Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03RANGOON213
2003-02-19 04:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

BURMA'S BANKS CRASH

Tags:  EFIN BM 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000213 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP AND EB
TREASURY FOR OASIA
CDR PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2013
TAGS: EFIN BM
SUBJECT: BURMA'S BANKS CRASH

REF: A. RANGOON 0030

B. 02 RANGOON 0938

C. 02 RANGOON 0554

Classified By: CDA, a.i. Ron McMullen. Reason: 1.5 (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000213

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP AND EB
TREASURY FOR OASIA
CDR PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2013
TAGS: EFIN BM
SUBJECT: BURMA'S BANKS CRASH

REF: A. RANGOON 0030

B. 02 RANGOON 0938

C. 02 RANGOON 0554

Classified By: CDA, a.i. Ron McMullen. Reason: 1.5 (d).


1. (C) Summary: Burma's expected banking crisis is no longer
pending; it's here. According to bankers in Rangoon,
depositors withdrew more than one-quarter of their deposits
with Burma's private banks during the week ending February
14, following revelations of connections between the private
banks and a set of unofficial financial institutions which
collapsed en masse at the end of January. The banks have
imposed restrictions on withdrawals and appealed to the
government through Secretary 1 for support. Indications are
that the government will step in with the supply of needed
liquidity, but, as of close of business February 19, no plan
commensurate with the problem had yet been announced. End
Summary.


2. (C) The long expected crisis in the Burmese banking sector
(reftels) hit last week. Martin Pun, the General Manager of
one of Burma's largest private banks (Yoma Bank),told the
DCM on February 16 that depositors had withdrawn more than a
quarter of their deposits with Burma's private banks during
the week ending February 14. According to Pun, a total of
some 70 billion kyat (about USD 70 million) was withdrawn,
with 19 billion kyat going out the doors on February 14
alone. Hardest hit was Asia Wealth Bank (AWB),the largest
of Burma's private banks. Over the weekend, private banks
met and agreed to place concerted limits on all withdrawals.
Starting February 17, all private banks will allow
withdrawals of only 500,000 kyat/week from checking and
savings accounts. They also appealed to Secretary 1 for
central bank support and an effective government guarantee of
all deposits in the private banks. Reportedly, the
government has agreed to provide support, but has not yet
issued a public announcement regarding its plans. Meanwhile,
concerns remain as to whether banks will be able to meet the
public's demand for cash as the week goes on.


3. (C) Behind all of these developments was the collapse at
the end of January of several unofficial financial
institutions (Arrow, Aye Yar Myay, Ngwe Zone, Kahing Marlar,
and others) who took loans and deposits against promises of
returns of 5 to 10 percent/month. These institutions had

flourished by investing in real assets during the high
inflation days of 2001 and 2002, but had been caught out by
tighter government enforcement of banking rules, the
stabilization of the kyat over the past 6 months at a rate of
about 1,100 kyat/dollar, and a flattening out of the asset
price inflation which had carried them to profits during the
previous two years. No longer able to deliver the returns
they promised, these institutions either folded or, in the
case of the few that still remain standing, unilaterally
placed restrictions on payments out.


4. (C) Unfortunately for the private banks, several of these
unofficial financial institutions were their clients. In
particular, Arrow was affiliated with AWB, and its collapse
precipitated the run, first on AWB, then on all the private
banks. The run started slowly at the beginning of February,
but rapidly gained momentum, cresting on February 14. Even
now there are signs that the panic is not over. On February
17 and 18, there were crowds at several banks and others (AWB
and Myanmar Universal Bank) had effectively closed to the
public and gone to an appointment system for depositors
seeking funds. While there has been no serious violence as
yet, public frustration is building. On February 18 and 19,
in fact, there were reports of stone-throwing at several
locations.


5. (C) As yet, however, it is still not clear who the public
will hold responsible for this fiasco. In some ways, of
course, the government is obviously to blame. It created the
repressed financial system and rip-roaring inflation that set
the conditions for the growth of the unofficial financial
institutions that have now collapsed. It also licensed many
of those companies, albeit not for banking operations. In
addition, it was obviously lax in its supervision of the
banks, who were allowed to lend freely (and imprudently) to
companies involved in blatantly illegal operations. Finally,
its response to the crisis has left a lot to be desired.
Even as of close of business on February 18; i.e., three
weeks after the start of the run, the government had still
not issued any public statement re-assuring depositors or
guaranteeing financial support for the banks.


6. (C) That said, the private banks will not escape blame.
When all is said and done, they did the dirty work. They
were the ones who took deposits in good faith and then lent
those deposits on to companies whose operations were not even
legal, much less viable in the long term. They may also be
the ones who pay the highest price for this fiasco. If they
survive at all, they will end up propped up by government
money and dependent on the government for their continued
survival. They may also be obliged to endure much closer
government supervision of their management of funds, which
could be embarrassing for many of the private bank managers.


7. (C) It also remains to be seen what impact this crisis
will have on real output and prices in Burma. Restricted
credit should hit both, but if the government steps in to
meet the liquidity needs of the private banks, we could see a
sharp fall in the exchange rate (as cash holders move their
withdrawn funds offshore) and a spike in the inflation rate,
depending on how quickly and completely the government makes
up for the banks' lost deposits. However, even that effect
may be muted, if the government trails the rate of
withdrawals (as it should),forces some banks out of business
(like AWB) and encourages the rest to clean up their lending
acts. Added to this will be the impact of the collapse of
the unofficial financial institutions whose operations
assumed huge proportions over the past three years.
Reportedly, those institutions ran up assets and liabilities
totaling over 200 billion kyat over the past three years.
Now, with their collapse, that whole unofficial credit
creation system will be wiped away. That alone will have an
impact on prices and output in Burma, regardless of how well
or badly the government handles the banking crisis.
McMullen