Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03RANGOON271
2003-02-28 10:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

BURMA'S BANKS: HOPING FOR THE BEST, EXPECTING THE

Tags:  EFIN PREL ECON BM 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000271 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EB
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2013
TAGS: EFIN PREL ECON BM
SUBJECT: BURMA'S BANKS: HOPING FOR THE BEST, EXPECTING THE
WORST

REF: A. RANGOON 249 AND PREVIOUS


B. RANGOON 30

Classified By: DCM Ron McMullen for Reasons 1.5 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000271

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EB
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2013
TAGS: EFIN PREL ECON BM
SUBJECT: BURMA'S BANKS: HOPING FOR THE BEST, EXPECTING THE
WORST

REF: A. RANGOON 249 AND PREVIOUS


B. RANGOON 30

Classified By: DCM Ron McMullen for Reasons 1.5 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: Week two of the banking crisis started with
grand hopes of a resolution to liquidity problems, but closed
with little change in the overall situation. The GOB started
the week strong, with the apparent extension of Central Bank
loans on the 24th, but remained disturbingly silent and
inactive the rest of the week. Banks continue to hemorrhage
deposits, and are maintaining, and in some cases reducing,
their withdrawal limits. Despite a stalled economy, and
without significant assistance from the banks, companies
scrimped and saved to ensure payday passed on the 28th with
no apparent disruption. However, it appears employers may
have used up their last reserves to meet payroll, and may
have little left to face any future shocks. End summary.

Banks Still in Doldrums


2. (C) Rumors at the beginning of the week that Burma's
private banks would lift their weekly withdrawal limits by
February 26 proved to be greatly exaggerated. It is clear
that some private banks are having more trouble than others,
but all are in increasingly desperate straits. All private
banks maintained withdrawal ceilings throughout the week.
However, until February 27, some were still able to provide
500,000 kyat (about $500) per week to customers. By fiat of
the Myanmar Banking Association, as of February 27 all banks
were told to reduce their weekly limits to no more than
100,000 kyat (though some banks were reportedly only able to
provide 50,000 kyat per customer/week). Bankers report
dismal conditions at branches across Burma, though the
tightest situations remain in Rangoon and Mandalay.


3. (C) According to our calculations, over the course of this
week the combination of tokens and withdrawal limits applied
by the banks allowed for withdrawals of at most 30 billion
kyat. In fact, banking sources say that net outflows were
likely quite close to the full 30 billion -- a bad sign for
the banks. AWB, KBZ, and the other large banks have been

willing in a very few cases to lift their withdrawal limits
slightly for major depositors who needed emergency cash to
meet their payrolls. However, the amounts that the banks
actually allowed to be withdrawn were reportedly far lower
than their customers demanded. Two bankers reported that
military intelligence insisted on vetting all requests for
emergency withdrawals, approving very few.


4. (C) On the plus side, bankers reported some return of
deposits (mostly into so-called "guaranteed" accounts).
However, the number of returnees was relatively
insignificant. Likewise, businesspeople report that the
banks asked borrowers to repay immediately between 25-40
percent of their outstanding balances. However, business and
banking sources have told us that borrowers have no ability
to repay since commerce has slowed to a halt and companies
are conserving every kyat on hand to pay employees and other
current expenses. We've heard rumors as well that banks have
sold or are trying to sell some of their real assets in an
effort to bolster cash reserves.


5. (C) All in all, the total estimated withdrawals this week
make the total outflow over the last two weeks roughly 230
billion kyat (about 200 percent of estimated cash on hand in
all private banks at the beginning of the crisis). In
response, the GOB this week reportedly extended 33 billion
kyat in loans to the three most troubled banks (AWB, Yoma,
KBZ). The Central Bank also allegedly loaned 20 billion kyat
to three second-tier banks (MUB, MOB, and Mayflower).
However, comments from some bankers (including Yoma Bank's
General Manager) have raised some questions as to whether all
of these Central Bank advances ever were actually made.

Wages Will Be Paid, But No Thanks to Banks


6. (C) The limited exceptions to the withdrawal limits
described above were not adequate to bail out most companies
facing payroll on February 28. Despite this, businesspeople
were nervously optimistic that they would be able to pay
their workers on time. Garment firms, and other
export-oriented industries, are paid in foreign exchange.
These industries have cashed in some of their dollar reserves
(at a relatively poor exchange rate) to get enough kyat to
pay salaries. Other firms with kyat revenues are following
the same model, cashing in real assets or borrowing money
from private lenders using these assets as collateral.
Traders are cutting back on their purchases this week, at a
cost to commerce, in order to conserve cash for payday. The
bottom line as of the end of February 28th, is that we've not
seen or heard any evidence that employers have failed to meet
their obligations.


7. (C) The mad dash to cash in dollars combined with people's
high expectations and the disappointing reality have had a
strong impact on the dollar/kyat market. After dipping
briefly to 800 kyat last week, the dollar recovered on
expectations of firm government action, back up to 1060 on
February 25. When withdrawal limits did not come off, and
when employers realized they were on their own, the dollar's
value dropped rapidly to 950 kyat/dollar on February 27,
where it remained through February 28.

How Long Can it Last?


8. (C) Economists, bankers, and businesspeople are unclear
how long the crisis will last, though there is no optimism
that a solution is in the offing. Though Burma has suffered
nearly every economic indignity imaginable, a banking crisis
is relatively uncharted waters. Bankers continue to hope
that at a minimum the GOB will be willing to add new money to
meet demands for liquidity. Even the most optimistic
observers, though, are less sure that the government will
take the correct steps to fully heal the patient (e.g., by
liberalizing the conditions under which the banks operate)
when and if the bleeding is stanched.
Martinez