Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03RANGOON433
2003-04-08 02:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

NEW FUNDING INITIATIVE: WHY NOT KEEP AN OPEN MIND?

Tags:  EAID SOCI BM 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 000433 

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AID/ANE
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EAP DAS DALEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2013
TAGS: EAID SOCI BM
SUBJECT: NEW FUNDING INITIATIVE: WHY NOT KEEP AN OPEN MIND?

REF: A. STATE 81067

B. TOKYO 1194

Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.5 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 000433

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AID/ANE
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EAP DAS DALEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2013
TAGS: EAID SOCI BM
SUBJECT: NEW FUNDING INITIATIVE: WHY NOT KEEP AN OPEN MIND?

REF: A. STATE 81067

B. TOKYO 1194

Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.5 (B,D)


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph seven.


2. (C) Summary: The language of the recent FY 2003-04 omnibus
spending measure's managers' report (asking us to work with
the NLD on a "new initiative" to outline a comprehensive
needs assessment) seems at odds with subsequent guidance (Ref
A) limiting this assessment only to democracy-related
programming. We ask that the Department revisit this issue
with the Hill to see if there is support for a slightly less
restrictive approach that would still address the primary
concern that USG assistance does not in any way benefit the
SPDC regime. End summary.


3. (C) We appreciate Ref A's elaboration on the language in
the FY 2003-04 omnibus spending measure's managers' report
regarding working with the NLD to identify and address the
"urgent needs" of the Burmese people. We were surprised,
though, by the expectation that traditional limitations on
general ESF funding would apply to this "new initiative."
The managers' report discusses other earmark-funded programs,
namely for fighting HIV/AIDS, that are not limited to
democracy promotion. We welcomed what we thought was indeed
a "new initiative" along these lines; to look -- as always in
tandem with the NLD and its leadership -- with an unbiased,
unjaded eye at what the most pressing priorities are.
Consulting with the NLD on the best way for the USG to
promote democracy in Burma does not constitute a "new
initiative." This has been the backbone of our work here for
many years.


4. (C) The managers' report asks us to use the "expertise of
the leadership" of the NLD to determine and address the
"urgent needs of the people of Burma." Nowhere does it imply
that the intent of the managers was to limit these findings
to new democracy programming. Indeed, from elsewhere in the
managers' report (such as the section requesting a report
from U.S. AID on the conditions of Burmese refugees and
displaced persons) it is evident that Congress this year is
interested in exploring the "root causes" of the crises
facing the people of Burma. This is a laudable objective.
Though lack of freedom and deplorable human rights are a
fundamental reason for the suffering of all Burmese people
(displaced or not),the more immediate causes of the
humanitarian crisis facing the Burmese people are horrendous
health, sanitation, and educational deficiencies. These are
the issues that other bilateral donors are now addressing, in
some cases quite independently of the SPDC.


5. (C) Limiting before the fact any discussion to democracy
promotion programs seems to go against the managers' intent.
It also ignores the NLD leadership's previously expressed
ideas that "urgent needs of the people of Burma" go well
beyond such programs. The NLD leadership has welcomed U.S.
support for HIV/AIDS, childhood development programs,
environmental conservation, and protection of workers rights
inside the country. While none of these fits directly within
the limited definition of democracy and governance programs,
there's no question that all would reside on the list sought
by Congress of "urgent needs."


6. (C) A third argument for allowing more slack in the reins
is that by giving the NLD and its leadership more flexibility
to guide USG assistance efforts, the party will gain status
and credibility with the SPDC, hopefully convincing it of the
NLD's important and indispensable role in the future of the
country. As reported in Ref B, at the most recent ICG
meeting in Tokyo, U.N. Special Envoy Razali urged donors to
work closely with the NLD while developing aid programs
specifically as a way to build up ASSK and the NLD and
perhaps get the dialogue jump started. From the local angle,
U.S. assistance to NLD-promoted humanitarian projects will
help cement the role of the NLD as a party truly interested
in and dedicated to the "needs of the people."


7. (C) Action request: We urge the Department to return to
the Hill to revisit this matter with all/all authors of the
report language, to decide whether it's truly in USG
interests to put the democracy promotion limitation on the
consultative process before we've heard what the NLD has to
say. We propose instead to approach the NLD and its
leadership with the broader aim of identifying programs that
address the urgent needs of the people (as requested by the
report language) and also scrupulously avoid "providing
direct support to the SPDC" and its affiliated organizations.
Martinez