RAZALI'S NEXT VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000446

SIPDIS

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

OFFICIAL INFORMAL FOR EAP/FO DAS MATT DALEY AND EAP/BCLTV
DIRECTOR JUDITH STROTZ
JAKARTA FOR AMBASSADOR RALPH BOYCE
KUALA LUMPUR FOR POLOFF JAMES ENTWISTLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2013
TAGS: PGOV BM
SUBJECT: RAZALI'S NEXT VISIT

REF: A. TOKYO 1194

B. 02 RANGOON 1479

C. RANGOON 433

D. KUALA LUMPUR 1064

Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ; REASON 1.5(D).

1.(C) Summary: Reliable sources indicate that Razali's next
visit could be delayed until late summer and, as the Special
Envoy's tenth trip to Rangoon slips, so does his ability to
rescue the political dialogue. On his next visit, Razali must
have substantial meetings with the Senior General; he should
deliver a formal written message from SYG Annan expressing
disappointment with the stalemate in the political dialogue,
urging the immediate and unconditional release of all
political prisoners, and urging the implementation of
effective economic reform efforts; and he must insist on
meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi. There is no guarantee that any
of these actions will push the SPDC down the path to
meaningful political dialogue with the opposition. But they
can make it clear to the regime that the "comfort zone" they
have established in the region does not extend to the larger
international community. The regime must understand that a
visible commitment to political dialogue and economic reform
is the only way to mitigate international condemnation and
address the country's continuing decline. End Summary.


2. (C) The latest word from reliable sources indicates that
Razali's next visit will not take place before the very end
of April or early May, and could be delayed until late
summer. As the Special Envoy's tenth trip to Rangoon slips,
so does his ability to rescue the political dialogue from a
quagmire of distrust and broken promises. Although Razali
received unanimous public statements of support at the
February ICG meeting in Tokyo (Ref A, para 5) for continuing
his mission, he had little to offer the group in the way of
new strategies to move the regime (and particularly Burma's
supreme ruler, Senior General Than Shwe) closer to a real
political dialogue with the opposition. In addition, since
Razali's "face" with the generals is predicated on his
relationship with Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir, he will
inevitably lose some of that face as the time draws near for
Mahatir to step down from office in October. Signs of
Razali's waning prestige with the generals include the
insulting few minutes he was given with Than Shwe on his
November 2002 visit, and the regime's success in pressuring
him to cancel a visit to Aung San Suu Kyi.


3. (C) Razali has been described by those in recent contact
with him as variously pessimistic, frustrated, or jaded. He
definitely appears to be out of fresh ideas. In a side
meeting with the COM and EAP/DAS Daley the morning after the
Tokyo ICG, Razali floated the idea of having SYG Annan write
a letter to Than Shwe regarding the need for political and
economic reform but then asked somewhat helplessly "But then
who could deliver it to Than Shwe?" Given that the obvious
person to deliver such a letter would be Razali himself, his
question reinforced a sense of frustration (and perhaps his
naivet),just as when he told the assembled diplomatic corps
in November that he had just come to the realization that the
agreements with anyone in the regime, including Secretary One
Khin Nyunt, meant nothing without the final word by Than Shwe
(see Ref B, para 2).


4. (C) It was apparent at the Tokyo ICG that Razali hopes to
use Rangoon UNDP's upcoming report on the results of its
"Humanitarian Review Exercise" (scheduled for summer release
to the GOB, civil society groups, the NLD and other political
parties for the consultative process before being finalized)
as a tool to break the political stalemate (Ref C, para 6).
This confirms recent information received from Razali's
assistant (see Ref D, para 5),but raises the concern that
the humanitarian issues could be lost in acrimony between the
NLD and the SPDC. Ralzali promoted the idea of strengthening
the NLD by including them in development of new humanitarian
aid programs and he should press the regime to allow
participation by the NLD and civil society organizations in
addressing the dire humanitarian needs of the Burmese people.
What Razali should not do is insist on making dialogue
between Aung San Suu Kyi and the Senior General/ Secretary
One an absolute condition for implementing the
recommendations that will arise from the UNDP assessment.


5. (C) We have also heard that Razali has toyed with the idea
that 2006 (when Burma takes over the chairmanship of ASEAN)
could be used as a target date for possible moves toward some
powersharing with the NLD. This is unrealistic - the regime,
and most of all, Than Shwe, has no intention of sharing their
place in the ASEAN sun with Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. The
regime's active regional diplomacy with its ASEAN partners,
China, India, and Bangladesh plainly demonstrates its
determination to show that the regime can maintain its power
and gain regional acceptance, even legitimization, without
any concessions to the democratic opposition.


6. (C) Razali used the Tokyo ICG meeting to exhort the ASEAN
members to use their good offices to push the regime to
address economic and humanitarian issues, which would in turn
impact positively on the political process. We also
understand that in contacts with our embassy in Jakarta he
floated the idea of approaching the Indonesian government to
use their influence on the regime. It seems Razali thinks
that perhaps the Indonesians can hold them out as an exemplar
of a military government's transition to democracy and
convince the SPDC that reforms are necessary. However, we
must agree with Jakarta's assessment of Razali's idea - it
will have little resonance with the Indonesian military or
foreign ministry - just as pressuring the junta for political
or economic reform has no resonance with ASEAN as a whole.
ASEAN's distaste for pressuring the regime was aptly
illustrated at the Tokyo ICG where the Burmese FonMin
successfully lobbied ASEAN countries to keep their
Rangoon-based ambassadors at home (Ref B).


7. (C) Razali has also expressed interest in a so-called
"invitation to dialogue with the U.S." issued by the regime
a few days after the Tokyo ICG. Again, this is a misplaced
hope. This press statement, in which the regime called on the
U.S. to "join us in open, constructive dialogue towards
humanitarian, economic and political development," was never
an official overture by the junta. In fact, after we saw it
in the foreign press, we contacted MOFA, which denied
knowledge of the statement. Two days later, the COM spoke
personally with Secretary One (General Khin Nyunt),and the
Deputy FonMin requesting a formal opportunity to explore the
meaning of "invitation to dialogue", and the following week
the COM posed the same question to Senior General Than Shwe.
The response from all the "decision makers"? A weak smile,
a nod, and an evasive "yes, we can discuss it." The only
"discussion" of this "invitation to dialogue" has come from
SPDC spokesman Col. Hla Min who said what was meant was that
the regime was open to more visits by US officials as long as
they did not "come to lecture."


8. (C)Comment: What should Razali be aiming at on his tenth
visit? The Special Envoy is one of the few arrows that we
have in the quiver and the visit could be our last shot, so
he must be aimed directly at Senior General Than Shwe. Razali
cannot accept a dismissive meeting on the fly as he did on
his last visit - he must have substantial meetings with the
Senior General. Razali should also deliver a formal written
message from SYG Annan expressing disappointment with the
stalemate in the political dialogue, urging the immediate and
unconditional release of all political prisoners, and urging
the implementation of effective economic reform efforts.
Razali must also insist on meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi (and
not cave in to the Senior General as both he and PM Mahatir
have done on their most recent trips). There is no guarantee
that any of these actions will push the SPDC down the path to
dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi. But they can signal to the
regime that the "comfort zone" they have established in the
region does not extend to the larger international community.
The regime must understand that a visible commitment to
political dialogue and economic reform is the only way to
mitigate international condemnation and address the country's
continuing decline. End Comment.
Martinez