on this and asked that it be stopped, she noted.

COMMENT: The generals often justify four decades of military
rule by the need to "preserve the Union" from fragmentation
by ethnic separatists. Does ASSK's support in ethnic areas
show that the Union could be preserved by democratic means,
thus jeopardizing the regime's self-proclaimed raison d'etre?
END COMMENT.


4. (C) DIALOGUE AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION: ASSK said the
generals need to "get out of denial mode." In Buddhism, she
reflected, a good man admits his errors, but a wicked man
does not. She said the regime leaders "are not good
Buddhists, having a congenital inability to confront their
own mistakes and shortcomings." She said that if the SPDC
thinks the NLD will put up with continued harassment and
intimidation for the sake of reconciliation, "they're
mistaken." "This is blackmail." She mused, "How much more
can we do?" "We are prepared to cooperate but not submit."
Regarding the lack of progress on dialogue, ASSK noted, "They
have the responsibility to give more--we are the aggrieved
party." She urged the U.S. to maintain its supportive stand,
saying "if they think you're going to act tough, they'll back
down."


5. (C) RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES: ASSK appreciated DAS
Daley's overview of recent developments in Thailand, and
offered comments on various states' interactions with Burma.
She was perhaps toughest on Australia and Japan, saying,
"They are dishonest and self-deceptive when they say they are
doing something to help democracy; they are really concerned
about relations with the regime." ASSK said that China and
the ASEAN countries were more straightforward and therefore
perhaps easier to deal with. She singled out the ambassador
of the Philippines as the instigator of an effort to close
off all contact between her and the ASEAN ambassadors. She
admitted having a soft spot for India, explaining that
India's warming with the SPDC was primarily a reaction to
Chinese inroads in Burma.


6. (C) SANCTIONS, AID: Regarding any prospective U.S. trade
ban, ASSK said she intended to stay at arm's length from the
issue, stating, "If it were to happen, it would be much
better if it comes from you as your own decision." Aung San
Suu Kyi expressed strong interest in continued financial
support for Prospect Burma, a scholarship program for Chin
and other exiles in India. She asked for two small favors:
assistance in procuring a low-light camcorder to record
evening events and incidents on her upcountry travels, and
help in finding a second-hand Toyota SUV that she could
purchase. She also told of a village in Sagaing Division
threatened by USDA supporters. The USDA warned that if the
villagers turned out to cheer ASSK, their village would be
burned down. They did and it was. The NLD is investigating
this incident. If in fact the village was torched as
reported, ASSK said it would be a powerful statement to
supporters of democracy if this village could be rebuilt
(stealthily, with NLD and USG help).


7. (C) Than Shwe's "Little Secret Weapon:" Aung San Suu Kyi
said the regime had intended to turn the Union Solidarity
Development Association (USDA) into a political party though
which the generals could continue to run the country, perhaps
in a more acceptable, quasi-democratic guise. "I don't think
this will work," ASSK opined. She said that unlike Ne Win's
socialist party, which was supported by some people on
ideological grounds, there is no ideology associated with the
SPDC or the USDA. It is only patronage and repression that
keeps the regime together, she said. Some lower ranking
military officers are disillusioned and want change, while
others are awaiting their turn at the trough, she concluded.


8. (C) COMMENT: Aung San Suu Kyi, who looked healthy and
relaxed, was in a talkative, reflective, and strategic
mood--she was perhaps drawn out by Daley's visit. Somewhat
uncharacteristically, she thanked him at length for a book he
had given her on a previous visit, and said she hoped he
would return soon. He said he might be back in the region in
June. Often visitors see a harried, detail-driven, and
determined (bordering on stubborn) ASSK, but on this occasion
she had a broader picture in mind and seemed eager to talk,
and to listen. End Comment.


9. (U) DAS Daley has cleared this message.
McMullen